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ABSTRACT 
 
HOUSEHOLDS IN OTTOMAN POLITICS: THE RIVALRY BETWEEN HUSREV 
MEHMED PASHA AND MEHMED ALI PASHA OF EGYPT 
 
by 
Azize F. Çakır 
 
History, M.A. Thesis, Spring 2013 
Thesis Supervisor: Yusuf Hakan Erdem 
 
 
This thesis aims to present an analysis of households in the Ottoman politics through 
rivalry of Husrev Mehmed Pasha and Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt. Especially with the 
adoption of tax-farming system, households of the Ottoman ruling elite began to assume 
former functions of timar and devşirme systems as well as the palace school. Parallel to this 
development, the forming or the attachment to a powerful household became a necessity for 
the Ottoman bureaucrats for both obtaining office in the Ottoman administration and for 
gathering influence and wealth. Accordingly, intra-elite rivalries of factions formed around 
households and patronage networks left its mark on the Ottoman politics. One of the most 
important intra-elite rivalries in the first half of the nineteenth century was the contestation 
between Husrev Mehmed Pasha and Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt. In this period, the Egyptian 
Question, the Morea Campaign, the military modernization, the Syrian Campaigns of 
Mehmed Ali, promulgation and implementation of Tanzimat were leading issues in Ottoman 
politics. Since the rivalry between Husrev Mehmed Pasha and Mehmed Ali Pasha had 
considerable impact on the course of all these events, this thesis focuses on their interactions 
to create a better understanding of interconnectedness during the late Ottoman period. 
 
Keywords: households, intra-elite contestations, Husrev Mehmed Pasha, Mehmed Ali Pasha 
of Egypt 
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ÖZET 
 
OSMANLI SİYASETİNDE HANELER: HUSREV MEHMED PAŞA İLE MISIR VALİSİ 
MEHMED ALİ PAŞA ARASINDAKİ REKABET 
 
Azize F. Çakır 
 
Tarih, Master Tezi, Bahar 2013 
Tez Danışmanı: Yusuf Hakan Erdem 
 
 
Bu tez, Husrev Mehmed Paşa ile Mısır Valisi Mehmed Ali Paşa arasındaki rekabet 
üzerinden hanelerin Osmanlı siyasetindeki yerini analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Osmanlı 
yönetici zümresinin haneleri özellikle de iltizam sistemine geçişten sonra, tımar ve devşirme 
sistemlerinin yanı sıra saray okulunun da işlevlerini bünyelerinde toplamaya başlamışlardır. 
Bu gelişmeyle birlikte, güçlü bir hane kurmak ya da güçlü bir hamiye sahip olmak, Osmanlı 
imparatorluk sistemi içinde güvenli bir mevki, nüfuz ve zenginlik edinmenin temel 
şartlarından biri olmuş ve haneler ile intisab ilişkileri etrafında şekillenen kişisel çatışmalar 
Osmanlı siyasetine damgasını vurmuştur. 19.yy’ın ilk yarısında, Osmanlı siyasetini belirleyen 
en büyük elitler arası çatışmalardan biri Husrev Mehmed Paşa ile Mısır Valisi Mehmed Ali 
Paşa arasında yaşanmıştır. Mısır Sorunu, Mora Seferi, askeri modernleşme, Mehmed Ali 
Paşa’nın Suriye Seferleri, Tanzimat’ın ilanı ve reformların uygulanması gibi bu dönemin en 
önemli olaylarında belirleyici bir rol oynayan bu çatışmayı incelemek, bahsi geçen olayların 
birbirleriyle ilişkisini ortaya çıkarmaya da yardımcı olacaktır.  
 
Anahtar kelimeler: haneler, elitler arası çatışmalar, Husrev Mehmed Paşa, Mısır Valisi 
Mehmed Ali Paşa 
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Introduction 
 
 
The first four decades of the long nineteenth-century Ottoman politics witnessed the 
challenge of Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt. Many historians1 focus on the relation between the 
Ottoman Empire and the European Powers while analyzing this internationalized crisis. 
Focusing on the international aspect, these researchers put forth the power shifts between the 
European Powers and the Porte, and their impacts on the latter. Although very insightful, they 
give scant attention to the internal dynamics of the Ottoman administration. A more complete 
research needs to focus not only the external but also internal factors. A closer look to the 
internal dynamics illuminates the importance of the intra-elite rivalries among the Ottoman 
ruling elites, as well as the struggle between them and the sultan. Indeed, these rivalries had a 
decisive influence in the development of the leading issues of the Ottoman politics. 
The literature on intra-elite struggles shed lights on the different patterns of 
contestation among the members of the Ottoman ruling class. Some scholars take these 
struggles as contestation between the center and periphery; others emphasize the conflict 
between those who belong to the palace culture and those who belong to the culture of 
province; or between reformist and traditionalist bureaucrats.2 Still others emphasize 
struggles among the Ottoman elites of different ethnic-regional and religious origins or the 
conflicts between the members of different departments of the Ottoman administration.3 
Although the rivalries can be resulted from such group affiliations such as reformist vs. 
                                                             
1 Schroeder W. Paul, The Transformation of Eurpoean Politics 1763-1848, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994; 
Clayton, G.D., Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli, University of London Press, 1971;  
Cunningham Allan, Eastern Question in the Nineteenth Century, Collected Essays: Vol. II, Edward Ingram (ed), 
Frank Class, London, 1993 
2 For the view of conflict among people of palace culture and those of provincial culture see., Mardin, Şerif, 
“Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire,” in Comparative Studies in Society and History, 
vol.11, no.3 (June 1969), pp.258-281 and for the view of struggle among province and center see.,  Hanioğlu, 
Şükrü, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, Princeton University Press, 2008; for the debate of 
reformist and traditionalist Ottoman elite see., Berkez, Niyazi, Development of Secularism in Turkey, 
Routledge, NY, 1998 
3 For the contestation of Balkan-stock bureaucrats (Westerners) and Caucasian-stock bureaucrats (Easterners) 
see., Kunt, İbrahim Metin, “Ethnic-Regional (Cins) Solidarity in the Seventeenth-Century Ottoman 
Establishment,” in International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 5, no.3 (Jun., 1974)., pp.233-239; for the 
contestation between Muslim and non-Muslim bureaucrats, see., Lybyer, Albert Howe, The Government of the 
Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificient, Harvard University Press, 1993 and for its critics 
see., Itzkowitz, Norman, “Eighteenth Century Ottoman Realities,” in Studia Islamica, no. 16 (1962), pp. 73-94 
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traditionalist or center vs. periphery, there have been times where the elite struggles within 
the same group take hand in shaping the unfolding of certain events such as the contestations 
among the reformist cadre of Selim III themselves.4 Indeed, these groups do not exemplify a 
monolithic structure and one needs to go beyond them to have a more nuanced account of the 
Ottoman politics at that period. This thesis takes the intra-elite struggle in the first four 
decades of the nineteenth-century Ottoman politics as household-centered personal rivalries. I 
am not the first to employ the household as a tool for historical inquiry.5 There are many 
other historians who explain both the empowerment of the Ottoman ruling elite and their 
contestation among each other through the household (kapu/kapu halkı or hane/hane halkı) 
and the patronage (intisab) relations. A literature survey of some of these studies would help 
us to question whether the concept of household may be used to understand the complex 
power relations underlying the Ottoman politics. 
Metin Kunt’s study of The Sultan’s Servants The Transformation of Ottoman 
Provincial Government, 1550-1650 published in 1983.6 In this work, Kunt analyzes career 
backgrounds and service term of the ümerâ (sancakbegi and beylerbegi). For the period of 
                                                             
4  For a detailed analysis see., Shaw, Stanford J, Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Selim III 
1789-1807, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971, pp.366-377 
5  For the rise of vizier and pasha households in the Ottoman Imperial system, see., Kunt, Metin, The Sultan’s 
Servants The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650, Columbia University Press, NY, 
1983; Abou-el-Hajj, Rıfaat Ali, “The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households 1683-1703: A Preliminary Report,” in 
Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol.94, no.4 (Oct.-Dec., 1974), pp. 438-447.For the growing 
interaction of the Ottoman central army members  with the rising households of jurists and viziers  after the 
adoption of tax-farming system see., Tezcan, Baki, The Second Empire: the Political and Social Transformations 
in the Early Modern World, Cambridge University Press, 2010. For the provincial households see., Toledano, 
Ehud, “the Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites (1700-1900): A Framework for Research,” in I. Pappe and M. 
Ma’oz (eds), Politics and Ideas: A History from Within, London,Tauris, 1997, pp.145-162.;  Akdağ Mustafa, Türk 
Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası (Celâli İsyanları), YKY, İstanbul, 2013.; Hathaway, Jane, The Politics of 
Households in Ottoman Egypt The Rise of Qazdaglıs, Cambridge University Press, GB, 1997.; T. Shuval, “Cezayiri 
Garp: Bringing Algeria Back into Ottoman History,” New Perspectives on Turkey, vol.22 (2000),pp. 85-114; 
Shuval, “Households in Ottoman Algeria” Turkish Studies Association Bulletin 24/1 (2000),pp.41-64; for the 
household-building and networking activities of the Ottoman dynastic women and harem staff see., Pedani, 
Maria Pia, “Safiye's Household and Venetian Diplomacy,” Turcica, vol.32 (2000), pp.9-32., and Pierce, Leslie, 
The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire, Oxford University Press, 1993.;  Kunt, 
Metin, “Kulların Kulları,” in Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Dergisi, vol.3, 1975. For the Ottoman princely household, see., 
Rhoads Murphey, Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty: Tradition, Image, and Practice in the Ottoman Imperial 
Household, 1400-1800, Continuum, London, and Kunt, Metin, “A Prince Goes Forth (Perchance to Return),” in 
Tezcan, Baki and Barbir Karl K. (ed.), Identity and Identity Formation in the Ottoman World, the University of 
Wisconcin Press, USA, 2007, pp.63-73. For the office-households of the Ottoman civil officers and the 
patronage relations of the scribes, see., Fleischer, Cornell H., Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman 
Empire: The Historian Mustafa Ali (1541-1600), Princeton University Press, 1986., and Findley, Carter V., 
Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922, Princeton University Press, 1980. 
For the marginalization of kapusuz people see., Barkey, Karen, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to 
State Centralization, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1997  
6 Kunt, Metin, The Sultan’s Servants The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650, 
Columbia University Press, NY, 1983 
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1550-1650, he uncovers three interrelated but distinct development: Protégés of leading 
bureaucrats at capital and graduates of the Palace schools began to take over provincial 
administration positions at higher ranks; the province replaced the district as the main 
administrative unit; household affiliations and patronage relations became dominant factor in 
this polity.7 He associates these developments and the growing importance of ümerâ 
households with obsolescence of timar system and its gradual replacement with tax-farming 
(iltizam) system. He then touches upon how the Porte’s growing reliance on households of 
high-ranking bureaucrats in gathering soldiers and in levying taxes brought about the 
dilemma of ‘well-fitted out household’ (mükemmel kapu). Because slowing pace of territorial 
expansion, too many viziers and pashas began to compete for the same number of provincial 
posts and they spend more and more time between appointments. They, at the same time, had 
to maintain a large household even they were out of office because appointments went to 
pashas and viziers who had a well-fitted out household.8 Kunt then shows efforts of the 
Ottoman administration to supplement the ümerâ incomes vis-à-vis the dilemma of well-
fitted out household such as assignment of fiefs directly to the member of viziers and pashas 
households and distribution of vacant timars to them.9 Kunt thus reveals how the large part of 
the imperial revenues was tied to political struggles with the rise of households, both as a 
requirement of running state affairs and as a political necessity in obtaining an appointment.10 
Rıfaat Ali Abou-el-Hajj, in his article of “The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households 
1683-1703: A Preliminary Report”, deals with the increasing importance of the vizier and 
pasha households in the late 17th century and explores the growth and continued political 
dominance of Grand Vizier Köprülü Mehmed Pasha’s household.11 He associates the 
beginning of growing influence of the vizier and pashas of the central administration with the 
transfer of grand vizierate outside the palace in 1654.12 His study illuminates the finding that 
by the second half of the 17th century, nearly half of all appointments for high offices in the 
capital as well in the provinces were staffed by men who had been raised, trained or attached 
to the households of vizier and pashas.13 He proposes that this growing preponderance of the 
households of the leading bureaucrats was a sign of both the decline in the personal rule of 
                                                             
7   Kunt, The Sultan’s Servants, p.95 
8   Ibid. 
9   Ibid., pp.84-85 
10  Ibid., p.99 
11 Abou-el-Hajj, Rıfaat Ali, “The Ottoman Vezir and Paşa Households 1683-1703: A Preliminary Report,” in 
Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol.94, no.4 (Oct.-Dec., 1974), pp. 438-447 
12  Ibid., p.439 
13  Ibid., p.438 
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the sultan and the down-grading of the palace as the sole training ground for public 
administrative experience.14 Regarding its impact on the personalization of the Ottoman 
politics, he argues that the sultan’s denial of de jure and therefore institutional recognition of 
the enhanced position of vizier and pasha households kept them in a precious state and 
predisposed “the internal political history of the state to potentially violent struggles for 
ascendancy during political crises”.15  
Jane Hathaway’s book of The Politics of Households in the Ottoman Egypt: The Rise 
of Qazdağlıs questions pattern of rupture and continuity between the institutions of Mamluk 
sultanate and Ottoman Egypt’s military elite of seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.16 In her 
revisionist interpretation, Hathaway expands the definition of household by including power 
relations of regimental leaders into the new concept of ‘barrack-household’.17 Based on the 
official documents –such as register of salaries- and chronicles, Hathaway shows that 
household membership overshadowed slave status in identifying a person’s position in 
Egyptian military society by the late 17th century and since then soldiers was defined by the 
patron of a household they followed.18 I think that her thesis is useful to reveal the household-
building strategies of Mehmed Ali Pasha before he acquired the post of the governor of 
Egypt. 
Carter Vaughn Findley has published two books and many articles emphasizing 
particular importance of the ‘patrimonial households’ in the organization of the Ottoman 
social and political life by employing the patrimonial model of Weber .19 After defining the 
palace of the sultan as ‘metaphoric integration of the entire state into a single household 
                                                             
14  Ibid., p.443 
15  Ibid. 
16 Hathaway, Jane, The Politics of Households in Ottoman Egypt The Rise of Qazdaglıs, Cambridge University 
Press, GB, 1997.; and see also, “Rewriting Eighteenth-Century Ottoman History” in A. Singer (ed.), New 
Historiographies of the Ottoman Mediterranean World,  special issue of Mediterranean Historical Review 19/1 
(2004), pp.28-52; “The Household: An Alternative Framework for the Military Society of Eighteenth Century 
Ottoman Egypt” in K. Fleet (ed.), Oriento Moderno 18/1 (1999), pp.57-66; “Military Household in Ottoman 
Egypt,” in International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol.27, no.1 (Feb., 1995), pp.39-52 
17 Hathaway, Jane, “Military Household in Ottoman Egypt,” in International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 
vol.27, no.1 (Feb., 1995), pp.39-52, pp.41-3 
18 Ibid., 39-52, p. 43 
19 Findley, Carter V, “Political Culture and the Great Households,” in Suraiya N. Faroqhi (ed.), The Cambridge 
History of Turkey: Volume 3, The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603—1839, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 
pp.65-81; “Patrimonial Household Organization and Factional Activity in the Ottoman Ruling Class,” in Halil 
inalcık, Osman Okyar, and Ü. Nalbantoğlu (eds), Türkiye’nin Sosyal ve Ekonomik Tarihi (1071-1920), Ankara, 
1980; Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922, Princeton University Press, 
1980; Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History, Princeton Universty Press, 1981; “Factional Rivalries in 
Ottoman Istanbul: the Fall of Pertev Paşa, 1837,” in International Journal of Turkish Studies, vol 10, pp.127-134.  
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establishment’ he explains how the elite households divided by factional rivalries began to 
contest with the power of the sultan.20 From Findley’s point of view, the concentration of the 
dynastic life into the palace, the adoption of the principle of seniority in succession, and thus 
growing influence of the vâlide sultan gave rise to the palace factions rooting on the alliances 
of the sultan’s son-in-law (damad) with dynastic figures and the palace staff.21 Apart from the 
palace groups, he analyzes office-households within the civil bureaucracy and states that  
One of the most prominent features of the traditional scribal career 
patterns was the politicization of the higher ranks. This phenomenon had 
many dimensions. The most distinctive, in culturally conservative 
patrimonial polity, was the political activity revolved around issues of 
personality and unconditioned persona loyalty, rather than substantive policy 
questions. This personalization of politics produced a pattern of factionalism 
organized around the households and patronage-networks of prominent 
figures…Polity issues and inter-service rivalries were often at work in 
factional conflicts, but tended to remain secondary to issues of personal 
loyalty.22 
 
Within this framework in mind, I attempt to analyze the rivalry between Husrev 
Mehmed Pasha and Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt by taking household as a tool for my 
historical analysis.23 A closer look to the interaction of these pashas illustrates a highly 
personalized form of politics in the first half of the nineteenth century, which supports the 
above-cited literature analyzing the empowerment and the contestations of the ruling elites 
                                                             
20 Findley, Carter V, “Political Culture and the Great Households,” in Suraiya N. Faroqhi (ed.), The Cambridge 
History of Turkey: Volume 3, The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603—1839, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 
pp.65-81, p.66  
21 Ibid. 
22 Findley, Carter Vaughn, “Factional Rivalries in Ottoman Istanbul: the Fall of Pertev Paşa, 1837,” in 
International Journal of Turkish Studies, vol 10, pp.127-134, p.127. 
23 Husrev Mehmed Pasha (1756-1855) was Abkazian-stock slave who entered the palace service through his 
master çavuşbaşı Said Efendi’s connections. In the reign of Selim III (1789-1807), he rose in rank and was 
integrated into the Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin Pasha’s household. In 1801, he was sent to Egypt as a part of 
military campaign against the French invasion and after his military success he was bestowed the rank of vizier 
and appointed as governor of this province. There, he attempted to form a modern army to strengthen 
Ottoman position against local power blocks and irregular Balkan troops among which Mehmed Ali Pasha, an 
Albanian irregular soldier, posed a prominent challenge. In the following days, Mehmed Ali Pasha obtained the 
administration of Egypt and forced Husrev Pasha to leave the province. After several provincial tasks in the 
Balkan region, Husrev Mehmed Pasha was entrusted with military operation during the Ottoman-Russo War of 
1806-1812 and obtained the rank of grand admiral in 1811 and 1822 where he and Mehmed Ali Pasha’s son 
İbrahim Pasha administered a naval operation initiated against the Greek Rebellion. In the following years, 
Husrev Mehmed dealt with formation of the new army (Asâkir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye) and strengthened 
his position by placing his men into various posts in the army, navy and central administration –including grand 
vizierate- while Mehmed Ali Pasha established very effective administration in Egypt and in the 1830s, he 
attempted to expand his rule over Syria and Adana. For detailed biography see, İnalcık, Halil. “Husrev Paşa.” İA 
(MEB) vol. V/I, pp.609-916, and  Toledano, E.R., “Muhammad ʿAli Pasha,” EI.2, vol.VII, pp. 423-431 
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through households. In the same line with Toledano, I take the power-elite status of the 
Ottomans as the status of those who are office-holders within the Ottoman Imperial 
household.24 After Husrev Mehmed Pasha and Mehmed Ali Pasha became the members of 
the Ottoman ruling elite with the mediation of their masters, they built their own households 
through which they did not only interact among each other but with the different segments of 
the Ottoman Empire which growingly interact with the European Powers. That is why I 
analyze their interaction at the juncture of these intertwined power relations.  
Before questioning the interaction between Husrev Mehmed Pasha and Mehmed Ali 
Pasha, I first contextualize the relations of the Ottoman Empire with the European Powers of 
that period. This contextualization is crucial in the sense that it provides the widest 
framework for the research in hand. To start with, the French Revolutionary Wars marked the 
beginning of new relations between the Ottoman Empire and the European Powers. France 
had began to threaten the European monarchies especially after issuing the Decree of 
Fraternity –promising to spread revolution into other countries – in 1792 and asserting a right 
to reach its ‘natural frontiers’ in the following year.25 Then, its ongoing war with Austria and 
Prussia was extended to Britain, Low Countries, and Spain – the members of the First 
Coalition – whose disunity resulted in the victory of France: Preoccupation of Russia, 
Austria, and Prussia with the partition of Poland left Britain alone vis-à-vis the French until 
the formation of the Second Coalition  in 1798.26 This war also brought about the change in 
the art of warfare: Unlike traditional dynastic wars, this was ‘people’s wars’ based on the 
concept of ‘the nation in arms’.27 It is also important to note that Napoleon Bonapart’s 
military career owed much to this shift, opening the army to new and talented officers.28 With 
the military reform of 1793, the Revolutionary regime of France began to increase the size of 
its army dramatically by expanding the conscription to the whole population of the country 
and managed to supplement its larger army through its growing military industry.29 As a 
result, War of the First Coalition (1792-1797) ended up with the decisive victory and 
territorial expansion of France that was recognized in the Treaty of Basle by Prussia and 
                                                             
24 Toledano, Ehud, “the Emergence of Ottoman-Local Elites (1700-1900): A Framework for Research,” in I. 
Pappe and M. Ma’oz (eds), Politics and Ideas: A History from Within, London:Tauris, 1997, 145-162, pp.150-
159. 
25  Chapman, Tim, The Congress of Vienna: Origins, Processes and Results, Routledge, London, 1998, p.9 
26  Ibid. 
27  Wright, D.G., Napoleon and Europe, Pearson Education Limited, London, 1984, pp.5-6 
28  Chapman, The Congress of Vienna: Origins, Processes and Results, p.9 
29  Ibid., p.10 
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Spain and then by the Austrians in the Treat of Campo Formio on 18 October 1797.30 After 
then, France diverted its attention to Britain which was now left to fight on alone.  
In July 1797, Talleyrand, Foreign Minister of France, gave a public lecture on “The 
Advantages of Acquiring New Colonies” and proposed that France should find new colonies 
to replace those it had lost to Britain in the West Indies and he identified Egypt as a suitable 
substitute.31 When this plan was realized through the Napoleon’s expedition of Egypt in 
1798, the Ottoman Empire made an alliance with Britain and Russia (the Triple Alliance) and 
became a member of the Second Coalition.32 In the first military action of the Second 
Coalition War, a joint Ottoman-Russo fleet was sent to the Ionian Islands under the French 
occupation.33 Then the British forces landed to Egypt as an ally of the Porte against the 
French.  
Considering that European had been driven out of Egypt and Palestine in 1291, the 
Napoleon expedition of Egypt was, actually, the end of nearly 500 years of non-involvement 
of the Europeans with the North Africa and the Levant as Biger states.34 In the following 
years, the European intervention to these regions and to the affairs of the Ottoman Empire 
grew dramatically; In 1820s, they were involved with the Greek Revolt; in 1830, France 
seized over the Ottoman Algeria and in 1840, a coalition of European armies fought together 
with the Sultan against Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt.35 In fact one year before this military 
operation, the Sultan demanded from the European Powers to force Mehmed Ali Pasha to 
accept the following demands:  
to restore the Imperial fleet; to renounce his pretentions to the 
hereditary government of Syria; to adopt more reasonable views with regard 
to the change of the Viziral office, -a change which depends entirely upon 
the will of His Highness; to cease endeavoring to stir up disorders; to agree 
                                                             
30  Doyle, William, The Oxford History of the French Revolution (second edition), Oxford University Press, 2002, 
p.213-7. According to the Treaty of Campo Formio, Austria ceded Belgium to France and recognized its rule 
over Bologna, Modena, Ferrara, and the Romanga and the Venetian Republic was partitioned as that France 
took the Ionia Islands while the Austrians took Istria and Dalmatia as well as Venice. 
31 Shosenberg, James W., “The Battle of Pyramids: Futile Victory,” in Aryeh Shmuelevitz (ed.), Napoleon and 
the French in Egypt and the Holy Land 1798-1801 (Articles Presented at the 2nd International Congress of 
Napoleonic Studies), The Isıs Press, Istanbul, pp.235-253, p.236. 
32 Sakul, Kahraman, An Ottoman Global Moment: War of Second Coalition in the Levant, Unpublished PhD 
thesis, Georgetown University, 2009, pp.13-15 
33  Ibid. 
34 Biger, Gideon, “Napoleon’s Expedition and the Return of Europe to the Middle East,” in Aryeh Shmuelevitz 
(ed.), Napoleon and the French in Egypt and the Holy Land 1798-1801 (Articles Presented at the 2nd 
International Congress of Napoleonic Studies), The Isıs Press, Istanbul, pp.75-89, p.75 
35  Ibid.  
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that this affair should be negotiated and arranged here, through the medium 
of the Five Powers.36 
 
This quotation illustrates that the Ottoman politics in that period was not only about the 
Ottoman-European interaction, crystallized around the Mehmed Ali Pasha crisis. A closer 
look to the demands suggests that the rivalries between Husrev Mehmed, Mehmed Ali and 
Ahmet Fevzi Pasha deeply affected the course of Egypt crisis: the Ottoman Imperial fleet 
were brought to Egypt by Grand Admiral Ahmed Fevzi Pasha as a reaction to the coup d’etat 
of Husrev Mehmed who captured the seal of the post of grand vizier in the succession 
ceremony of Abdülmecid.37 Mehmed Ali’s demand for the change of the Viziral office was 
also reaction to the overly empowerment of Grand Vizier Husrev Mehmed since he perceived 
him as the main obstacle for his hereditary claims over Syria.38  
These complex relations between Mehmed Ali Pasha, Husrev Mehmed Pasha and 
Ahmed Fevzi Pasha raise many questions about the positioning and interactions of the 
Ottoman bureaucrats during the first half of the 19th century: Which conditions led to such 
level of personalization of the Ottoman politics? How did Mehmed Ali Pasha concentrate 
such an extensive power against which the sultan had to ask help of the European Powers? 
How Mehmed Ali collaborated with Grand Admiral in regard to common hostility against 
Husrev Mehmed?  What was the origin of these hostilities? How Husrev managed to appoint 
himself as the grand vizier?  How the Sultan and his other bureaucrats reacted to Husrev’s 
coup d’etat? How intra-elite rivalries affected the running of the state affairs of the Porte in 
the first four decades of the 19th century? Did the rivalry of Husrev Mehmed and Mehmed 
Ali and their interaction with other leading Ottoman bureaucrats affect other issues in the 
Ottoman politics such as the Morea Campaign, the Syrian Campaigns of Mehmed Ali, 
promulgation of Tanzimant and the institutional modernization projects of the Porte? This 
thesis is motivated by these questions and attempts to answer them. 
In doing so, this thesis is organized in four chapters. The first chapter focuses on the 
household strategies of the sultan as macro sphere of the Ottoman intra-elite relations and 
                                                             
36 PP, 1841, XXIX, Ponsonby to Palmerston, 21 August 1839. Quoted in Kutluoğlu, Muhammed H., The Egyptian 
Question (1831-1841) The Expansionist Policy of Mehmed Ali Paşa in Syria and Asia Minor and the Reactions of 
the Sublime Porte, Eren Yayıncılık, 1998, p.146, fn.6 
37 Kutluoğlu, Muhammed H., The Egyptian Question (1831-1841) The Expansionist Policy of Mehmed Ali Paşa in 
Syria and Asia Minor and the Reactions of the Sublime Porte, Eren Yayıncılık, 1998, p.31 
38 Ibid., p.27 
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details how the Sultan organized their power relations through the distribute policy rooting on 
the division of tax-payer subject people and tax-exempted kuls. The chapter then analyzes the 
conditions which paved the way to the rise of ruling-elite households in this distributive 
policy and questions the impact of the replacement of timar system with tax-farming system. 
Then, it attempt to deal with the organization of ruling-elite households and their household-
building strategies.  
The second chapter details the power relations of Husrev Mehmed and Mehmed Ali in 
the context of the Ottoman Imperial campaign against the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt. 
Because this campaign became the first scene of their interaction, the chapter firstly studies 
the war strategies of Selim III. In doing so, it questions the impact of the war on the careers 
of the high-ranking bureaucrats who were in charge of the campaign. Then, it elaborates the 
interaction of both pashas with the local power holders of the region. Lastly, it tries to 
compare the household-building strategies of Husrev Mehmed and Mehmed Ali and search 
how the latter managed to seize the governorship of Egypt.  
The third chapter analyzes the interaction of Husrev Mehmed and Mehmed Ali within 
the period of the Greek Revolt of 1821 and in the First Syrian Campaign. It studies how the 
interaction of Mehmed Ali and Husrev Mehmed affected the course of the Morea Campaign. 
Then it attempts to detail the impact of the Morea Campaign and Mehmed Ali’s challenge 
over the military modernization of Mahmud II, and Husrev’s appointment to the post of 
serasker of the Mansure Army. 
The last chapter deals with the changing power balance between Mehmed Ali, Husrev 
Mehmed, and the Sultan and its transformative impact over the Ottoman administration from 
the beginning of the first Syrian Campaign to the London Agreement of 1840, with the 
special reference to the growing influence of the civil bureaucracy and representatives of 
European states. 
In conducting this research, I benefit from both primary and secondary sources. The 
primary sources are largely based on the general histories covering the first half of the 
nineteenth century in which Husrev Mehmed Pasha’s and Mehmed Ali Pasha’s rivalry takes 
place. First primary source I employ is the chronicles of Ahmed Cevdet Pasha. In his 
chronicle covering the period between 1774 and 1826, Ahmed Cevdet (1823-1895) narrates 
the ongoing events of that same period at the juncture of both European-Ottoman diplomacy 
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and the power relations within the Ottoman bureaucracy.39 Another chronicle which enables 
us to trace their interaction is that of Lütfi Efendi (1814-1907).40 Lütfi Efendi, the successor 
of Ahmed Cevdet in the post of official chronicler, helps to trace the relation between Husrev 
Mehmed and Mehmed Ali Pashas after the year of 1826. The Imperial Edicts of Selim III 
with his leading bureaucrats constitutes another primary source which helps us to grasp the 
ongoing power relations in Egypt between 1798 and 1805; the period in which Husrev 
Mehmed and Mehmed Ali first met each other.41 The edicts do this by covering the power 
relations surrounding the protector of Husrev Mehmed, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha. Finally, I 
employ Helmuth von Moltke’s travel account.42 Moltke, the Prussian instructor in the 
Mansure Army, lived through the period of military modernization during the Mahmud II’s 
era; traveled to many places within the Ottoman Empire and took an active duty in the 
Imperial Campaign. His narration, thus, helps us to trace the intra-elite struggles among the 
Ottoman bureaucrats and officers; the empowerment of Husrev Mehmed Pasha as serasker 
and the reaction of the people to both the ongoing modernization project and Husrev 
Mehmed’s extensive power.   
There are two critical secondary works that provide ways of thinking about how 
Husrev Pasha and Mehmed Ali perceived the other. Yüksel Çelik’s doctoral thesis on 
“Hüsrev Mehmed Paşa: Siyasi Hayatı ve Askeri Faaliyetleri (1756-1855)” has extensively 
drawn upon Ottoman archival documents and contemporary chronicles primarily for the 
career of Husrev Mehmed and his interaction both with members of his household and the 
other bureaucrats like Mehmed Ali.43 Likewise Khaled Fahmy’s seminal study, All the 
Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt, reveals Mehmed 
Ali’s household-building strategies and his relations with the Porte and Husrev Mehmed by a 
detailed analysis of Egyptian National Archives and diplomatic correspondence.44 The other 
critical secondary sources I employ are the studies of Stanford J. Shaw and Avigdor Levy 
which helps to analyze the intra-elite rivalries, of which Husrev Mehmed and Mehmed Ali 
                                                             
39  Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Tarih-i Cevdet, İstanbul, Matbaa-i Osmanî, 1309/1891-92 (tertib-i cedid) 
40 Ahmed Lûtfi, Vak’a-nüvis Ahmed Lütfi Efendi Tarihi, vol.IV-V and VI-VII-VIII (ed. Nuri Akbayar), Tarih Vakfı-
Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999 
41  Karal, Enver Ziya, Selim III’ün Hattı Hümayunları, TTK, Ankara, 1999 
42  Helmuth von Moltke, Türkiye’deki Durum ve Olaylar Üzerine Mektuplar, TTK Basımevi, 1960, Ankara 
43 Çelik, Yüksel, Hüsrev Mehmet Paşa; Siyasi Hayatı ve Askeri Faaliyetleri (1756-1855), PhD thesis, İstanbul 
Üniversitesi, 2005.  
44 Fahmy, Khaled, All the Pasha’s Men, Mehmed Ali, his army and the making of modern Egypt, Cambridge 
University Press, 1997 
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Pashas took part, during both the reign of Selim III and Mahmud II.45 Shaw demonstrates 
both solidarity and conflict patterns in the complex relation of the Ottoman ruling elite in the 
first half of the 19th century. He takes the view that Selim III secured his momentary power 
by splitting his reformist cadre intro rival factions and played them off against each other.46 
Like Shaw, Avigdor Levy shows how Mahmud II manipulated intra-elite rivalries in order to 
prevent empowerment of certain factions within the army and other state offices.47 Lastly, 
Muhammed Kutluoğlu’s study on the Egyptian Question covers interaction of Husrev 
Mehmed, Mehmed Ali, the leading Ottoman bureaucrats of time, and representatives of the 
European states at the juncture of the international diplomacy and internal power dynamics of 
the Porte.48 Having explained the structure of the thesis and the sources I employ, let us now 
turn to the theoretical framework which will helps to understand importance of the elite 
households in the Ottoman politics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
45 Shaw, Stanford J., Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Selim III 1789-1807, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971; Shaw Stanford J. and Shaw, Ezel Kaya, History of the Ottoman Empire 
and Modern Turkey, vol II: Reform, Revolution and Republic: the Rise of Modern Turkey, Cambridge University 
Press, 1978; Shaw, J. Stanford, “The Origins of Ottoman Military Reform: The Nizam-ı Cedid Army of Sultan III,” 
in The Journal of Modern History, vol.37, no.3, pp. 291-306; Shaw, Stanford J., “The Nizam-ı Cedid Army under 
Sultan Selim III 1789-1807,” in Oriens, vol.18/19 (1965-1966), pp.168-184 and Avigdor Levy, The Military Policy 
of Mahmud II, 1808-1839,  Unpublished PhD thesis, Harvard University, 1968; Levy, Avigdor, “The Officer Corps 
in Sultan Mahmud’s New Army, 1826-1839,” in International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol.2, no.1 (Jan, 
1971) 
46 Shaw Stanford J. and Shaw, Ezel Kaya, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol II: Reform, 
Revolution and Republic: the Rise of Modern Turkey, Cambridge University Press, 1978, p.273 
47 Shaw, Levy, Avigdor, “The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud’s New Army, 1826-1839,” in International Journal 
of Middle East Studies, vol.2, no.1 (Jan, 1971), pp. 21-39 
48 Kutluoğlu, Muhammed H., The Egyptian Question (1831-1841) The Expansionist Policy of Mehmed Ali Paşa in 
Syria and Asia Minor and the Reactions of the Sublime Porte, Eren Yayıncılık, 1998 
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Chapter I: The Sultan and His Servants 
 
I.1: The Formation of the House of Osman 
 
The analogy between family and nation occupies an extensive place in the discourse 
of nationalism. Theoreticians of nationalism, for example, constructed ‘imagined 
communities’ through familial references.49 Within this discourse, the family is perceived as 
an unchanging sphere of disinterested love and solidarity, the discourse of ‘fraternity’ is one 
conception of the family as evidence in one of three principles of the French Revolution.50 
Contrary to nation states/national discourse, pre-modern empires, on the other hand, did not 
need to construct a family image in order to unify its people since they had actual dynastic 
families around which the ruling elites and societies gathered. In this regard, Duindam 
emphasizes centrality of family and household in pre-modern period as that “at all level of 
societies, households shaped reproduction, socialization and interaction. In a large share of 
human society, political organization, too, arose primarily in the context of family and 
household. The hierarchical pre-eminence of a single family or clan, continuing its hold on 
power over generations, led to development of dynasties.”51 Whether being Ottoman, 
Habsburg, Ming, Tudor or Romanov, the dynastic family was in the very centre of the 
imperial structures as Duindam suggests. 
In the Ottoman case, servants of the dynastic household were kuls of the sultan, who 
mediated for their master’s relations with the rest of society and with other states in the 
administrative, fiscal, military, diplomatic, and judicial terms. Ottoman imperial structure 
depended on the division of tax-exempt ruling class (askerî) and tax-payer subject people 
(reâyâ). In the patrimonial framework, modeled on the supervision of the head of family over 
his household, the sultan was the head of dynastic family and members of ruling class were 
the servants of this family while subject people as well as state lands were seen as being 
                                                             
49 Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Verso, 
London and New York, 1991, pp.143-4 
50 Ibid.  
51 Duindam, Jeroen, Artan Tülay, and Kunt, Metin (eds), Royal Courts in Dynastic States and Empires; A Global 
Perspective, Brill, Boston, 2011, p.1 
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entrusted by God to the guardianship of the sultan.52 Regarding the hierarchy of the central 
administration, top level administrators of state departments represented the royal authority in 
the imperial council and after participating to council meetings they held councils in their 
own residences to organize affairs of their own office. Among these administrators, the grand 
vizier was the supreme representative of the sultan and his absolute deputy. Servants of the 
imperial household (askerîye) were classified under four categories: military-administrative 
service (seyfiyye), religious service (ulema); scribal service (kalemiye), and the palace 
service. To understand the interaction of these servants with the sultan and reâyâ, the 
Ottoman Circle of Justice may be used: 
It is justice which is necessary for the world; the world is a vineyard 
and its wall is the state; state is governed by the sharia; the sharia cannot be 
maintained without a king; the king cannot govern without soldiers; he 
cannot congregate soldiers without wealth; it is reaya who accumulate 
wealth; and its justice which makes the reaya the servants of the padişah of 
the universe.53 
  
As this formulation suggests, legitimacy of the sultan was rooted on his ability in distributing 
justice through the allocation of imperial tax sources collected from reâyâ to the expenses of 
askerîye who were supposed to maintain order and justice as representatives of the imperial 
household. Dirlik, i.e. livelihood, was the basic income for the members of askerîye class.  
Dirlik refers to the state revenues in a particular locality bestowed to an official who is 
obliged to collect those revenues and fines (niyabet) from reâyâ, supervised agricultural and 
economic activities and maintained public order within his place of duty.54 Varied in value 
and size, dirliks were grouped in three categories: timar with revenues up to 20.000 akçes, 
zeâmet from 20.000 to 100000 akçes and hâs with revenues over than 100.000 akçes. 
Regarding to the relations between these dirlik-holders, timar and zeâmet were self-contained 
administrative units in which the authority of their holder was coextensive with the limits of 
their dirliks as there was no hierarchical relation between them but with the governor of 
                                                             
52 Findley, Carter V., Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922, Princeton 
University Press, 1980, p.7 
53 Kınalızade’s formulation: “Adldir mucib-i cihan; cihan bir bagdir divarı devlet; devletin nazımı seri'attır; 
şeri'ata haris olamaz illa melik; melik zapteylemez illa lesker; leşkeri cem' edemez illa mal; mall cem' eyleyen 
re'ayadir; re'ayayı kul eder padişah-ı aleme 'adl” Qoted by Ergene, A. Boğaç, “On Ottoman Justice: 
Interpretations in Conflict (1600-1800)”, Islamic Law and Society, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2001), pp. 52-87, p.57 fn.13 
54 Kunt, Metin, The Sultan’s Servants The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650, 
Columbia University Press, NY, 1983, p.9 
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district, sancakbegi.55 In military terms, the sancakbegi was commander of the provincial 
cavalry, dirlik-holders of his sancak, who provided a fully equipped cavalry (cebelü) in return 
of income of each 3000 akçes for lower ranks and of 5000 akçes for holders of high dirliks. 
At the top of hierarchy, the governor of province (beylerbegi) supervised sancakbegis and 
because of difficulty in mobilizing troops in Europe and Asia simultaneously; two separate 
beylerbegiliks were formed in Rumeli and Anatolia. In the provincial administration, apart 
from officers of dirlik, representatives of legal-administrative system, kadıs in cities, zaîms or 
subaşıs in towns and in larger villages, served under the supervision of the two kadıaskers at 
the capital, one responsible for Rumelia and the other for Anatolia.56 
The imperial order (nizâm) was rooted on the continuity of this distributive 
system.Therefore social mobility between askerîye and reâyâ was subject to restriction. The 
central place of the sultan in this imperial order was supported by his religious titles and 
duties such as Protector of the Holy Cities, gazi, conqueror of infidel lands added to the 
adobe of Islam (dârülislâm), and caliph. Likewise, relics such as the Standard of Prophet, his 
Mantle and Sword played important roles in the legitimacy of the sultan especially in the 
accession ceremonies (cülus).57 As Findley states, the concept of sultan rooting on both the 
Iranian tradition of absolute kingship and the Turkic ideal of quasi-divine monarchy was, 
however, contradicting with the Islamic ideal of caliphate that was to compensate through 
ostentatious respect to Islamic law and religious-judicial scholars; unprecedented 
development of state’s legislative functions by means of the promulgation of kanunnâmeler; 
the sultan’s power to issue these codes extensively, and by the inclusion of religious-judicial 
scholars into the imperial apparatus.58 Apart from the religious and judicial services, the 
sultan and his servants interacted with the subject people in fiscal and military spheres as 
well. The house of the sultan, the Topkapı Palace, was the essential organizational unit for all 
these interactions. Besides, the education and training given in the palace played key role in 
the construction of kul identity. To understand social standing of these kuls, it seems now 
necessary to detail their way of inclusion to the Ottoman administration. 
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I.2: Recruitment of Kuls into the Imperial Household 
 
Formation of an alienated administrative-military bureaucracy seems to be one of the 
main concerns of the Ottoman governmentality. In this regard Kunt argues that caliphs and 
sultans -differently from their European counterparts relying on the main national element as 
administrative and military servants- opted for distancing themselves from the main ethnics 
groups in society by forming household troops composed of outsiders.59 Furthermore, these 
outsiders were imported as enslaved, deracinated warriors owing sole loyalty to their master 
that made them perfect troops for dynastic empires.60 Apart from this, nökership, a common 
practice among the Eurasian nomadic societies, was also developed by the house of Osman. 
Conscripted from nomadic groups, usually subdued tribes, the nökers (retainer or client) were 
free individuals who were trained and supported by the ruler and served him as bodyguards.61 
As Piterberg argues, the Mamluks and Ottomans brought perfection to nökership since they 
recruited nökers to their households as slaves. In this context, Kunt interprets the existence of 
a household cavalry’s section called gurebâ (outsiders/strangers) in the house of Osman as a 
continuation of the nöker-like phenomenon since majority of Osman’s household members 
were of kul origin.62 
 Concerning the origins of the ghulâm system practiced in the house of Osman, İnalcık 
argues that the principle of training young slaves for the service of palace and state was 
inherited from the Seldjuk Sultanate of Rum. However, the Ottomans, unlike Seldjuks 
employing ghulâms in merely military service, opened all influential administrative posts to 
the slave-origin members of imperial household from the reign of Mehmed II (1451-1481) 
onwards.63 Concerning the recruitment methods of these kuls, the original place of location of 
the house of Osman, which was one of the dynamic frontier regions (udj) between the 
Byzantine Empire and Muslim Turkic principalities, enabled the Ottomans to increase their 
human sources through ghaza practices. According to the Sharia, Muslim rulers were entitled 
                                                             
59 Kunt, İ. Metin, “Turks in The Ottoman Imperial Palace” in Duindam, Jeroen, Artan Tülay, and Kunt, Metin 
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60 Ibid. 
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62  Kunt,“Turks in The Ottoman Imperial Palace,” p.290 
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with the right for enslavement of the prisoners of war due to their harbi statues -non-Muslim 
population living outside the territory of Dârülislâm-. From the reign of Bâyezîd I onwards, 
young boys of non-Muslim population in newly-conquered regions also became subject to 
recruitment (devşirme).64 This practice, i.e. enslavement of the sultan’s non-Muslim subject 
peoples, may be called in a sense the Ottomanization of ghulâm system that was to form the 
backbone of the Janissary troops. Compatibility of the devşirme system to Sharia has been 
questioned extensively since the zimmîs -People of the Book living under the administration 
of a Muslim ruler- were not subject to enslavement according to the Islamic jurisprudence. 
Regarding this issue, Erdem draws attention to the distinction between harbî and zimmî status 
as he states that people in harbî status do not gain zimmî status automatically but by their 
recognition of superiority and authority of an Islamic state.65 This recognition -of the social 
contract of zimmî status (the zimmet contract)- was manifested with voluntary submission to 
the Ottoman authority and in the refusal to submit; forcefully conquered harbîs or zimmîs 
rebelling against the Ottoman rule may be subject to enslavement practices on the ground of 
their violation of the zimmet contract.66 Regarding the distribution of enslaved harbîs, one-
fifth share (pencik) of the prisoners of the war was the ruler’s right. Apart from pencik 
tradition and devşirme system, the imperial purchases at slave markets, slaves sent by some 
tributary states and by leading bureaucrats and sons of local nobilities constituted additional 
human resources for the sultanic household.67  
 
 As Kunt states, the devşirme system was, by far, a more effective way of recruitment 
than human booty of raids since it provided the Ottoman administration with an element of 
choosing.68 Accompanied by a scribe, a Janissary officer –generally a yayabaşı- with his 
authorization berat visited kadıs of regions which were subject to levy and selected best of 
the children of the ages eligible.69 Upon arrival at Istanbul, these children were examined 
according to the science of physiognomy and then the best were taken into the Palace service 
or distributed to prominent bureaucrats while others were hired to Turks in Anatolia and 
Rumelia to work in the agricultural production and to learn Turkish language and Islamic 
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culture (Türk üzerinde olmak).70 Muslim subjects –except Bosnian families converted to 
Islam- were not subject to devşirme practice as the Kavânîn-i Yeniçeriyân of the 17th century 
explains: “If they [Muslim Turks] were to become slaves of the sultan, they would abuse this 
privilege. Their relatives in the provinces would oppress the reâyâ and not pay taxes. They 
would oppose the sanjak beyis and become rebels. But if Christian children accept Islam, 
they become zealous in the faith and enemies of their relatives”.71 Contrary to these 
assumptions, the system did not cut off the devşirmes from their all former associations. 
Nevertheless, it provided a relatively high degree of loyalty of the devşirmes to the persona of 
sultan.72 
 Newly-conscripted devşirmes taken into the palace service were called içoğlan and 
after two to seven years education under the surveillance of eunuchs a second selection 
distributed the most talented pages to the Greater and the Lesser Chambers while others were 
sent to the kapıkulu cavalry divisions.73 Ak ağas –white eunuchs of the Palace- serving under 
the kapı ağası supervised education of these palace pages covering physical education, sport 
activity, fine arts or crafts, literary arts, and religious teaching. Ak ağas played a determinant 
role in the appointment and promotion of these pages since they made recommendations to 
the sultan as his absolute deputy in the palace hierarchy.74 After graduation from inner 
service (Enderun), some pages proceeded to the second and first courts for Outer Service 
(Birûn) which provided access for palace services, six sipahi elite household cavalry 
regiments, and military offices for various divisions of lower-ranking household troops, 
palace scribal service, chancery or treasury, palace art studios and workshops.75 Lastly, 
palace pages might be appointed to the provincial post. In there, they served as ümerâ 
commanders who worked together with provincial administrators and kadıs of ulema 
hierarchy and if they earned enough success, they might attain the office of district governor 
(sancakbegi) and then reach the rank of a province governor (pasha).76 
I have hitherto introduced how the kuls were integrated into the Ottoman imperial 
household and emphasized that the Ottomans developed enslavement methods of pre-modern 
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administrations by opening all administrative offices to the kul-origin servants and by 
including their own non-Muslim subject people into the devşirme practices. Since several 
types of enslavement coexisted in the Ottoman society, distinctive aspect of kuls should be 
noted. Although they were theoretically subject to main laws of slavery defined in Sharia, kul 
status, in reality, referred to the attachment to imperial household. For instance, sultans could 
confiscate their property and may sentence them to death but alongside these slave-origin 
kuls, free-born Muslims in kul status (with the exception of ulema)77 were also subject to 
these practices. Kul status, on the other hand, referred to privileges, setting apart the 
administrative-military servants from the rest of society. Having being chosen for talent, 
ability, and physical qualities, these servants perceived their status as a source of pride and 
prestige.78 Being accepted to the imperial household was the first step in their career and in 
order to be able to maintain their administrative-military post they were supposed to do what 
their master did: to form their own households which would be resilient to power struggles.  
 
I.3: Rise of the Households 
 
The devşirme system gradually lost its importance and the latest record of a devşirme 
recruit dates to 1705.79 If the imperial household gave up this system, then how did it manage 
to find new men for administrative and military offices? Apparently, servants of the sultan, 
heads of ruling elite households, took over the responsibility for staffing the state offices 
from the palace in time. Regarding to this issue, Findley states that  
The decline of the child levy and of the palace school, and 
implication of institutional decay and territorial loss for the possibilities of 
appointment and promotion obviously introduced changes into this picture. 
Still, the decline of such highly institutionalized recruitment system as the 
child levy and the acquisition of certain elements of the ruling class of the 
some of the attributes of self-perpetuating elite kept alive an altered form of 
the “patrimonial style in recruitment”. This emphasized discretional or even 
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capricious use of patronage and heavy reliance on the kind of relationships 
through which the grandee households were put together.80 
 
Considering that the houses of the members of ruling class functioned as state offices 
in general until the bureaucratic reforms of the 19th century, it seems difficult to distinguish 
personal retinue of Ottoman bureaucrats from the staff of their office. Besides, distributive 
policy of the empire had formed fiscal and administrative dependency between a head of such 
office and his men. Likewise, in the absence of a salary system –until the 1830s- gift-giving 
economy was an important income item for the Ottoman bureaucrat that was mainly rooted in 
the exchange of money or valuable articles among the members of the imperial household. In 
light of all these practices, patronage relations seem not new for the ruling elite households 
but an established constituent of them. What changed with the decline of the devşirme system 
and palace school is that heads of elite households began to gather their own men 
autonomously as they less and less relied on the imperial recruitments and appointments as a 
pool of human sources, as Findley emphasizes. Consequently, households became main 
centers of training and socialization for the candidates of administrative posts. In the 
residence of leading bureaucrats, family and household members of officers obtained 
knowledge of bureaucratic correspondence, bookkeeping and other administrative-military 
skills as the interaction with experienced members increased the expertise and knowledge of 
newly-recruited members.81  
To understand the growing importance of these households within imperial structure, 
it seems necessary to analyze the late 16th and the 17th centuries of the Ottoman Empire in 
which the imperial distribution policy dramatically changed in favor of the ruling class 
households. In the 1630s, Koçi Beg82 (?-1650) diagnoses this change as that  
…contrary to the tradition, vacant timars and zeamets began to be 
distributed by Istanbul. Leading notables and bureaucrats bestowed vacant 
places upon their men and relatives and thus some of the best timars and 
zeamets in Islamic lands were transformed into private properties and waqfs; 
some were included to the royal domains; some were allocated as pension to 
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those who did not gain pension rights yet. These corruptions put the most 
reputable soldiers of the state into trouble.83  
 
In a similar way, anonymous chronicle of the Kitâb-î Müstetâb criticizes monetarization of 
dirlik system; the purchase of mansıbs and the title of military posts by the members of 
reâyâ; decreasing role of the palace service along with school military-administrative service 
and experience in the appointment to the state offices.84 As Koçi Beg and the Kitâb-î 
Müstetâb point out, transformation in the distribution of dirliks profoundly changed power 
relations among the servants of the sultan and contributed to the rise of new ruling elite 
households which would be the basic units of politics, administrative-military and fiscal 
system, contestation, and cooperation within the Ottoman imperial structure.   
 Being intertwined with each other, factors such as the impact of the price revolution 
of the 16th century, European advancement in the fire-arms, inability and reluctance of the 
timarlı sipahis in adopting new weapon technology, growing demand of the Porte to the cash 
flow, population growth, and slowing pace of territorial expansion brought about a gradual 
shift from timar to tax-farming (iltizam) system since the late 16th century onwards.85 When 
timar-holder sipahis were a very essential part of the Ottoman army in the mid-16th century, 
30 to 40 percent of military expenses were met by the sipahis themselves who collected 
revenues in rural regions; after their traditional weapons proved inadequate against European 
musketeers the palace increased the number of the standing infantry troops.86 Meanwhile, as 
timar system was gradually abandoned for tax-farming, auctioning off the collection of the 
rural taxes to the highest bidders became prevalent in order to meet cost of this shift.87 
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Thanks to this shift, the Ottoman ruling class which formerly generated income directly or 
indirectly from military campaigns and conquests, found a new income channel: participation 
in the tax-farming (iltizam) system. In addition to iltizam, adoption of the life-term tax-
farming system (malikane) in 1695 helped the Ottoman ruling class to increase their share 
over the provincial tax sources because of their control over the auction of malikanes.88 
Mustafa Nuri Paşa (1824-1890) illustrates the outcomes of this shift through gift-giving 
practices: “it was a tradition for viziers and commanders to provide the sultan with gifts 
extracted from newly conquered lands and from booties. This gift-giving tradition -rooting on 
the material acquisitions of military campaigns- has gradually disappeared since viziers and 
beylerbegis have begun to present gifts to the sultan on the occasions of their return [from 
provinces] to Istanbul”.89 
The more imperial household relied on the tax-farming system as a source of wealth –
in forms of gift or money-, the harsher contestation seemed to occur among different parties 
of the Ottoman ruling class over the provincial tax sources subject to iltizam system.90 In this 
process, the power relations between the dynastic household, pasha households in the capital, 
provincial power locii, and reâyâ changed dramatically as the imperial centre became more 
closely connected to its provinces. It was a highly complex process of change where 
monetization and demilitarization of the distributive policy, blurring border of ruling class 
and subject people, elite households’s takeover of the functions of timar and devşirme 
systems, and of  the palace schools,  transformed power relations on the imperial scale. It 
seems that as the tax-farming system increased economic and political dependency between 
all parties, it also diversified bonding patterns among people of different segments of the 
Ottoman society.91 Accordingly, in this growing dependency and interaction, the dynastic 
household and its servants in the different department of the imperial administration 
exercised varying degree of influence over each other in composite settings as elite 
households gained more inclusive form in general. 
 Members of the dynastic family and central administration, provincial magnates, 
military commanders, and ulema were drawn into the financial and political attraction of tax-
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farming system and of provincial posts.92 To understand how these figures included 
themselves into the tax-farming activities, it seems necessary to analyze changing pattern in 
the appointment of provincial offices whose sources of income and responsibilities were 
redefined as they absorbed former roles of timar-holders in their body. In his detailed study, 
Kunt summarizes the results of declined timar system as following:  officers of central 
administration began to take over provincial administration posts at higher ranks; the 
province replaced the district as the essential administrative unit; and patronage relations 
along with household affiliations became determinant factors in the polity.93 In other words, 
upon the declining role of timarlı sipahis in the army, the military and administrative 
obligations of timar-holders were replaced with fiscal duties that made experience gained in 
the provincial administrations redundant for the candidates. As a consequence, in the end of 
the 16th century, servants of the sultan who were trained in the palace and in the households 
of bureaucrats at the capital began to be appointed to the higher ranks in the provincial 
administration in the growing numbers. Appointment lists in the Kunt’s study shows that not 
only their numbers but also that of members of their households were on the rise when 
compared with those of the preceding century. This trend, extended channel from central 
administration to the provinces, included members of central army as well. Upon the decline 
of timarlı sipahis, the central army troops began to play more important roles in the 
suppression of internal disturbances in the provinces where they began to be numbered 
among the local notables with extensive economic dealings.94 Another factor, making intra-
bureaucratic contestations more competitive was the brief office terms. As Kunt states; 
Because tenure in one post was shorter, the expenses involved in 
moving households and retinues from one post to another were more often 
incurred. More seriously, the ümerâ were left without official revenues 
during the increasingly longer periods spent out of office between 
appointments. Furthermore, even when out of the office the ümerâ were 
forced to keep large retinues, because at a time when there was a greater 
competition among increasingly greater number of candidates for not many 
more, maybe even fewer, offices the officers who attended campaigns with 
large households had a better chance of earlier appointment or promotion. 
The paradox was that the candidate who could afford a large retinue while 
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out of the office could get position and therefore have official revenues with 
which to increase his household. 95 
 
As might be expected, bureaucrats facing with this dilemma of strong households found 
several solutions varied with the economic, military, and manpower potentials of their posts. 
Involvements in commercial activities, investment into the waqf-making, formation of intra-
household alliances were some of these solutions.96 Besides, the central administration was 
well aware of this dilemma and adjusted to its promotion and distribution policies 
accordingly while alliances between the bureaucrats in the center and in the periphery 
manipulated these policies in favor of their own interests, as Kunt states. 
Inclusion of vacant timars to the arpalık of ümerâ, their entitlement with the right of 
levying additional taxes on reaya, assignments of state revenues directly to the member of 
ümerâ households, granting some state revenues to officials on the permanent basis (as ber 
vech-i çiftlik, bi-resm-i çiftlik) -regardless of where they happened to be serving at a given 
time- and placement of member of ümerâ households into the palace service were some of 
these solutions central administration adopted to lighten growing expenditures of elite 
households.97 As these policies show, ümerâ households became the main unit in the imperial 
structure since the late 16th century onwards. In another words, the Ottoman Empire was 
adjusting its military and fiscal systems to the necessities of the time -such as replacement of 
cavalries with infantry troops, monetization of distributive policy- by relying on ümera 
households. Despite these acquisitions, shortening office terms still posed difficulty for the 
ümerâ who were now held more liable for levying taxes, and for maintaining security and 
order in the provinces. As Pamuk points out, especially levying taxes through tax-farming 
and malikane systems necessitated coalition of central elites and provincial notables: Many 
provincials began to acquire and transfer their shares of state revenues as long as they 
remained in the good graces of local administrators or their Istanbul sponsors.98 As he states, 
well-connected individuals in the capital city and in the provinces established mutually 
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profitable relations in order to obtain government tax revenues which was more lucrative than 
investing in agriculture, manufacturing or trade.99 
 To grasp the degree of dependency between notables (âyân and eşrâf ) and the agents 
of imperial centre, it is necessary to compare their power basis. In Istanbul, there was no local 
countervailing power independent from the central government since the city had not existed 
as a Muslim city with an Islamic society and its natural leaders -in established families who 
inherited social prestige- before the conquest.100 The cities of Arab provinces and Anatolia, 
however, witnessed the existence of influential Muslim families as urban notables who had 
formed their regional power basis long before the Ottoman sovereignty. Hourani analyzes 
politics of these notables in terms of “patriciate” that arises when the following conditions 
exist: first, society is organized according to the relations of the personal dependence; 
secondly, society is dominated by urban notables, by great families, reside usually in urban 
areas, draw their main influence there, and because of their positions in cities are able to 
dominate also a rural hinterland; and thirdly these notables have some freedom of political 
action.101 As he states, this freedom may take the form of self-government of cities by the 
notables or the city may be subject to a monarchial authority on which the urban population 
wishes and is able to impose some limits or exercise power as in case of many Arab and 
Anatolian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, the political influences of these 
notables rely on two factors: they have to possess access to authority, and thus be able to 
advise, to warn and to defend interests of locals and secondly, they must have some social 
power of their own which is not dependent on the sultan and gives them a position of 
accepted and natural leadership.102 The Ottoman administration recognized the natural 
leadership of âyâns with the decree of 1726 opening path for the appointment of provincial 
power-holders as governors of sancaks and provinces.103 As intermediaries between the local 
populace and the Porte, their service consisted of relaying complaints of reâyâ about 
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administration to the centre; assisting to guard towns; overseeing the practice of law; 
regulating monetary adjustments and food provision for the town.104  
While analyzing the rise of âyân and eşrâf, Mardin concludes that growing number of 
them opted for canalizing their wealth into the tax-farming since this system provided more 
profit when compared with productive enterprise.105 For instance, Mü’minzade Abdülmümin 
Efendi, a wealthy member of the ulema in Yenişehir, invested his money to influence 
government office to appoint him to a higher office and then through gift-giving economy he 
harassed religious officials in the lower ranks and secured lucrative tax-farming privileges.106 
Similarly, Toledano emphasizes the inclusive impact of the tax-farming system over the local 
notables throughout the empire in the 17th and 18th centuries. He even associates the delayed 
emergence of Middle East and North African nationalism with the successful inclusion of 
their local elites into the imperial administration through mainly tax-farming system and the 
resulting rise of Ottoman-Local elite households: 
Mechanism to assess and levy legitimate and illegitimate taxes 
(iltizams) transferred to office-holders considerable revenues collected in the 
name of the state. However, with the rise of the kapi (elite household), a 
growing portion of the state revenues appropriated by such office-holders 
remained in the province to maintain those large and costly establishments. 
A wide range of local people found employment and protection in kapis, 
becoming kapihalki, or protégées, but also a focus of one’s identity.107 
 
As his statement suggests, with the adoption of tax-farming system, local magnates and 
population began to form intense dependent relations with centrally appointed state agencies 
as growing portion of state revenues remained in the local elite households in order to 
maintain the system. In the 18th century, most district governors began not to reside in 
provinces and they appointed local notables as their agents (mütesellim). Contrary to brief 
service time of vâlis, local notables hold the post of mütesellim for 40-50 years that led to 
their hereditary claims over the provincial posts.108 
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The study of Hathaway, dealing with the rise of local elites of the 17th and18th century 
Egypt, reveals similar Ottomanization and localization trends. Regarding the interaction of 
the Ottoman administration with the former Mamluk practices, Hathaway shows that the 
Ottomans replaced the Mamluk system of cavalry-supporting assignments of usufruct, or 
iqtâs, with the regime of centrally appointed tax collectors known as âmins that gradually 
transformed to the tax-farms during the 17th century.109 Parallel to this, diffusion of the 
imperial power necessitated intra-household alliances in which ambitious locals sought favor 
with imperial center by participating to the households of imperial functionaries; agent of the 
centre in turn employed their clients to the households of local magnates; local magnates 
even channeled members of their households into elite households of the imperial capital.110 
In the Arab provinces, the leading households were the Qazdağlıs of Egypt, the 
Ebuziyades of Iraq, the Azms of Syria, the Husaynis of Tunis and the Karamanlıs of Libya.111 
In the late 18th century, Ali Pasha of Janina controlled southern Albania and Epirus; 
Pazvandoğlu of Vidin in western Bulgaria and parts of Wallachia and Serbia; Tirsınıklı 
İsmail Aga and his successor Alemdar Mustafa Pasha of Rusçuk, controlling central and 
eastern Bulgaria and some parts of eastern Thrace; Karaosmanoğlu family present in 
southwest Anatolia; Çapanoğlu in central Anatolia.112 While some of provincial households 
were constructed by the local magnates, others were formed by centrally appointed 
administrative-military officers who had, in time, gained local characters.113 Not surprisingly, 
dynasty and members of ruling class in the capital re-organized and extended their 
households accordingly. Above all, predominance of palace figures, viziers, Istanbul ulema 
over the auctions of the tax-collection and malikane contracts made networks around the 
central administration indispensable associates for the provincial figures.114 
 Abou-el-Hajj draws our attention to the growing influence of vizier and pasha 
households in the late 17th century. His study illuminates the finding that by the second half 
of the 17th century, nearly half of all appointments for high offices in the capital as well in the 
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provinces were staffed by men who had been raised, trained or attached to the households of 
vizier and pashas.115 According to the appointment list of 1683-1703, the balance between the 
palace graduates and associates of vizier and pasha households changed in favor of the latter 
which secured about fourth of central offices and a little over a third of provincial posts.116 As 
Abou-el-Hajj explains, grand vizier Köprülü Mehmed Pasha’s unprecedented influence over 
the Ottoman politics played an important role in the empowerement of this post and in the 
above-mentioned shift of the appointment patterns. As with this case, the dynastic household 
tried to control ambitious bureaucrats by supporting their rival households in the 
administration. It is also important to note a common pattern seen in both grand vizier 
household and provincial households: growing inclusion of non-askeriye people into the 
Ottoman administration through patronage (intisab) relations offered by the head of state 
offices. For the interaction of central and provincial elites, Abou-el-Hajj suggests that the 
vizier and pasha households of the late 17th century might have served as the second [after the 
sultan’s household] and actual model for growing number of ambitious âyâns and derebeys 
(provincial military) of the 18th century.117 In brief, the transformation in the distributive 
policy gave way to the rise of ruling elite households. A closer look to their recruitment 
methods, composition, functions and official recognition may help us in grasping importance 
of ‘ruling elite households’ within the Ottoman politics. 
 
I.4: Organization of Households  
 
The Ottoman term for the household, the gate (bab/kapı), refers to official and 
domestic, the public and private settings. As Göçek shows, the office/residence of grand 
vizier was named as “exalted gate” (Bâb-ı Âlî) as this term was fashioned after that of the 
imperial household (Bâb-ı Hümayûn) in which household members were united symbolically 
“behind the gate of the household head” with most members residing within the complex.118 
The rise of office-households began with the expansion of the administration out of the 
palace in the second half of the 17th century in which Grand Vizier Derviş Mehmed Pasha 
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brought his office to his own residence.119 Building complex of households varied according 
to the ruling elites’ place of duty and function of their office. For instance, viziers residing in 
the capital used to have farms (çiftlik) around the city apart from their main residences. 
Considering that viziers assumed military tasks in war times, these farms were also used as 
storage for war materials. According to the account of Mustafa Nuri Pasha, viziers of the 16th 
century had nearly 2.000 men some of which resided in these farms and made a living from 
agricultural production and live-stocking activities conducted there while animals of the 
household were kept in their barns.120 Evliya Çelebi gives the account of 1060 vizier farms 
with approximately ten armed employees (devlet âyânı çiftlikleri esnafı) for his time.121 
Aktepe also provides us with a description of building complex of Grand Admiral Kaymak 
Mustafa Pasha (1721-1730) as that “a large mansion for the official and his harem, with two 
smaller houses near it, in addition to a bath house, coffee room, cellar, some additional 
buildings for household members on a higher bank, flower and fruit gardens, and yet another 
house at a corner of the garden”.122 In time, households of high ranking bureaucrats in the 
central administration lost their residential characters; only their administrative offices and 
staff began to be referred to “gates” such as the gates of finance (Bâb-ı Defterî), of war (Bâb-ı 
Seraskeri), and of religious administration (Bâb-ı Meşihat).123 
Regarding households of viziers, Mustafa Nuri Pasha provides us with a full picture 
of an average vizier household for the period of 1687-1774.124 Leading members of 
household, such as treasurer, steward (kapı kethüdası), dïvân efendisi, mektûbcu, kethüdâ  
katipleri, imâm ve harem kethüdâsı dealt with bureaucratic affairs of the pashas.125 The 
steward (kapı kethüdası) was responsible for the coordination of his master with the central 
administration.126 Similar to the hierarchy of the palace, iç oğlans served under the 
supervision of ağas such as silahtar ağa in the vizier households.Viziers and pashas usually 
relied on their slaves and young recruits for important posts.127 In these replicas of sultanic 
household, some members (tütüncü başı, ibriktar ağa, kilerci başı, macun ağası, mikramacı 
başı, sofracı başı, mirahor, seccadeci başı, peşkir ağası, kahvecibaşı) served viziers’ persona 
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and his other men in the guild-like hierarchy since they possessed gedik and they were 
responsible for the service and training of yamaks.128 Gedikli iç oğlans had their own servants 
(zobular, koğuş uşakları and grooms). In the promotion rituals, ağa provided a horse, 
equipments, and dress for his zobu and arranged a banquet for manifestation his servant’s 
promotion to the rank of ağa: In this ceremony, a newly promoted ağa was bestowed a 
quilted turban (kavuk) and in case of removal from the service, ağas commissioned a meeting 
in where they retook kavuk of accused member and punished him accordingly (keçe külah 
idilir).129 Apart from these servants, viziers had military retinues of 100-150 men covering 
infantry troops (piyâde) and cavalries (süvârî) under the supervision of tüfenkcibaşı and deli 
başı.130 While some members of vizier households received salary, others made a living from 
gift-giving economy. For instance, tax-collectors and local administrators paid traditional 
subsidy, ‘mübaşiriye’, to içağas sent to provinces.131  
 
I.5: Household-building Strategies 
 
Household (kapı halkı or hane halkı) contained domestic, administrative and military 
protégés and clients gathered around nuclear or extended family of the founder. Members of 
a certain bureaucratic households were alternatively called as dairesine mensub, maiyetinde 
müstahdem, takımından, tâbi, havadarları, bendeleri or mensubanı.132 Regarding their 
recruitment, enslavement, friendship, gift-exchange, patronage (intisab), kinship, conjugal 
arrangement were common methods while forming a household. In some cases, a member of 
household was attached to the founder through more than one of these connections such as 
with the marriage of a slave-origin member to the daughter of the household’s head. Marriage 
was not only used in attaching members of the same household but also in intra-household 
alliances such as marriage of the sultan’s daughter with a man of leading bureaucrats 
(damad). In other cases, the sultan married his pages off to a daughter of high-ranking 
bureaucrats. As Göçek points out, when these pages were appointed to administrative posts, 
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the sultan gave them some slaves and servants that shaped the nucleus of the page’s own 
household.133 
 Ethnic-regional ties also played important role in the household-building strategy. 
Common culture and language helped members of a household in constructing more intimate 
ties with their patron. As Kunt explains, the Ottoman term of cins referred to origin; the 
words hemşehri, hemcins, and mücânese were used to remark a communality or origin; 
solidarity rooted on a common origin was expressed with bi-hasb el-mücânese, bi-hükm el-
cinsiyye, hemcinsiyet takribiyle, or gayret-i cinsiyet muktezâsınca.134 Bureaucrats in the 
capital seemed to use their regional ties to the extent that they were frequently criticized for 
staffing state offices with their hemcins. Kunt draws attention to such cins-based polarization 
among westerners (Balkan-stock bureaucrats) and easterners (Caucasian-stock bureaucrats) in 
the 17th century.  
 As with the sultan’s household, enslavement was of crucial importance for the elite’s 
household-building strategies. Considering that 4/5 of war prisoners remained in the hands of 
the military class, territorial expansion and conquests had provided bureaucrats -especially 
those who attended to military campaigns- with slave-stock new members.135 In some cases, 
bureaucrats added them to their entourage while other times they exchanged slaves as gift or 
sold them to other bureaucrats in order to strengthen their intra-household alliances. For 
instance, the tereke register of bâb üs-saâde ağası Cafer Ağa (d.1557) shows that majority of 
his 122 men (bendeleri) were either sold or given as present by various bureaucrats such as 
sipahis, pashas, and viziers.136 Self-enslavement also used to access imperial household. 
Evliya Çelebi illustrates that Abkhazian-origin officials in the 17th century often sent their 
newborn babies to families in Abkhazia for more than ten years in order to obtain the ways of 
the hometown and come back as a simulation of purchased slaves.137 Albert Bobovi -the 
captive who witnesses power relations in 17th century Ottoman palace- recounts similar trend 
adopted by Muslims as that “the exclusion of native Turks from the service often means that 
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the principal officers of the palace take the children of their friends and offer them as 
Christians and tribute children.”138 
 Gift-giving economy was also an essential part of household-building strategies. The 
heads of households provided economic protection to their members through salary; 
placement to the offices in the administration; gift-giving economy or with combination of 
them. In some cases, the founder of the household himself or his men in the higher positions 
bestowed gifts for their protégés while other times members of other households provided 
them with presents/tips (bahşiş) as a sign of their friendship. Mustafa Nuri Pasha explains 
how even janissary service pay (ulûfe) became subject to gift-giving practices among 
bureaucrats in the period of 1739-1768. Vacant ulûfes at the disposal of Janissary ağas were 
either sold or distributed among his men and members of friendly households. A certain 
amount of these ulûfes given to those under protection of leading bureaucrats and of palace 
servants were called as kapulu ulûfesi.139 Besides, there were various extra taxes, such as 
imdad-ı seferriye and hazariyye, bestowed upon the head of bureaucratic households.140 For 
instance, kapı altı hasılatı (in other words tayyarat or bad-ı hava) was one of the income 
items covering tahsiliye, penalty fines, and traditional presents given by tribal communities to 
the bureaucrats in the high-ranking provincial posts.141 Likewise, ‘devr’, ‘kaftan-baha’, 
‘zahire-baha’, ‘öşr-i diyet’, ‘imdad-ı seferiye’, ‘kudumiye’, ‘tekalif-i şakka’, ‘ikramiye’, 
‘hediye-baha’, ‘konak masrafı’, ‘dem öşrü’, ‘mefruşat baha’ were extra taxes covering 
expenses of households of higher ranking bureaucrats.142 It should also be noted that 
bureaucrats were obliged to pay exorbitant sums for the appointment to the higher positions. 
For instance, Hamamcı Pasha paid 65 purses to buy the office of the Erzurum governorate 
while Küçük Paşmakcızade obtained governorship of Selanik in return for 18 purses in the 
second half of the 17th century.143 Apart from appointment expenses, the transportation of 
household to the assigned regions and mobilization of military retinue to the theater of war 
were main financial difficulties which led to bureaucrats to impose these extra taxes and to 
apply gift-giving economy.  
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Besides its economic function, the gift-giving practice embodies an extensive 
symbolism such as commitment, loyalty, trust, respect, and reward. As with other issues, 
ruling elites seem to model their gift-exchange on the practice of imperial household in terms 
of its ceremony, materiality, hierarchy, and meaning. The gift-giving practice of Tirsinikli 
İsmail Ağa –one of leading âyâns of the 18th century Balkans- provides a perfect example for 
this modeling/interaction. Tirsinikli used ceremonial fur coats (hil’at) and gold purses while 
appointing his junior alliances to the offices and in awarding military success of his silahdar 
Alemdar Mustafa, exactly in the same manner as did the sultan in the promotion (terakki) and 
appointment rituals of his servants. By giving these fur coats, Tirsinikli manifested his 
superiority over the region as he provided his men with prestige, recognition, and reward. 
When he made, however, the same offer to Manav İbrahim, the favorite man of his rival 
Osman Pasha, the latter declined the offer and manifested that his loyalty to Pasbandoğlu, his 
master, was not something purchasable with a gold purse.144 Even though Tirsinikli could not 
win Manav İbrahim, he had such loyal men whose commitment continued even after the 
death of his master: Alemdar Mustafa assured the central administration about discharging 
Tirsinikli’s debts (efendimi borçlu yatırmam).145 As might be expected, there were numerous 
factors shaping degree of loyalty between master and his men such as term of service, manner 
of recruitment, and ability of the master in creating wealth for his household.  
Lastly, the founder of households used patronage to find new members. Since 
patronage relations were established within highly diverse settings, various connotations such 
as “Aladdin’s lamp effect” (Mardin) or “wheel of fortune” (Findley) were attributed to the 
term. Evliya Çelebi gives numerous examples about how a would-be member and a head of 
household might come together: Being a poet of an impressive poetry, a performer of 
enjoyable fireworks, the luck of being a handsome boy, a demonstration as a talented artisan, 
all these could obtain a secure position –regardless of their competence to task- even in the 
sultan’s household. Influenced by Timurid tradition, the Ottoman palace and the leading 
bureaucrats provided artistic patronage for artists, handicraftsmen, scholars and men of 
letters. Considering that men of letters sometimes penned the ‘mirror of princes’ genre 
(nasihatname) in order to disfavor rivals of their patron or to glorify his success in the eyes of 
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the sultan, artistic patronage was an effective political tool for bureaucrats.146 For instance, 
Tanındı’s study, ‘Bibliophile Aghas (eunuch) at Topkapı Palace’, details the leading bâb üs-
saâde ağaları’s involvements with literal productions, and shows how their artistic patronage 
manipulated the context of the miniatures and chronicles.147 Especially poetry and literary 
texts played an important role in the access to elite households where men of letters as 
‘mürebbâ’ of the patron received ethics and culture of adab through private lessons and 
meetings.148 Even for those who were not such lucky, factors such as kinship, neighborhood 
relations, membership to guilds, lodges, Sufi orders, waqfs, charity organizations, and even 
Friday prayers at mosques provided socialization for their access to a household. The founder 
of households provided political and economic protection to their members in return to their 
services that developed in self-perpetuating quality: the more members provided growing 
influence for the head; the stronger the head provided higher ranks with better incomes to his 
members; more potent members secured higher position for their patron in the imperial 
structure. They were bound to the each other to the extent that members of a certain 
bureaucrat in the administration were usually dismissed upon disfavor of their master or vice 
versa. To reduce the risk of such removals, the ruling elites did not only trust to members 
within their own households but also in that of rivals. 
Spies (çaşıtlar) placed in the rival networks collected information about conspiracy 
plans against their master; lobbied for him; conducted smear campaigns against foes. As 
Mardin states, in the Ottoman political culture, “popular rebellion” followed a typical pattern 
from gossiping to demonstrations and to armed intervention as a last resort.149 This pattern 
seems also suitable for intra-elite rivalries since gossiping, intrigues and aspersion played 
important roles in superseding rivals. That is why spies were an invisible but yet 
indispensable part of elite households. Especially when bureaucrats were appointed to the 
provinces, their spies and informants in the centre had to be more careful about possible 
conspiracy plans targeting to instigate the sultan against their master.150 Evliya Çelebi shows 
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that bureaucrats in the capital or in the provinces, sometimes, hired spies in order to get 
information about their foes in the different locality.151 
Another important strategy was to form intra-household alliances through social 
networks. In the 18th century, the most common way of social interaction for the bureaucrats 
in İstanbul was attending each other’s informal courts and receiving days where they 
discussed state affairs, gained supports for the execution of particular matters and exchanged 
information on the availability of offices and related appointments.152 Apart from 
appointments, intra-household alliances provided parties with security against punishment 
practices. For instance, when one bureaucrat heard about the sultan’s order to execute an 
acquaintance, he would send his own men ahead to inform him as to escape while other 
friends would then intervene for modifying the sentence.153 As with other forms of 
socialization, gift-giving practices were of crucial importance in forming intra-household 
alliances. 
Regarding the hierarchy of the elite households, they seem as complex as the imperial 
household itself. For instance, a female family member, a lower rank associate, the most 
senior or most trusted member or heads of other household could all take over leadership 
upon the death of founder. This seems also true for appointment patterns. Among the 
members of the same household, a cook may be promoted to the rank of vizier while highly-
trained favorite members could not find any place in the administration. Moreover, a member 
might obtain higher position in the imperial administration than his master have. Husrev 
Mehmed Pasha’s petition, written for sending his other slaves (in the rank of viziers) to the 
military service in the place of his cook, provides us with an extreme example.154 Whoever 
the damads of the sultan were, grand admirals of imperial navy or even the grand vizier; they 
were still in the lower status than Husrev Pasha within his own household hierarchy.  
In short, the household became the main unit of attachment for the Ottoman society 
especially after the gradual replacement of timar system with tax-farming. While forming 
their own households, military-administrative servants and local notables imitated the 
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imperial household on a smaller scale. As with imperial household, members of elite 
households developed loyalty to the persona of their master that shaped the course of 
Ottoman politics. Patronage relations, gift-giving economy, ethnic-regional solidarity, 
marriage, kinship, and enslavement practices were the main strategies in constructing 
household-based personal loyalties. While ruling elite households competed for 
administrative posts and control of imperial revenue sources, they also constructed alliances. 
As mentioned before, the Porte adjusted its promotion and appointment regulations to the 
growing expenditures of households which now assumed the functions of devşirme and timar 
systems along with palace school. The Porte, at the same time, tried to keep economic and 
political power of these households in control through three practices: depleting their 
resources by allocating them less than what was necessary to maintain their household, 
confiscation their economic sources and by instigation of intra-household competitions.155 
Nevertheless, some members of the imperial household developed wider interests which 
sometimes conflicted with that of the Porte as with the case of Mehmed Ali Pasha of Egypt. 
The next chapter will detail the contestation between Mehmed Ali and Husrev Mehmed 
Pasha by comparing their household-building strategies.  
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CHAPTER II: The Kethüda and the 
Tüfengcibaşı in Egypt  
 
II.1: Wars and the Changing Power Balance  
 
When Selim III acceeded to the throne in 1789, he devoted most of his energy to the 
ongoing Russian and AustrianWars (1787-1792) in order to make his accession as a herald of 
victorious sultan. Since the annexation of the Crimean Khanate by the Russians in 1783 
created a legitimacy crisis for the administration, Abdülhamid I closely dealt with the war 
efforts and appointed Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pasha to the command of the army while 
Gazi Hasan Pasha in the post of grand admiral assumed naval operations.156 After the death 
of Abdülhamid I in April 1789, Selim III seems to have expressed the same determination to 
end up in victory as his war time correspondences suggest.157 Accordingly, he penned edicts 
to appoint Ziya and Hasan Pashas to the less-important offices (respectively, the post of 
border serasker and that of serasker of Özi) on the ground of their poor performance at the 
ongoing war.158 Apparently, issuing an edict (ferman) was not enough to convince, at least, 
Hasan Pasha since he stipulated four conditions to leave the post of the grand admiral: 
deferral of his appointment to the spring, to keep his title until that time without taking over 
the title and ceremonial fur of seraskerlik, appointment of Ali Pasha, governor of Anatolia, to 
Wallachia, and lastly not to be appointed back to navy before concluding his projects in the 
new office.159 After negotiations, the grand admiral accepted to leave his post to Giritli 
Hüseyin Pasha (1791/2), predecessor of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha –the protector of Husrev 
Mehmed. 
This very telling story provides insight not only for the rise of Husrev Mehmed 
Pasha’s patron in the administration but also for the recurring theme of the reign of Selim III: 
growing autonomy/demand of the sultan’s servants in the war times in which the Porte 
became more and more dependent to their military and economic powers. Whether it was the 
Russian war or Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt, Selim III encountered with the same dilemma: 
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he would either give extensive authority to his already powerful bureaucrats or trim off their 
power by reinforcing political standing of their rivals or he would give some privileges to one 
of the great powers in return of its political and military backing of the Ottoman Empire 
against the others. Although all these policies helped the sultan to overcome difficulties of the 
war times, they created greater problems in the post-war periods. As might be expected, the 
main problem was that allies of the sultan -whoever they were âyâns, Europeans, high-
ranking bureaucrats or non-elite power blocks- were reluctant in leaving re-gained/controlled 
territories or in abandoning their war-time privileges and manners. In such cases, the Porte 
was applying the same methods but this time with other allies against its war-time associates. 
If we adopt Findley’s term for remittent power relations, the Porte was spinning wheel of 
fortune in the war-times and after than in the post-war periods and the Egypt expedition 
against the French threat as we will detail below. 
When news about Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt reached the capital, Selim III 
dismissed his Grand Vizier İzzet Mehmed Pasha on the ground that the Pasha had not 
fulfilled his duties such as construction of the necessary fortifications during his governorship 
of Egypt and because of his inability in anticipating the attack of the French.160 Along with 
the new Grand Vizier Yusuf Ziya, Cezzar Ahmed Pasha161, tax collector of Tirhala region 
Köse Mustafa and Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin Pasha were appointed to the campaign 
with extensive authority.162 In addition to them, the Porte approached Britain and Russia in 
order to gain their military and political support against the French. This was the war-time 
spin of wheel of fortune. When the French threat came to the end with the evacuation treaty 
of 1801, the war-time allies turned into new sources of danger to the Porte: Mehmed Ali, 
commander of Albanian irregulars in the military retinue of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha captured 
the governorship of the province from the hands of centrally appointed officers; the British 
protected the Mamluk begs against the sultan; Cezzar Ahmed Pasha turned into semi-
autonomous governor etc.163 The Porte, this time, made the post-war alliances in order to 
eliminate its ally-cum-rivals. An imperial edict of Sultan Selim about his rejection of 
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dismissal of Cezzar Ahmed reflects this vicious circle as that “Dismissing him is useless if 
his successor would not be powerfull. A powerfull successor becomes another Cezzar and 
then we will have two of them. In such case, what is supposed to do with the old Cezzar?”164 
Ironically enough, the sultan appointed Cezzar Ahmed Pasha to the campaign because of his 
extensive power which then enabled him to gather more power and to be one of the most 
important figures of the region in the post-war period.165  
Napoleon’s invasion brought about a power shift not only in Egypt but also between 
different branches of the Ottoman administration. In the face of the French invasion of Egypt, 
the Porte gained support of Britain and Russia through intense diplomatic negotiations 
conducted by officers familiar to European languages. As sizable reports of Ali Efendi -the 
Ottoman ambassador to Paris- suggests, the Porte expanded its communication lines with the 
European capitals.166 Besides, Sultan Selim initiated military reforms in the peace period 
between the Russian War and the French invasion. Since these reforms were modeled on the 
European war methods, weapons, and training the Porte invited European instructors and 
officers to its army. Apart from Russian renegades of the Ottoman-Russo War, four French 
infantry officers –Lieutenant-General Menant and Lieutenants Luzin, Ranchoup and Pierce 
Laroque-Monteil- along with six sergeants sent by the French Ministry of War trained new 
Ottoman crops while the Porte imported new-style rifles from France, Britain, and Sweden.167 
Parallel to the growing volume of diplomatic and military relations with the west, Europeans 
began to be included into both imperial and elite’s households. Selim III, however, did not 
rely on only the European instructors but also elite households while forming the New Order 
(Nizâm-ı Cedîd) Army. 
 Between the years of 1792-1806, 22,685 men and 1,590 officers were enrolled into 
the Nizâm-ı Cedîd, majority of which were sent by provincial governors and notables, and 
after six-month training they returned back in order to form their local militias.168 Beside 
their support to the new army, leading bureaucrats and notables played important roles in the 
conscription of irregular troops. Since 1768 onwards, miri levandats (state-financed infantry 
and cavalry regiments) were used in Ottoman campaigning in great numbers, but differently 
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from Janissaries or household troops (kapı halkı), they were levied by local magnates-cum-
officials and financed by the central treasury.169 In other words, bureaucrats and notables 
provided necessary man power while European instructors and states supplied modern 
weapons and military training for the Nizâm-ı Cedîd Army. 
As Fahmy points out, the military success of Mehmed Ali Pasha, for instance, owes 
much to the French instructors and officers occupying high-ranking positions with extensive 
authority in the command of his army.170 Contrary to Mehmed Ali, Selim III and his 
successor Mahmud II were reluctant in appointing European officers to the executive posts 
although they benefited from knowledge and expertise of foreigners as instructors. On the 
other hand, it was the diplomatic success of the imperial household, which turned military 
acquisitions of Mehmed Ali in the Nezib War to zero. Accordingly, European allies and 
clients expanded their influence over the Ottoman politics that brought about new type of 
factionalism within the bureaucracy as different cliques developed intimacy with different 
European states and their represantatives, particularly of the French, British, and Russian.171  
 To sum, it was another war-time spin of wheel of fortune which enabled Husrev 
Mehmed and Mehmed Ali to rise in the Ottoman administration while growing interaction of 
the Porte with Europeans brought about an essential shift in the household strategy of the 
ruling class. This was such a striking shift that Mahmud II, contrary to his predecessors, 
allied with Christian powers in order to suppress one of his Muslim governors, i.e. Mehmed 
Ali Pasha. To understand the beginning of this shift and how the contestation between Husrev 
Mehmed and Mehmed Ali emerged, it is necessary to describe military operation of the Porte 
against the Napoleon’s invasion of Egypt.  
 
 
 
                                                             
169 Aksan Virginia, “War and Peace,” in Suraiya N. Faroqhi (ed.), The Cambridge History of Turkey: Volume 3, 
The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603—1839, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, pp.81-118, p.98  
170 Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, pp.80-82. As Fahmy states, chief among the French officers was “Colonel” 
Sèves, known as Süleyman Paşa, who became second-in-command of the army ranking only below İbrahim 
Paşa.  
171 Shaw, Stanford J, Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Selim III 1789-1807, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971, pp.368-373 
  
40 
 
II.2: Egypt: First scene of Husrev Mehmed-Mehmed Ali Rivalry 
 
Egypt had remained under the Mamluk rule until Selim I’s campaign in 1517. After 
the conquest, substantial numbers of Ottoman forces -composed of Anatolian Turks, Balkan 
devşirmes, and Turkish and Kurdish tribal levies- remained in the provinces while centrally 
appointed bureaucrats settled to Cairo with their households and worked with holdovers from 
Mamluk bureaucracy.172 As Hathaway points out, Selim I adopted an inclusive policy 
towards the Mamluk begs and their troops in order to balance rebellious attempts of the 
Ottoman soldiers stationed in Egypt. Beside this military concern, demographic and 
administrative characteristics of Egypt played determinant role in the conquest policy of the 
central administration. According to Karal, the Porte did little change in the provincial 
administration because of three reasons. First, majority of local population and Mamluk begs 
were Muslims that led the Ottoman administration to adopt a more inclusive policy when 
compared with the non-Muslim subjects. Second, Mamluks had already established an 
effective administration to adopt. Lastly, the distance between the Ottoman capital and Egypt 
made Mamluk begs unalienable for the Ottoman sultans.173 In sum, the sultan could only 
maintain his authority over Egypt through inclusion of Mamluks into the provincial 
administration.  
Apart from the Mamluks, a centrally appointed governor (vâli), leaders of the local 
garrisons and ulama assumed intermediary role between the Porte and local population. 
Provincial council (dîvân) was the main unit of interaction for these representatives of the 
sultan and locals. In Cairo, a centrally appointed governor (vâli) presided over the grand and 
lesser dîvân adopted by the Mamluks. The lesser council was similar to the personal 
entourage of governor, covering his agent (kethüda), treasurer (defterdâr), janissary ağas and 
leading members of ulema. Apart from them, amir al-hajj, centrally appointed kapûdan begs 
(captains of Alexandria, Suez, and Damietta) and kadı along ağas of military corps and 
community leaders were members of the grand council that was supreme authority to which 
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vâli had to obey.174 Despite of the consultancy tradition embodied in dîvân and continuous 
struggle among ağas, vâli, real power actually remained in the hands Mamluks.175 
Hourani associates dominant position of Mamluks with their successful household 
strategies creating common interests and ambition to protect these interests (asabiyya). 
Despite of their connections with Muslim merchants and with the rural population and their 
control of waqfs and of their prestige derived from religious ancestry and learning, the ulema 
did not provide necessary asabiyya because of their long-term experience of military rule.176 
Inclusion of locals into regiments and relaxation of military discipline among soldiers 
prevented leaders of the seven regiments from establishing this asabiyya which was 
necessary for people who wished to seize and hold power.177 Contrary to the ulema and ağas, 
Mamluks succeeded in gathering sufficient number of members/followers who zealously 
identified their interest with that of their leaders as following: 
These [Mamluke households] were not military crops but élites 
created by men possessing political or military power and inheriting prestige, 
composed of freedmen trained in the service of the current heads of the 
household, and held together by a solidarity which would last a lifetime. The 
training and tradition of household produced individuals who knew how to 
make of it a core around which could be combined religious leaders, the 
commanders of the regiments, popular guilds, and behind them the great 
loose of combinations of Egypt, Nisf Haram and Nisf Sa’d and then, with 
this combination, to secure real power –to obtain for themselves and their 
followers from the governor of the rank of bey and therefore access to the 
great offices to which beys were appointed, and to seize control of the tax-
farms.178 
 
As Hourani emphasizes, the residences of Mamluk begs became the center place for 
concentration and distribution of power through the interaction of their members with the rest 
of society. After the sixteenth century, Circassian Mamluk households of Qasimiyya, 
Faqariyya, and then Qazdağlıs gained dominance in Egypt.179 For the most part of the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, a troika of Faqariyya faction of Hasan Ağa 
Bilifya, his son-in-law Ismail Beg, and his protégé, the Janissary officer Mustafa Kâhya al-
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Qazdağlı controlled Egypt, as Hathaway states.180 Then, the province witnessed the rivalries 
among two sub-factions of Qazdağlıs: Mamluks belonging to Muhammad Beg following 
either İbrahim Beg or Murad Beg contested with the followers of Bulut Kapan Ali Beg.181 
Although the Porte sent Grand Admiral Ghazi Hasan Pasha to Egypt in 1786 to curb the 
power of the contesting Mamluk begs, they re-established their authority over again after the 
early leave of the Ottoman forces due to the outbreak of the Russian War.182 
Although the vigorous challenge of the Mamluk begs compelled the Porte to grant 
them some sort of autonomy, this challenge was not as alarming as the landing of French 
troops to Alexandria in 1798. This was an unexpected development for Selim III who had 
always maintained friendly relations with the French even before his accession. In the relative 
freedom of his princehood, he had corresponded with Louis XVI and sent one of his men, 
İshak Bey, to France in order to acquire information about war technology, weaponry and 
drilling methods of the French army.183 Furthermore, there were French officers dealing with 
the formation of Army of the New Order (Nizâm-ı Cedîd) in the Ottoman capital when 
Napoleon carried out an attack to Egypt. Another reason for the Ottomans’s quandary was 
that Napoleon pursued the preparation of campaign in a great secrecy in order to preempt 
possible British intervention. Although the Ottomans monitored the French press and the 
naval preparations held in Toulon’s docks through Ali Efendi, French foreign minister 
Talleyrand refuted the rumors and assured Ali Efendi that the target of the naval expedition 
was Malta.184 In essence, an Egypt expedition was one of the much-debated issues in the 
context of revolutionary France’s war against Britain. Talleyrand, who was appointed to the 
post of foreign minister in July 1797, soon submitted several memoirs, advocating an Egypt 
campaign as a part of prospective colonial policy while Napoleon put pressure on the 
Directory in August 1797 to capitalize on the capture of the Ionian Islands by extending 
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French activities over the Ottoman territories, including the seizure of Egypt.185 Apparently, 
the Egypt campaign was an output of a more ambitious plan, namely direct invasion of 
Britain. When the French administration acknowledged the difficulty in actualization of such 
a grand plan, military plans were canalized to the colonies of Britain. In order to threaten the 
India trade, being vital part of British economic power, and to cut Britain’s support line with 
its continental allies, the Directory concluded positively about the Egypt campaign in the 
early March of 1798 and instructed Napoleon on April 12 to make necessary dispositions.186 
In the context of the French interests over the Ottoman territories, the Treaty of Campo 
Formio, partition of the Republic of Venice between France and Austria, should also be 
mentioned since it made France neighbor to the Ottoman Morea in October 1797.  
According to the Treaty of Campo Formio, France obtained the Venetian possession 
in Adriatic, such as the Ionian Islands (Corfu, Paxos, Lefkas, Ithaca, Kefalonia, Zante, and 
Kythira) and in Dalmatia and soon after tried to expand influence over the adjacent Ottoman 
Morea as well. In the following year, expansionist policy of the French further threatened the 
Porte: Napoleon personally commanded the landing to Alexandria in July 1798 at the 
expense of the long-termed Ottoman-France alliance. These two states had maintained 
amicable terms so much so that Napoleon would try to curb resistance of centrally appointed 
officers and locals by claiming that he has landed to Alexandria with the approval of the 
sultan.187 
 
II.3: The Rise of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, Patron of Husrev 
 
When the news of the landing reached the Porte, Selim III made new appointments -
including replacement of Grand Vizier İzzet Mehmed by Yusuf Ziya Pasha- and sent the 
imperial navy to Egypt under the command of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha.188 According to Sicill-i 
Osmani, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha had entered the service of Silahdar İbrahim Pasha as a 
Circasian-stock slave and then he was introduced to Mustafa III in 1767.189 In the following 
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years, he seems to have gained the trust of Prince Selim while serving him as a member of his 
princely household during the cage period.190 When his new patron ascended to the throne in 
1789, Küçük Hüseyin became one of the most influential figures in the palace. In the 
accession ceremony, the new sultan integrated members of his princely retinue to the key 
posts in the palace hierarchy. In this process, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha obtained the title of 
başçukadar.191 The year of 1792 marked another important shift in the career of Küçük 
Hüseyin: He was promoted from başçukadarlık, a personal service of the sultan, to one of the 
leading administrative posts. Selim III did not only appoint Küçük Hüseyin Pasha to the post 
of grand admiral but also honored him with the title of damad by mediating for his marriage 
with Esma Sultan, the daughter of Abdülhamid I.192 In April 1792, he was sent to a long 
naval expedition to the Mediterranean. As Shaw states, the appointment of Küçük Hüseyin to 
the post of grand admiral and his following expedition was also result of an intra-elite 
rivalry.193 A closer look to Selim’s balance policy may help us to grasp the background of 
this rivalry.  
In fact, Selim III mainly relied on approximately twenty men who, one way or 
another, supported reforms and effectively participated in the decision making process 
through consultancy mechanism. Along with Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, Çelebi Mustafa Reşid 
Efendi (slave-origin spiritual teacher of the sultan), Yusuf Ağa (a Cretan slave, serving as 
lieutenant of the Vâlide Sultan), Mahmud Raif Efendi (he entered the bureaus of the Sublime 
Porte and then became protégé of the Reisülküttâb Mehmed Reşid Efendi), Tatarcıkzade 
Abdullah Efendi (the son of a member of ulema, who served as the judge in Jerusalem, Cairo, 
and Medina), Ebubekir Ratip Efendi (son of a judge, who was educated in the Treasury and a 
close friend of Selim in his princehood), İbrahim Nesim Efendi (the son of a former chief 
treasurer), Mehmed Reşid Efendi (son of a scribe in the offices of the Imperial Council), 
Arabacızade İbrahim Efendi (the son of an imam at Hotin) formed the cadre of Selim III’s  
reformist retinue.194 After the dismissal of Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pasha (3 May 1792), 
this reformist cadre began to dominate over the Ottoman politics although they could not 
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maintain solidarity and unity for a long time.195 In order to balance their contestation or 
because of the instigation of rival subgroups, Selim III made constant appointments and 
dismissals. In this framework, it was the coalition of Yusuf Ağa and Mihrişah Vâlide Sultan 
(1745-1805), which impelled the sultan for the appointment of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha to the 
post of grand admiral and for sending him to a long naval expedition in the Mediterranean in 
order to use his absence to end his influence.196 But contrary to their expectation, the post of 
grand admiral provided Küçük Hüseyin Pasha with more influence and prestige. 
To understand the importance of this appointment in the career of Küçük Hüseyin 
Pasha, it seems necessary to detail the status of the grand admiral (kapûdan pasha) within the 
imperial administration. After the conquest of Constantinople, the navy assumed two key 
responsibilities: to control and regulate sea trade for provisioning the population and to 
protect sea routes.197 Parallel to the expanded functions of the navy, Selim I had ordered 
Cafer Kapûdan the construction of new fleet at the new arsenal (Tersâne-i ‘Âmire) at the 
capital in 1517.198 Thus, contrary to the limited naval activities at Gallipoli, former naval 
base, the new arsenal witnessed vigorous construction facilities to the extent that the imperial   
(Donanmay-ı Hümayûn) began to set sail on the yearly basis in order to protect 
Mediterranean and Black sea costs from pirates. With the expanded functions of the navy, the 
office of grand admiral gained mighty prestige especially after the entrance of Barbaros 
Hayreddin Pasha to the service of Süleyman I in 1534. Regarding to livelihood (mansıb) of 
the grand admiral, Barbarossa were bestowed Algiers, future seat of the kapûdan pashas,  to 
which the sancaks of Kocaeli, Sughla, and Bigha from the beglerbeglik of Anatolia and 
Eghriboz, Aynabakthi, Karlıeli, Mizistre and Mytilene form the beglerbeglik  of Rumelia 
were also added while Gallipoli remained the sancak of kapûdan pashas.199 Parallel to the 
new conquests, the eyâlet of kapûdan pasha reached to twelve sancaks including two sancaks 
of Cyprus along with Chios, Naksa, and Mehdiye in the first half of the 17th century. Residing 
in divanhane of the arsenal in the capital, the kapûdan pashas were now responsible for the 
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supervision of the arsenal and of all issues related to the Ottoman fleet; administration of 
twelve eyâlets; and administrative control over the navy hierarchy.200 
In the peace period between the Russian war and the French invasion, Selim III dealt 
with the reformation of the army and the navy. To be able to conduct this project, the sultan 
staffed the high-ranking military posts with his reformist cadre as with the appointment of 
Küçük Hüseyin Pasha to the post of grand admiral.201 Before going through the contributions 
of Küçük Hüseyin to the projects of his master, it seems necessary to touch upon ‘reform-
minded’ bureaucrats and ‘traditionalists’ of the period. As Riedler points out, historiography 
of the reformation period has evaluated the power struggles and contestation of bureaucrats 
mainly in the line of reformists and traditionalists. Contrary to this evaluation, Riedler’s study 
dedicated to the key political conspiracies of the 19th century shows the importance of 
personal relationships that take precedence over questions of ideology.202 This seems also 
true for the reign of Selim III. As the contestation between the Yusuf Ağa-Mihrişah Vâlide 
Sultan coalition and Küçük Hüseyin implies, main intra-elite rivalries emerged among 
reformist bureaucrats themselves since Selim III staffed them to the leading offices. 
Adolphus Slade’s detailed memoir narrates the role of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha in the naval 
reform as that 
No capitan pasha did so much for the navy as Kutchuk Huseyin, the 
favorite, and son-in-law of Selim III, whose disinterestedness and liberality 
seconded his master’s projects. Though no sailor, he had common sense to 
direct him in the pursuit of knowledge. He procured architects from France, 
with whose aid he resuscitated the arsenals of Constantinople, of Sinope, and 
of Rhodes, supplying the first with two wet docks, and all other necessaries 
for the equipment of a large fleet; and in a short time he had twenty sail of 
the line, built on the newest models, anchored before the windows of his 
palace. He reformed Galiondgis, built barracks for them, and encouraged the 
naval school, -the professor of which, when I was there, was a young 
Englishman named Redhouse.203 
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As Slade recounts, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha’s effort in reforming navy increased his prestige in 
the eyes of the sultan. More importantly, the navy provided him with new trustees who 
protected his interests against rival power blocks in the capital. In 1796, the leading trustees 
of Selim III were divided into three factions led by Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, Yusuf Ağa and 
İzzet Mehmed. Ingiliz Mahmud Raif, Ebubekir Ratip Efendi and Ishak Efendi were in the 
Küçük Hüseyin’s group which favored the French; Yusuf Ağa with Vâlide Sultan, Çelebi 
Mustafa Reşid and Mehmed Reşid were supporting the Russians and the British; Izzet 
Mehmed, his trustees, and many members of the lesser council remained impartial towards 
European ambassadors in the capital.204 Because these three factions were kept in balance by 
the palace and the Porte, they tried to strengthen their position through out-palace alliances: 
Yusuf Ağa and Vâlide Sultan collaborated with the Janissaries and the ulema; Çelebi 
Mehmed depended on the soldiers of the Nizâm-ı Cedîd Army and reformed artillery troops; 
Küçük Hüseyin relied on the sailors in his fleet.205 In other words, the post of grand admiral 
helped Küçük Hüseyin in finding new trustees out of the palace.  
Apart from naval reforms, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha dealt with the suppression of 
Pazvandoğlu’s revolt, a magnate of Vidin, until the news of Napoleon’s expedition reached to 
the Porte.206 Then, his success in the Egypt campaign in 1801 provided him with opportunity 
to consolidate his powerful standing within the imperial household. As a victorious grand 
admiral and highest-ranking bureaucrat just after the grand vizier in the theatre of war, Küçük 
Hüseyin Pasha’s position was strong enough to secure appointment of his household’s 
member to the prominent posts of the Egypt administration.207 
 
II.4: The Kethüda and the Tüfengcibaşı in the Retinue of the Grand Admiral 
 
In the late March of 1801, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha arrived in Egypt with 70 ships and 
nearly 6.000 men. As kethüda of the grand admiral, Husrev Mehmed was accompanying his 
master. A tüfengci named Mehmed Ali also arrived in Egypt as a second in the command of 
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Albanian irregulars sent by the tax collector of Kavala region.208 Ironically enough, Mehmed 
Ali, Husrev’s future rival would be part of this retinue in the following days although his way 
of arrival to Egypt was diametrically opposite: he benefited from kinship ties while Husrev 
Mehmed began his career as Abazha-stock slave (kul cinsi) of Çavuşbaşı Said Ağa. With the 
mediation of his patron, Husrev was accepted into the palace service during the reign of 
Abdülhamid I and after serving in the treasury chamber under the patronage of Arnavud 
Yahya and Süfyan Ağas, he became the apprentice (çırak) of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha.209 
Ethnic-regional solidarity may have been a determinant factor in the patronage relations of 
Husrev. Like Grand Vizier Yusuf Ziya and his patron Küçük Hüseyin Pashas, Husrev was a 
Caucasian-stock bureaucrat who was included into the palace service as a slave. Although it 
seems difficult to conclude that Caucasian-stock bureaucrat -the Easterners- established 
dominance in the administration of the period, the two most important posts –grand vizier 
and grand admiral- were in the hand of this group. Besides, Selim III’s mother Mihrişah 
Sultan was also of Georgian-stock. Based on her correspondence, she seems to have 
established cordial relations with Grand Vizier Yusuf Ziya who had Georgian origins as 
well.210 As we will touch upon the contestation of Yusuf Ziya and Küçük Hüseyin, of these 
two easterners, personal ambitions would contradict with ethnic-regional solidarity at other 
times. That is why long lasting trust relation between Küçük Hüseyin and Husrev cannot be 
explained by merely their common origin. It rather seems that among many other factors, 
common origin played a partial role in Hüseyin Pasha’s networking activities. Husrev 
gradually rose in the household hierarchy of his patron and until the Egypt campaign he 
obtained the title of sealkeeper and then of kethüda.211 It is also important to note that the 
grand admiral -unlike the other high-ranking bureaucrats- was allowed to appoint his  
kethüda among his own men rather than relying on centrally appointed one, according to the 
code of 1793 (Vüzerâ Kânûnnâmesi).212 
Mehmed Ali, on the other hand, was not a member of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha’s inner 
household but that of Kavala hakimi, a relative of his wife.213 As with this case, kinship ties 
remained an essential strategy in the household-building of Mehmed Ali. Before Kavala 
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hakimi, Mehmed Ali had benefited from patronage of his uncle Tosun Ağa -tax collector of 
Kavala region- upon his father’s –bekçibaşı İbrahim Ağa- early death.214 After his uncle’s 
execution he entered the service of a French tobacco merchant –Monsieur Léon.215 Except 
Léon, Mehmed Ali seems to have preferred patronage of his relatives. When he constructed 
his own household, he mainly relied on his own family members. Apart from kinship ties, an 
unexpected development helped Mehmed Ali in expanding his own power basis: When the 
commander of his patron’s Albanian troops –Ali Ağa- returned home, Mehmed Ali took over 
command by proxy.216 
In sum, when Husrev and Mehmed Ali arrived in Egypt, the former was in more 
influential status as kethüda of the grand admiral. Mehmed Ali, on the other hand, was a 
member of a middle-ranking provincial household and his patron was not in the battle field. 
Although Napoleon left Egypt in August 1799, large numbers of French troops had remained 
in the province. Regarding the evacuation of these soldiers, the Porte and France signed the 
convention of al-Arish on January 24, 1800. While all parties were in expectation of a 
peaceful evacuation, the British intervention, especially their insistence on the transportation 
of French prisoners of war to Britain, caused resentment of French that lighted the fuse of a 
new clash of arms.217 Küçük Hüseyin Pasha and his naval force arrived at Abuqir at this stage 
of war and British land forces joined them. Hüseyin Pasha instructed Husrev Mehmed with 
the capture of Rozetta and after a four-day siege of Rosetta castle with the help of British 
land troops, French forces submitted on 20 April 1801.218 After a successful pinching 
movement of the grand admiral, the grand vizier, Mamluk begs, and the British, the Ottoman-
British joint army seized the control of Cairo by July 1801.219 
Regarding the subsequent diplomatic negotiations, France and Britain signed the 
treaty of Amiens in March 1802 and agreed on the restoration of the Ottoman territories to 
the pre-war status and on the recognition of independence of the Ionian Islands. On 25 June 
1802, France and the Porte signed the Treaty of Paris which guaranteed restoration of the 
peace, renewal of the previous treaties including trade privileges in articles I, II, and III. 
Article IV was about the Porte’s recognition of the Treaty of Amiens while the rest were 
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dedicated to the mutual guarantees, exchanges of prisoners, return of confiscated properties, 
and renewal of the favored nation status for each state.220 In sum, Ottoman suzerainty over 
Egypt was recognized at the diplomatic level. Despite this, realities of post-invasion period 
proved that re-establishment of this suzerainty could not be as easier as Selim III expected.  
First, nearly three-year long disturbances and military struggles brought difficult times 
to the local population, especially the urban masses of Cairo since the army troops, rarely 
paid on time, resorted to force in order to get their salaries or resorted to methods to meet 
their material needs more directly.221 In this context, composition of the grand vizier’s 
military retinue became main focus of critics. Karal, for instance, describes this retinue as 
following: “that army of 60.000 men [the grand vizier Yusuf Ziya’s army] had no importance 
in reality because it was a useless crowd consisting of tribe people and worthless slaves taken 
en route …most of the men came to Arish for  the looting…”222 Similarly, Fahmy argues that 
the Janissary troops in the grand vizier’s entourage was one of the main obstacles which 
prevented the sultan in re-establishing effective control over Egypt: These troops which the 
British defined as a “medieval horde” was completely deprived of training and discipline.223 
When compared with them, some troops in the retinue of the Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin 
Pasha, was, by far, superior in terms of equipment, training, and discipline. As mentioned 
before, the grand admiral had dealt with military and naval reforms with the assistance of 
European instructors since 1792. When he arrived in Egypt to assist the grand vizier and the 
British, there were nearly 4,000 troops under his command and 1,200 of them was trained and 
disciplined along modern lines under the surveillance of European officers.224 The rest of his 
military retinue, however, was a collection of irregular troops among which Mehmed Ali was 
a member of Albanian recruits. Despite of military superiority of the grand admiral, the grand 
vizier was still in the highest rank within the Ottoman bureaucracy. Accordingly, Selim III 
seemed very attentive to obtain consent of Yusuf Ziya Pasha while making new appointments 
for the administration of Egypt.225 
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As his correspondence with Yusuf Ziya suggests, Selim III ascribed significant 
meaning to the appointment of a mighty governor who would suppress the Mamluk begs. In 
this context, the sultan told his grand vizier about that Hakkı Pasha, the governor of Kandiye, 
would be most proper candidate because of his loyalty, obedience, and authoritarian way of 
rule, which was especially necessary for the re-establishment of the order in Egypt.226 
Nevertheless, the Sultan and Yusuf Ziya could not reach an agreement on Hakkı Pasha. 
According to Karal, Yusuf Ziya Pasha probably had another name in his mind for the post of 
governor that might be the reason behind this disagreement.227 The correspondences of Selim 
III with the other bureaucrats suggest that Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin Pasha had also a 
nominee for the governorship of Egypt and the Sultan’s approvement of this nominee 
(Husrev Pasha) may be evaluated as the lessening influence of Grand Vizier Yusuf Ziya 
Pasha over the appointments.228 
Yusuf Ziya, as one of the leading trustees of the sultan appointed to a provincial 
mission, suffered from several smear campaigns conducted by his rivals at the capital.229 As 
mentioned before, a bureaucrat’s disgrace or rise mainly depended on his or his patron’s 
ability in direct accession to the sultan. That is why keeping influential spies or followers 
back in the capital and having information about lobbying activities of rival households were 
of vital importance for those who were sent to provinces. Correspondences between Selim III 
and the grand vizier in Egypt show that Yusuf Ziya was well-informed by his men in the 
capital regarding various palace gossips.230 Apart from hostile networks in the capital, Yusuf 
Ziya had to cope up with the lobbying activities of bureaucrats in Egypt, especially that of 
Küçük Hüseyin. Cevdet Pasha associates the distrust between these two bureaucrats with 
their contesting foreign policies: Yusuf Ziya had reported the Porte about Küçük Hüseyin’s 
proximity to the French.231 Besides, he said that Hüseyin’s distrust to the British made the 
coordination between his own troops and those of the grand vizier and the British difficult.232 
Apparently, Selim III sided with Küçük Hüseyin in this contestation and Yusuf Ziya resented 
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the sultan for his direct correspondence with the grand admiral: “You probably know that 
Kapûdan Pasha did not write anything against you. Kapûdan Pasha’s nature and your good 
behavior are known. Even if Kapûdan Pasha writes about you, I don’t take it into 
consideration.”233 Although the sultan tried to placate his grand vizier, Yusuf Ziya’s 
resentment was not baseless: the grand admiral’s leading members in his inner household 
were soon appointed to highest ranks in the provincial administration of Egypt. Thank to the 
mediation of his master, Husrev Mehmed, thus, obtained the title of governor of Egypt in 
September 1801 while Hurşit, another protégé of Küçük Hüseyin, was appointed to the post 
of tax collector of Alexandria.234 
Apart from the growing influence of the grand admiral, strategic and military 
considerations might have been determinant for the decision of the sultan. Napoleon had 
invaded Egypt through a naval attack. Besides, the British did not leave Alexandria yet. In 
other words, if one of these states attempt to take Egypt in future, only a well-organized naval 
and land defense would repulse the rival. Since Husrev was a protégé of the grand admiral, 
they would coordinate such a defense in harmony. Furthermore, Egypt was responsible for 
provision of flax yarn, patent leather, and saltpeter (güherçile) for the imperial navy while 
captains of Alexandria, Dimaetta, and Suez assumed to construct necessary ships for the 
navy.235 Considering that, another fiscal burden of Egypt was to ship sugar, rice, coffee, 
lentil, and wheat for the provision of Istanbul’s population. This shows us the intertwined ties 
of this province, the imperial navy and the imperial capital. In addition to these, custom taxes 
of Egypt were newly included for the financing of the autonomous treasury of İrâd-ı Cedîd 
which was supposed to cover expenses of military and naval reforms.236 In light of all these, 
the appointment of a protégé of the grand admiral to the administration of Egypt seems as a 
necessity for the Porte, aiming to exploit sources of the newly re-captured province 
effectively. However, it was neither a naval attack of a European state nor a Mamluk Beg but 
a newly-arrived commander of Albanian troops of small number who would pose grave 
danger to Husrev Mehmed Pasha. 
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II.5:How to Exchange Governors: Barrack-Household versus Office-Household 
 
 Power struggles over Egypt were not confined to the contestation of the grand vizier 
and grand admiral. The latter’s household might have obtained highest ranking posts of the 
province but it turned out that keeping this posts in the hand would be much more difficult 
than obtaining them since the Porte, Britain, Mamluk Begs, ocak ağas, irregular troops, and 
rival households of centrally appointed bureaucrats had contesting plans. Worse still, plans of 
all parties were subject to constant change that made all alliances suspicious and ephemeral. 
For instance, Selim III, in the beginning, was very determined to remove all Mamluk begs 
from the administration of Egypt as his correspondence indicates.237 Since the sultan was 
ruling an empire of extensive territories, appointment of local figures to the central 
administration or to provinces –remaining out of their influence- was one of the most 
common practices in curbing regional powers of rebellious locals. This policy, however, did 
work out on Mamluks and the sultan attempted to carry out a more ambitious plan aiming an 
overall destruction of beys in a ship massacre.238 This plan could not be realized -until 
Mehmed Ali’s castle massacre in 1811- and worse still, the Mamluk begs lost their 
confidence with the Porte after learning the details of this plot. This event and other 
excluding policies of the Porte eventually resulted in a British-Mamluk alliance. As a result, 
Britain strengthened its standing by providing patronage to the Memluk begs who, in return, 
provided their new patron with regional knowledge and influence. After then, the sultan had 
to take steps backward to the extent that he even reconsidered appointment of a Mamluk beg 
to the post of governor.239 
As such, all parties were constantly adjusting their power relations according to 
emergent polarizations. Husrev, as an inexperienced governor, seems to have difficulty in 
keeping pace with these power shifts. His failure especially in winning the support of 
Albanian irregular troops strengthened hands of Mehmed Ali who already began to constitute 
his own power base modeled on the barrack-households of former begs. Like other groups in 
the Ottoman society, members of army relied on the household-building activities in order to 
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provide protection, solidarity, and wealth. Qazdağlıs were the par excellence of barrack-
household which dominated over Egypt for much of the 18th century through the placement 
of their regimental clients to the leading administrative posts.240 Based on the official 
documents –such as register of salaries- and chronicles, Hathaway shows that household 
membership overshadowed slave status in identifying a person’s position in Egyptian military 
society by the late 17th century and since then soldiers was defined by the patron of a 
household they followed.241 She also puts emphasis on the strong connections between 
barracks’ groups and trade networks in cities by stating that patrons of barrack-based 
households, regimental officials, relied on urban tax-farms contrary to the Mamluk begs 
depending on the rural tax farms until the early 18th century where clients of military 
households began to be included to the rural tax-farming system as well.242 In the light of 
chronicles, Mehmed Ali seems to have used the pattern of barrack-based households while 
constructing the nucleus of his own power basis in Egypt as we will detail below. 
Although Husrev was appointed to the governship of Egypt in September 1801, the 
real power, in essence, remained in the hand of the grand vizier until his return to Istanbul in 
early January of 1802.243 As mentioned before, British intervention had prevented the Porte’s 
plan aiming overall destruction of the Mamluk begs who then fled to the Upper Egypt. As a 
measure against the threat of these begs, Grand Vizier Yusuf Ziya left a great number of his 
military retinue back in the province while returning to Istanbul. One of his men, Tahir Pasha 
was the head of the Balkan irregulars. To Cevdet Pasha, ethnic origin of Tahir Pasha played 
an important role in this appointment since he was an Albanian like the majority of Balkan 
irregulars.244 It seems that ethnicity-based solidarity also played role in Mehmed Ali’s 
promotion to the serçeşmelik of these troops. As with other leading bureaucrats, we have very 
limited information about the early career of Mehmed Ali. To Çetin, the oldest official record 
referring to serçeşme Mehmed Ali dates to November 1802 and covers his appointment by 
Husrev to lead military operation against the Mamluk begs.245 Based on the narratives of 
Mouriez and Mengin, he argues that Mehmed Ali began to rise in the military hierarchy 
under the patronage of Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin that he obtained through the mediation 
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of Hasan Ağa (an officer in the retinue of Kapûdan) and thus secured this title even before the 
departure of the grand admiral for Istanbul.246 If this was the real case, Husrev’s laudatory 
evaluation for Mehmed Ali’s efforts in the oldest official record may have aimed to inform 
his patron about his well coordination with his other favorites.  
Regarding the post of serçeşme, it was exclusive to the extensive households of 
governors of big provinces such as Erzurum, Diyarbekir, Mosul, Bagdad, and Damascus. 
Unlike the ordinary vizier households having only one infantry and cavalry unit under the 
command of only one “tüfenkcibaşı” and “deli başı” respectively, these governors had more 
than one unit that necessitated a post of a supreme commander called serçeşme who was 
responsible for the coordination of several tüfengcibaşıs and deli başıs.247 Mehmed Ali as the 
serçeşme of the Balkan irregular forces was assisting Tahir Pasha. According to Cevdet 
Pasha, Tahir did not show interest in political and military issues while Sufism and 
fraternizing with sheikhs occupied an extensive place in his daily life that made Mehmed Ali 
a prominent figure among the Balkan irregular troops.248 In other words, Mehmed Ali seemed 
to fulfill the power vacuum of Tahir in the eyes of irregular soldiers. Although these soldiers 
helped Husrev Pasha in his struggle against Mamluk begs, the Porte seems to have perceived 
their excessive number as a source of disorder as early as November 1802 and issued a decree 
in order to keep their number in a manageable size.249 It is also important to note that the 
Porte’s decision in reconciliation with Mamluk begs under the protection of the British 
rendered presence of large numbers of irregular troops unnecessary. After the settlement of 
Mamluk begs to Aswan (Asuvan) the British forces left Alexandria in late February, 1803.250 
With the elimination of threats of Mamluk and British, Husrev began to involve with 
administrative and military regulations until the late April of 1803 where an armed resistance 
of irregular troops caused his abdication from the post of vâli.251  
 
 
                                                             
246  Ibid, p.29 
247  Mustafa Nuri Paşa, Netâyicü’l-Vukû’ât, pp.375-376 
248  Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, Tarih-i Cevdet, vol.VII-VIII, p.216 
249  Çetin, Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa’nın Mısır Valiliği, p.33   
250  Ibid., p.34 
251  Çelik, Hüsrev Mehmet Paşa, p.41 
  
56 
 
II.6: The Serçeşme, the Vâli, and the Unpaid Irregular Troops 
 
Husrev’s report to the Porte, dated 13 January 1803, sheds light on his ambivalent 
feelings about the irregular troops: He complained about disorder among these troops and 
financial difficulty in meeting their excessive expenditures while, at the same time, admitting 
that their military existence is necessary for intimidating inimical power blocks (bazı hainler 
ve urban taifesi) in Egypt.252 He also added that after removal of these blocks, he would send 
majority of irregular troops back. Based on this report and the abovementioned imperial edict 
-restricting further arrival of irregulars- the Porte and Husrev Pasha seem to be of one mind 
about the necessity of the evacuation of these soldiers. Discontent, however, was not one-
sided since these soldiers suffered from ill-payment. As a solution, Treasurer Recâî Efendi 
convinced Husrev Pasha to pay the accrued salaries (güzeşte ulûfe) on the condition that those 
soldiers who receive salary should leave Egypt.253 Although Husrev Pasha borrowed some 
money from leading merchants, he could not find enough founding to cover all accrued 
salaries of the irregular soldiers who, in return, refused to leave until receiving the full 
amount. On 23 April 1802, they gathered in front of the residence of Treasurer Recâî Efendi 
after which everything went out of control.254 Since chronicles have given quite diverse 
accounts for Husrev’s reaction to the events, it seems necessary to present rest of the story 
within a comparative perspective based on the narratives of Cevdet Pasha, Câbî Efendi, and 
Tayyarzade Âta Efendi.  
To start with, Cevdet Pasha depicts events as following:255 Treasurer Recâî Efendi 
evaded soldiers by stating that Mehmed Ali was retaining the salaries. When soldiers arrived 
to Mehmed Ali’s residence, he informed them that the treasure did not send any money to 
him and right after, tension rose, the two parties joined battle until an announcement which 
assured the soldiers that salaries would be paid within a week.256 When they went to the 
treasurer’s residence six day later, Recâî Efendi informed them that he had not enough money 
and sent a letter to Husrev Pasha in order to get financial support for payments but received 
unfavorable reply (bir akçe vermem ve birşey verilmesine ruhsatım dahi yoktur).257 Then, 
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when the treasurer asked the pasha to deal with soldiers surrounding him, the latter began to 
bombard Recâî Efendi’s residence without making any effort to rescue the treasurer himself. 
Although Janissaries ağas, ocaklıs and some locals suggested strengthening the fortification 
of the castle, Husrev rejected this proposal in a quite hostile fashion as he accused them of 
planning to divide his military strength (siz benim askerimi tefrik etmek istiyorsunuz).258 
Then, Tahir Pasha tried to communicate with Husrev but his answer was discouraging again.  
Next day, Husrev send his own soldiers – in the Nizâm-ı Cedîd order – over irregular 
troops some of which managed to transport the treasurer with the salary records and official 
documents from the besieged residence to Tahir Pasha’s mansion.259 However, Husrev’s 
troops were defeated mainly because of their involvement with plundering instead of 
fighting. Tahir Pasha joined revolting soldiers as his nephew in the castle helped Albanian 
soldiers to take the control of citadel.260 The following day, they bombarded Husrev’s 
residence; arrested some of his slaves in Qasr El-Einy (Kasr-ı ʿAynî), plundered his men’ 
(paşaya müteallik olanlar) houses in Azbakiyah (Özbekiye), at the end, Husrev with his 
household covering family members, his troops, and his slaves fled from Cairo.261 On 6 May 
1803, a divan meeting was held with the participation of sheiks and kadıs (meşâyih and kadı-i 
belde) who appointed Tahir Pasha to the post of vâli by proxy and informed the Porte about 
this decision. After then, some followers of Husrev were arrested but they were soon released 
with the mediation of sheiks and kadıs.262 
In this narrative, Husrev is portrayed as an irreconciliable person although Cevdet 
Pasha does not explain why Husrev positioned against Treasurer Mehmed Recâî Efendi and 
Tahir Pasha at the beginning of the event. Nevertheless, his narrative is replete with important 
information about power relations of Recâî Efendi that may be reason for Husrev’s hostile 
stance against him. Recâî Efendi had worked in the Mektûbî Chamber and then served Yusuf 
Ziya Pasha as his divan scribe in Maden (a district of El-aziz).263 Upon his master’s 
promotion to the post of grand vizier, they returned to İstanbul where Recâî obtained the rank 
of kalyonlar kâtibi and in the time of the Egyptian campaign he was appointed as the 
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treasurer through which he generated significant income.264 Although he was dismissed 
because of his misconduct, he retrieved the post upon the resignation of Şerif Efendi. In brief, 
he was serving Husrev as the treasurer although he was a protégé of Grand Vizier Yusuf Ziya 
Pasha. Considering that the grand vizier and the grand admiral, the master of Husrev, were in 
rivalry, Recâî Efendi might have deliberately aimed to put Husrev in trouble by suggesting 
sending the irregular troops without covering all accrued salaries. Or, Husrev might have 
suspected that Recâî Efendi has taken the irregular troops’ side in order to unseat him. This 
might be also true for Husrev’s refusal for Tahir’s request for help since he was known as a 
protégé of grand vizier too.  
Lastly, one of the recurring themes in Cevdet Pasha’s narrative is that Tahir, Mehmed 
Ali and the irregular troops showed a maximum effort to protect artisans and city dwellers of 
Cairo from possible damages the armed conflict against Husrev might give rise to.265 We may 
associate distrust of Husrev toward locals with this amity and cooperation they established 
with revolting soldiers. Apparently, Husrev Pasha seems to have trusted exclusively his own 
household, especially his military retinue in suppressing the revolt. His men were, however, 
stationing in different locations such as the castle, Qasr El-Einy and Azbakhiyah that might 
have obstructed their well-coordination. Even worse, there were some irregular soldiers in 
these places, who cut of communication among protégés of Husrev Pasha.  
In brief, the narrative of Cevdet Pasha suggests that the events leading to the fall of 
Husrev began as a reaction to the irregular soldiers to Tresurer Recâî Efendi’s decision of 
cutting salaries. In the course of events, the uncompromising manner of Husrev, however, 
united irregular troops, Recâî Efendi, Mehmed Ali, Tahir Pasha, and the local power blocks 
into one camp. In the light of this polarization, we may conclude that Husrev could neither 
organize his own household effectively nor include leading figures of Cairo to his power 
network although this strategy was a must for a centrally appointed governor. Regarding the 
role of Mehmed Ali, Cevdet Pasha does not mention any direct contestation between him and 
Husrev. He rather suggests that Mehmed Ali adopted anti-Husrev stance as a result of pasha’s 
exclusive policy. In other words, the fall of Husrev was not a consequence of intra-household 
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competition between him and Mehmed Ali although the latter would benefit from this event 
in consolidating his influence over artisans, city-dwellers of Cairo, and irregular soldiers.266  
Contrary to Cevdet Pasha, Tayyarzade Atâullah Beg puts the blame of all events on 
Husrev Pasha.267 After emphasizing the quarrelsome personality of Husrev, Atâ Beg 
criticizes him for his disrespectfulness toward Tahir Pasha; cutting salaries of Albanian 
soldiers; his negligence in protection of the castle; his reluctance in winning other 
government officers such as Mehmed Ali and Recâi Efendi; his negligence in establishing 
order in the province; and his failure in winning the local population.268 In this narrative, Atâ 
Beg touches upon neither financial difficulty in salary payments nor excessive number of 
irregular troops in disorder. What is more to the point; he does not mention about the role of 
Recâi Efendi in cutting salaries.  
Then, in the chronicle of Câbî, Husrev is depicted as a victim of opportunist irregular 
soldiers.269 Câbî Efendi points out two main problems of the army: Mass of irregular troops 
(sekbân) and lack of control over the payment rolls of soldiers.270 As we have witnessed 
above, Atâ Bey presented Husrev as irresponsible and incompatible governor while Câbî 
depicted him as mere victim of disobedient soldiers. Finally, Halil İnalcık gives two different 
accounts for the Cairo days of Husrev Pasha in two different encyclopedic entries of two 
Islamic Encyclopedias, published respectively by the Turkish Ministry of Education (MEB) 
and by the Turkish Religious Foundation (DIA). In the latter edition, İnalcık only recounts 
critics of Ceberti and Atâ Beg about misconduct of Husrev without adding any comment. In 
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mercden birçok zâyi’âta uğramış ve güç hâl ile yakayı kurtarmış olan ahâlinin icrâyı taltifiyle kalben devlete 
meylü mahabbet itdirmege çalışmaması ma’mûriyet-i beldeye lüzûm u memûl kadar himmet itmemesi ve bu 
şeyleri ihtar eden hayr-hâhânını dinlememesi encam-ı kâr Mısır’dan sıfru’l yed avdetini netîce vermiştir.” 
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the MEB edition, he criticizes Husrev for searching every possible ways to increase the 
revenue of his extravagant master instead of focusing on his administrative duties.271 In a 
similar way, Atâ Beg criticizes Küçük Hüseyin Pasha -master of Husrev- for his 
appropriation the wealth of reaya (halktan irtikâb itdigi mebâlig-inâ-meşrû’nın).272 Like other 
leading bureaucrats, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha was, probably, in the hope of gaining further 
wealth and influence while placing members of his household into administrative posts. 
Nevertheless, it seems difficult to determine to which extend his financial demands led his 
protégés to adopt oppressive rule against reâyâ as Husrev Pasha was said to had done. 
Whether the main reason for Husrev’s failure was his own misconduct, fiscal pressure of his 
master, his irreconcilable manner or his overconfidence for his own household, especially for 
his military retinue, he was soon eliminated from power struggle for the post of governor. 
Consequently, Husrev Pasha could not succeed in establishing reliable alliances to maintain 
his position and he was thus outrivaled through an armed contestation where all leading 
figures of Cairo began to positioning against him.  
 
II.7: How a Serçeşme becomes the Vâli of Egypt? 
 
After the fall of Husrev, Tahir Pasha, commander of the Rumelia irregular troops took 
the rule of Egypt on himself. As with Husrev’s case, unpaid soldiers revolted against Tahir 
that brought an end not only to his administration but also his life. Janissaries who resented 
the discriminatory and exclusive manner of Tahir Pasha allied with Ahmed Pasha, 
commander of Medina of the Hijaz region.273 Meanwhile, Mamluk begs in the Upper Egypt 
were closely monitoring power struggles in Cairo. They got in contact with Tahir who, in 
return, invited them around Cairo to guarantee their help in case of need.274 On 26 May, some 
Janissaries gathered in front of the Tahir’s residence in order to demand salaries; after 
receiving negative reply, two parties began to fight in which Tahir was assassinated. To 
restore the order, Ahmed Pasha invited Husrev –at this point still residing in Damietta – to 
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Cairo and then asked the sheiks to convince Mehmed Ali to obey his instructions.275 
Regarding the sheiks and the religious figures of Cairo, Marsot states that Sayyid Umar 
Makram (an active politician who had galvanized a popular resistance against the French in 
1800), Shaikh al-Sadat (the influential head of Sufi orders in Egypt) and Shaikh al-Sadat (the 
head of Sufi fraternities) were the most influential leaders of whom Mehmed Ali tried to gain 
support.276 According to Marsot, especially Sayyid Umar Makram helped Mehmed Ali in 
gaining support of locals: Ulema, the notables and merchants, led by Sayyid Umar Makram 
made a common cause with Mehmed Ali in order to re-establish the order in both the public 
affairs and the trade activities.277 Mehmed Ali, meanwhile, tried to gain consent of the Porte 
as well.  
With the death of Tahir, Mehmed Ali gained recognition as the sole leader of irregular 
troops from Rumelia. To maintain this leadership, he seems to have made a deliberate effort 
to remain in a legitimate position vis-à-vis the Porte while negotiating with its agencies. He, 
for instance, replied the call of Ahmed Pasha as that “Ahmed Pasha was not vâli of Egypt. He 
is a guest there…Tahir Pasha, on the other hand, had been appointed commander for Egypt 
by the Porte. That is why we obeyed him and made him kaymakam. Hence Ahmed Pasha is 
not in such a position, it would be better if he leaves Egypt [ie.Cairo] along with the 
Janissaries”.278 Meanwhile, the Porte appointed Trabluslu Ali Pasha to the post of vâli. Like 
Husrev, Ali Pasha had organic ties with Küçük Hüseyin Pasha and the imperial navy. Ali, as 
a slave of Algeria beylerbegi Mehmed Pasha, had firstly joined to Cezayir-i Garb (Algeria) 
and then with mediation of his brother Seyyid Ali – an influential person in the Imperial 
Shipyard – he was introduced to Küçük Hüseyin Pasha who appointed Ali to the post of 
beylerbegi of Trablusgarb (Tripoli).279 In the time of the vâli crisis, he volunteered to fulfill 
power vacuum in Egypt but soon after his arrival, he was killed by the Mamluk begs. The 
Porte subsequently appointed Hurşid Pasha in Alexandria to the post of vâli.280 
Mehmed Ali had made a coalition with Mamluks under Bardisi Beg. When Elfi Beg, 
a rival of Bardisi, returned to Egypt from Britain on February 1804, Mehmed Ali began to 
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play on the old factionalism and rivalry between these two Mamluk begs.281 In the face of the 
joint attack of Mehmed Ali and Bardisi, Elfi fled to the Upper Egypt and then, he began to 
gather supporters in order to organize a resistance against Bardisi.282 Mehmed Ali, this time, 
refused to help Bardisi unless his Albanian troops were given all the back pay due them from 
the treasury that forced Bardisi, acting kaymakam in the absence of the governor, to impose 
heavy new tax on the population of Cairo to raise the demanded money.283 When people of 
Cairo, in return, revolted against Bardisi, Muhammed Ali gained their trust by proclaiming an 
end to the tax and then used this popular support in his attempt to force Bardisi to flee to 
Upper Egypt.284 Then, Mehmed Ali planned to release Husrev and restore him as vâli in order 
to legitimatize his own position but upon the opposition of his troops, he proposed Hurşid 
Pasha.285 Hurşid Pasha’s measures to re-establish the order in Cairo made population of Cairo 
as well as Mamluks and Albanian troops resented against him, who asked the Porte to appoint 
Mehmed Ali as a new vâli of Egypt.286  
In the face of these developments, the Porte could not do anything but approve the 
governorship of the winning party. Because of the long distance between Istanbul and Cairo, 
the central administration was receiving the news about the current power shifts in Egypt 
after several days. Therefore Sâlih Beg as an envoy of the Porte arrived in Egypt in May 1805 
with two imperial edicts for Mehmed Ali and Hurşid Pasha, one for the appointment and one 
for the removal. After evaluating the current power relations (icâb-ı hale göre), Sâlih Bey 
would give the decree for appointment (velâyet fermanı) to the most proper candidate, and he 
opted for Mehmed Ali.287 According to the records of Ottoman foreign affairs, personal 
relations played important role in the decision of Sâlih Bey: In his previous visits to Egypt, he 
had received kindness and respect of Mehmed Ali.288 Thus, the Porte appointed Mehmed Ali 
as governor of Egypt and obliged him to pay the annual tribute of the province and to take 
measures to suppress the Wahhabis in the Hijaz region.289 Because Mamluk begs in the 
Upper Egypt maintained to challenge his authority, Mehmed Ali was reluctant to leave Cairo 
for the suppression of Wahhabi revolt that resulted in the Porte’s attempt to depose him in 
                                                             
281  Fahmy, “the Era of Muhammad ʿAli Pasha,” p.143 
282  Shaw, Between Old and New, p.287 
283  Ibid. 
284  Ibid., p.288 
285  Ibid. 
286  Fahmy, “The Era of Muhammed Ali Pasha,” pp.139-180, p.144 
287 Râgıp Raif and Rauf Ahmed, Bâb-ı Âli Hâriciye Nezâreti Mısır Meselesi, Fırat Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2011, 
Elazığ, p.7 
288  Ibid. 
289  Kutluoğlu, the Egyptian Question, p.36 
  
63 
 
June 1806.290 Although the Porte allied itself with Mamluks against him, the support of Umar 
Makram, leading notables and ulema enabled Mehmed Ali to restore favour of the Porte on 
the condition of paying tribute and sending his son İbrahim as a hostage.291 Lastly, the death 
of Bardisi Beg on November 1806 and Elfi Beg in 1807 left Mamluks vulnerable to 
Muhammad Ali’s intrigues, as Fahmy states.292  
In brief, Husrev and Mehmed Ali rose in the Ottoman administration during the Egypt 
campaign of Napoleon. As the rivalries between the grand vizier, the grand admiral, 
Janissaries, irregular troops and Mamluk begs suggest, servants of the imperial household did 
not only fight against a foreign enemy but entered into conflict among themselves. In these 
struggles, all parties resorted to various household-building strategies. The Porte, for its part, 
tried to balance its military weakness by relying on the irregular troops of elite households 
and by establishing diplomatic relations with European states. Meanwhile, the sultan initiated 
military and naval reforms and sent some of newly trained Nizâm-ı Cedîd troops alongside 
the irregular soldiers to Egypt. The Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, for his part, gained 
further favor of the sultan and staffed members of his household to the leading posts of 
Egypt. Husrev, as kethüda of the grand admiral, obtained the title of vâli through his master’s 
mediation. As with other Easterners, slavery and ethnic-regional solidarity played important 
role in his access to the Ottoman administration. During his short-term office, he could not 
win the support of local power foci in Cairo that led to his deposal. Mehmed Ali, on the other 
hand, arrived in Egypt as part of the military retinue of the local-elite household of the 
Kavala region. Contrary to Husrev, Mehmed Ali was a free-born Muslim and benefited from 
kinship and marriage ties. In Egypt, he became a part of barrack-household and gained 
supporters through ethnic-regional solidarity of Albanian troops. As a head of barrack-
household, he also developed the alliances with the urban population of Cairo. In the next 
chapter, we will detail how his barrack-household transformed into family-based household. 
Apart from family members, European experts and instructors helped him in consolidating 
his power. Meanwhile, the Porte was changing its household strategies towards more 
centralized state with modern/standing army as well. In this process, Husrev managed to 
remain in the high-ranking echelons of the Ottoman administration through his support for 
the military reforms. 
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Chapter III: The Grand Admiral and the 
Vâli of Egypt in the Morea Campaign 
 
III.1 Changing Household Strategy of Mehmed Ali after 1805 
 
Mehmed Ali obtained the post of vâli through his control of power relations in Cairo. 
In order to secure this position, he had to expand his authority over entire Egypt. The French 
occupation, lasting three years did not only exhaust power of Mamluks but also introduced 
modern tools of administration which provided inspiration for the centralization projects of 
Mehmed Ali. It is true that the imperial household was also expanding its communication 
channels with the West. For instance, one of the reform proposals (ıslahat layihaları) 
submitted to Selim III was prepared by Berntrand –a European expert- while the reports of 
Ebubekir Ratip Efendi (who introduced the term of Nizâm-ı Cedîd  into the Ottoman political 
vocabulary) was based on his observation over the Austrian army and administration.293 But 
different from Selim III, Mehmed Ali had the opportunity to personally observe colonial 
administration of a European state. In other words, he witnessed implementation of modern 
administration over the Ottoman subjects living within the Ottoman territory.  
For the Egyptian campaign, Napoleon included a well-organized civilian, scientific 
and technological commision of 167 people, consisting of technical experts, civil engineers 
surveyors, cartographers, surgeons, pharmacists, archeologists, architects, artists, 
mineralogists, zoologists, and businessmen to his retinue.294 The mission of these people was 
to study the run of the state of affairs of Egypt and to pass on the achievement and knowledge 
of French sciences and arts to the local population.295 During the occupation period, 
Napoleon opened two schools; published newspapers (Décade Egyptienne and Le courier 
d’Egypte); supported artistic and scientific activities by establishing a theatre hall, an 
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institute, an observatory house, and a chemistry lab.296 More importantly, a new tax system 
imposed by the French weakened the control of Mamluks over iltizams that made it easier for 
Mehmed Ali to replace this system with a more centralized one, and thus to curb the 
economic power basis of the Mamluks.297 In addition, Mehmed Ali, in his military and naval 
reforms, used the service of the French soldiers and technicians who choose to remain in 
Egypt after the evacuation treaty.298 
 Beside colonial administration of the French, Mamluk household tradition and kinship 
ties also helped Mehmed Ali in expanding his control over Egypt. In the previous chapter, we 
had already detailed how barrack-household tradition and ethnic-regional solidarity among 
Albanian troops were successfully used by Mehmed Ali. After he obtained the title of 
governor, he gradually reduced the roles of Albanian troops in favor of locally conscripted 
soldiers. It is also important to note the impact of Husrev Pasha’s Nizâm-ı Cedîd troops over 
Mehmed Ali’s military reforms. During his term of office in Egypt, Husrev Pasha had trained 
some of the Mamluk troops along French lines after enlisting in his service those French 
officers who remained in Egypt and he also formed a Sudanese regiment trained in the 
French style.299 As Fahmy states, Husrev’s borrowings from the French influenced Mehmed 
Ali when he introduced new tactics and training drills to the Albanian troops, forming main 
man power of his military retinue until the 1820s when he began to gather slaves from Sudan 
and conscript the fellahin of Egypt.300 Besides them, family members began to assume most 
important tasks in the household of Mehmed Ali after 1805.  
Mehmed Ali invited his family and friends to Egypt and gave them important 
positions in the administration as with the appointment of his 16-year-old son, İbrahim, to the 
command of Citadel in Cairo.301 Mehmed Ali and Amina, his only legal wife, had three boys 
and two daughters: İbrahim (1789/90), Ahmed Tosun (1793), İsmail Kamil (1795), Tevhide 
(1797), and Nazlı (1799).302 Ahmed Tosun served as commander-in-chief of expeditionary 
forces sent to the Hijaz region until his early death in 1815 and İsmail Kamil helped his father 
in the conquest of the Sudanese territories (between 1820 and 1822) at the expense of his own 
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life.303 After the early death of his two brothers, İbrahim remained as the only supreme 
commander of the Egytian army. Apart from his sons, Mehmed Ali relied on his relatives: 
Muharrem Bey, Pasha’s son-in-law, was the head of the navy in the Morea War; then 
Mehmed Said Pasha, his son, was appointed to the post; his nephew İbrahim Pasha Yeğen 
was the head of infantry forces; Abbas Pasha, one of his grandsons, was the head of cavalry 
forces; Mehmed Şerif Pasha, another nephew, would be appointed to the governorship of 
Syria etc.304 In other words, Mehmed Ali’s army was actually an “household army” in which 
Pasha’s blood relatives, his son-in-laws, and his slaves occupied higher ranks, as Fahmy 
states.305 To sum, the mixture of French colonial administration, Mamluk household tradition, 
Selim III’s military reforms, and kinship ties formed basic elements of household strategy of 
Mehmed Ali after the year of 1805.  
 
III. 2:Husrev Mehmed Pasha’s Career after 1805 
 
While Mehmed Ali expanded his power in Egypt in the early 1800s, Husrev Mehmed 
Pasha was having most difficult times of his career. The death of his protector, Küçük 
Hüseyin Pasha, in 1803 did not only affect Husrev’s career but also the deposition and then 
the murder of Selim III. Grand Vizier Yusuf Ziya encountered with resistance upon his effort 
to form a Nizâm-ı Cedîd contingent in the Balkans. Because of the resentment of Balkan 
notables, Janissaries and the ulema leaders to the expansion of military reforms, Selim III 
replaced him with Hafız İsmail Pasha who was originally a man of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha but 
now a secret opponent of reformers.306 According to Uzunçarşılı, insolent attitudes of 
bureaucrats of the Irâd-ı Cedîd, were main reasons for Hafiz İsmail’s anti-reformist stance, 
who supported the Balkan notables and Istanbul reactionaries, leading to the Edirne Incident 
of June 1806.307 As a result, Selim III abdicated for Mustafa IV in May 1807 and he was 
killed upon Alemdar Mustafa Pasha’s effort to restore him to the throne in July 1808. 
Uzunçarşılı emphasizes that the death of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha in 1803 retarded reforms and 
left Selim III defenseless against his opponents.308 After the death of his patron, Husrev 
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benefited from the patronage of Mehmed Emin Rauf Pasha309 who was the son of çavuşbaşı 
Said Efendi –first patron of Husrev.310 
During the Ottoman-Russo War of 1806-1812, Husrev assumed military tasks and dealt 
with the suppression of some Balkan âyâns. Like the Egypt expedition, this war witnessed 
various intra-elite contestations, including that of Yusuf Ziya and Husrev. As detailed in the 
previous chapter, Yusuf Ziya and Küçük Hüseyin Pashas were in rivalry during the Egypt 
expedition and the death of the latter did not bring an end to this contestation since men of 
Küçük Hüseyin continued to suffer from the enmity of Yusuf Ziya. During the war efforts, 
Husrev was appointed governor of Bosnia (1806), of Tessaloniki (until 1808), and of Silistra 
with charge of commander of Danube Front (1809).311 When the defeat of Rasvat exhausted 
economic power of Husrev, he penned a petition and asked to be appointed to a remunerative 
(nemaluca) dirlik in order to compensate the loss of his wretched household.312 Contrary to 
his expectation, Grand Vizier Yusuf Ziya allocated the non-profitable sancak of Karahisar 
and instructed Husrev to administer this dirlik directly (bizzat zapt-ı idaresi).313 As Çelik 
points out, this deliberate decision aimed to weaken the power of Husrev Pasha since he was 
a man of Küçük Hüseyin, former rival of Yusuf Ziya. Mahmud II, however, did not approve 
the grand vizier’s decision and backed Husrev in order to prevent possible damage of this 
rivalry to the war efforts.314 Sultan Mahmud maintained his support to Husrev by appointing 
him to the post of grand admiral in January 1811. After seven years in office, Husrev was, 
this time, dismissed mainly because of another rivalry between his new protector Mehmed 
Emin Rauf Pasha and Hâlet Efendi.315 Then, he served in a number of provincial 
governorships until the outbreak of Greek Revolt.316  
 
                                                             
309 For the power relations of Mehmed Emin Rauf Pasha see., Şeref, Abdurrahman, Tarih Söyleşileri  
(Musahabe-i Tarihiye), Sucuoğlu Matbaası, İstanbul, 1980, pp.11-14 
310   Çelik, Hüsrev Mehmet Paşa, p.140 
311   İnalcık, Halil, “Husrev Paşa”, İA (MEB), vol.V/I, pp.609-616, p.610. 
312   Çelik, Hüsrev Mehmet Paşa, p.90 
313   Ibid. 
314   Ibid, p.91 
315  İnalcık, Halil, “Husrev Paşa”, İA (MEB), vol.V/I, pp.609-616, p.610-11 and Şeref, Tarih Söyleşileri (Musahabe-
i Tarihiye), pp.11, fn.3. According to Şeref, Hâlet resented to the rapid rise of Rauf Pasha to the grand vizierate 
in 1815 and managed to make him deposed in the following days. Although Hâlet made a great effort to made 
Rauf Pasha executed, he could not succeeded in it. As İnalcık points out, Halet also targeted the protégés of 
Rauf as well and caused the dismissal of Husrev from the post of grand admiral in February 1818. 
316  “Khosrew Pasha” IE.2, vol.V, p.35 
  
68 
 
III.3: Greek Revolt of 1821 and Intra-elite Contestations 
 
Atâ Efendi associates the outbreak of the Greek Revolt with Küçük Hüseyin Pasha’s 
unlawful appropriation of the Morean people’s wealth as to increase his own fortune. 
According to his narrative, resentment of Greek-orthodox subjects to the unjust conduct of 
Küçük Hüseyin, after 18 years, manifested itself in the form of Greek Revolt of 1821.317 
Although not sufficient to cover main dynamics of the revolt, his argument leads us to 
reconsider decisive role of intermediaries in the relations of subject people and the Porte. For 
the Greek-Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire, main intermediaries are the Patriarchate 
–representative of Orthodox millet-, Phanariorate Greeks of Istanbul, and provincial 
administrators of Greek-populated regions.318 All these people did not only interact with 
Greek-orthodox subjects but also with leading bureaucrats of the Porte, like Hâlet Efendi. 
Mehmed Said Hâlet Efendi (1761-1823) was one of the most influential bureaucrats in 
the early years of Mahmud II’s reign: After his success in the suppression of the rebellious 
governor of Bagdad, Küçük Süleyman Pasha, he gained the favor of Mahmud II to the extent 
that he was appointed as steward of the sultan’s court (kethüda-ı rikab-ı hümayun) and then 
as nişancı of the Imperial council in 1815.319 In the early days of his career, he had served as 
secretary to certain Ottoman dignitaries, such as the Phanariot Kallimakhi.320 Before detailing 
the impacts of his established relations with Phanariots, and his rivalry with Ali Pasha of 
Janina over the events of Morea, it seems necessary to touch upon economic, political, and 
ideological roots of the Greek Revolt of 1821. 
The Egypt expedition and the French’s seizure of the Ionian Islands contributed to the 
spread of revolutionary ideas on Morea. More importantly, French and British fleet’s 
involvement with these wars enabled Greek merchants and entrepreneurs to develop their 
own fleets and to gain a stronghold over the Ottoman seas that gave impetus to the industrial 
and agricultural growth in Morea.321 Coupled with the growth of Greek merchants’ colonies 
in the Mediterranean and Black sea, European thoughts contributed the rise of intellectuals 
and foundation of Philiki Hetaria (1815) which found wide audience under the leadership of 
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Alexander Ipsilanti, member of a Phanariote family.322 As Shaw states, Ali Pasha of Janina, 
Albanian-stock leading notable of the region, posed the main obstacle for the activities of 
Philiki Hetaria and Hâlet Efendi, probably at the instigation of the Phanariotes, got the sultan 
to ignore the Hetairia and instead to concentrate on curbing Ali Pasha’s power.323  
According to Ahmet Cevdet, Hâlet’s intimacy with Janissaries also played role in his 
instigation against Ali Pasha. In İstanbul, Janissaries could gather a decisive weight to tip the 
scales in favor of one political faction and Hâlet Efendi allied himself with these troops.324 
Sultan Mahmud II was planning to reform the Janissaries and in order to divert his attention, 
Hâlet brought the threat of Ali Pasha into the forefront.325 As detailed, he had also intimacy 
with Phanariotes who supported his smear campaign against Ali Pasha with the secret agenda 
that the following power vacuum in Morea could provide an ideal setting for the revolt of 
Greek-orthodox subjects.326 Consequently, Hâlet Efendi convinced Mahmud II for the 
elimination of Ali Pasha that led to rebellion of the latter to the Porte.  
Resistance of Ali Pasha of Janina could not be controlled until the late 1822 and the 
Porte seemed to have difficulty in distinguishing concurred rebellion of Greek-Orthodox 
subjects on Morea from Ali Pasha’s event at the beginning. When the sultan and the 
administration acknowledged that Hâlet Efendi’s claim –Ali Pasha was responsible for the 
uprising of Greek subjects- was not true and that Hâlet’s personal hostility drew the Porte 
into trouble in Morea, he became target of harsh criticism.327 Main associates of Hâlet, 
Janissaries and Phanariots, also lost prestige in the eye of the sultan during the Morea crisis. 
Furthermore, this crisis made Hâlet devoid of the economic support of Phanariot rulers of 
Wallachia and Moldavia and therefore he could not canalize money to the Janissary ağas that 
cut off main economic basis of his networking activities.328 Finally, Hâlet Efendi was 
executed in November 1823 as his associates were removed from administration. The list of 
his leading associates subject to appropriation and banishment gives idea about diverse 
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composition of his network: member of his household and their clients (his treasurer Ahmet 
Ağa, sealkeeper Ziver Efendi, kapu çuhadarı İzzet Ağa, his sarraf  Haskel and his brother, 
kaftancı Abdulhamid Ağa and his brother Abdülhalim Ağa, voyvoda of Urla –member of 
İzzet, Voyvoda of Menemen –rikap kethüdası of Hâlet-, Filibe nazırı Mehmed Ağa –former 
mehter başı of Hâlet) and his close friends such as Tophane nazırı-matbah emini Tekirdağlı 
Ahmet Ağa.329 Covering both central and provincial administrators, title of ağas and efendis, 
this list remind us that power shifts in the Ottoman administration could be confined to the 
intra-office contestations or to the tension between centre and periphery but rooted on 
contesting loyalties of the members of leading bureaucrats. The execution of Hâlet opened a 
path for the rise of his rivals, including Husrev Pasha who expanded his power basis during 
the Morea campaign as the grand admiral of the navy.330 
 
III.4: The Morea Campaign 
 
Like the Egypt expedition, Albanian irregular troops played an important role in the 
military campaign of Morea. Accordingly, payment issue maintained to produce conflict 
between irregular soldiers and administrative-military servants of the imperial household. In 
July 1822, Hurşid Pasha, as commander-in-chief of Ottoman forces in Rumelia, wrote a letter 
to grand vizier asking money to cover salaries of Albanian irregular troops. As Erdem 
analyzes, lack of discipline, dissatisfaction and reluctance of Albanian soldiers to fight –
unless they are paid in advance – are labeled as “treason of Albania tribe” by Hurşid Pasha 
and during the Morea campaign the issue of military dependability and political loyalty of 
Albanians took a form of distrust of the Porte toward its Albanian subjects especially during 
the grand vizierate of Mehmed Reşid Pasha, a leading member of Husrev’s household, in the 
years of 1829-1833.331 Apart from the difficulty in mobilizing irregular troops effectively, 
intra-elite rivalries and factionalism produced numerous problems among centrally appointed 
commanders and local magnates, participating to the military campaign of the Porte. 
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Yusuf Pasha of Siroz, for instance, in his report to the Porte criticized the late Hurşid 
Pasha (d.1823) for favoring members of his household at the expense of the resentment of 
others. Hurşid was said to appoint his own slaves as military commanders “without ever 
thinking whether all these great commanders, receivers of the sultan’s great titles, would 
accept the command of this page of a man” and he also complained about Hurşid’s exclusive 
manner in which he employed and consulted only “a few frivolous slaves” (birkaç sebükmağz 
köle) and pages of his own household, as Erdem states.332 What made intra-elite contestations 
more complicated was that the campaign was conducted by both land forces and navy and 
commanders of these two forces constantly accused each other for military failures. For 
example, Yusuf Pasha, on his part, was complaining about the ineffectiveness of the navy. To 
make matters worse, Husrev Pasha, as grand admiral of the Ottoman navy, was supposed to 
get on with his sworn enemy Mehmed Ali Pasha and his son İbrahim Pasha, commanding the 
fleets sent from Egypt. As might be expected, the rivalry between İbrahim and Husrev, 
hovewer, left its mark on the naval operations.333 Before contextualizing this rivalry within 
the Morea campaign, it seems necessary to question the motives of Mehmed Ali in sending 
his fleet to Morea.  
Mehmed Ali from the beginning onwards showed interest toward Syria and interfered 
in its power relations since the early days of his rule in Egypt. The security of Hijaz region 
and the suppression of the Wahhabi movement were of great importance for the sultan whose 
legitimacy depended party on his ability in providing security for the hajj and holy cities of 
Islam. Since Mehmed Ali became the most powerful vâli of the neighboring region, the Porte 
intervened to the Hijaz region through Mehmed Ali’s army that provided him with influence 
over the hinterland of Egypt.334 While his army encountered with difficulty in suppressing the 
Wahabbis in 1813, he, for instance, sent a letter to the grand vizier and told that he could 
offset the reverses suffered from by his army’s Arabia campaign only if he was given the 
province of Damascus in addition to Egypt.335 Two years later, he repeated the same demand 
and complained about how the vâli of Damascus damaged his campaign against the 
Wahhabis by not sending sufficient number of camels for the final attack on the Saudi capital 
Dar’riyya.336 Apart from camels, Syria region was famous for its raw materials, particularly 
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for timber and wood which would cover material necessities of Mehmed Ali in building a 
fleet and industrial infrastructure. Besides, his conscription policy and wars pulled away 
considerable man power from agricultural production, whereas heavily populated Syria 
region would fill this gap. Lastly, as Fahmy points out, Mehmed Ali was well aware of that 
his position as vâli of Egypt rooted on his personal strength rather than Mahmud II’s 
satisfaction and if the sultan decided to remove him by force, Syria would be a base for such 
an attack.337 Due to these reasons, Mehmed Ali was keen to expand his rule over Syria, and 
his military support to the Morea campaign would guarantee consent of the sultan for this 
plan.  
 
III.5: Father and Son, Patron and Slave in the Morea Campaign 
  
The Porte’s attempt to suppress the Greek Revolt with militias of local magnates and 
troops under the command of centrally-appointed bureaucrats did not bring success; 
increasing frustration led Mahmud II to call help of Mehmed Ali in the late 1823. Especially 
military failure in capturing Missolonghi and withdrawal of Mustafa Pasha to İşkodra 
alarmed Mahmud II for taking immediate measures.338 As usual, difficulty in mobilizing 
irregular Albanian troops and intra-elite contestations played decisive role in the failure of the 
siege of Missilonghi. Mustafa Pasha of İşkodra, for instance, reported to the Porte that he 
retreated from Missilonghi mainly because of ineffectiveness of irregulars while contestation 
between the tax collector of Tirhala region, Mehmed Reşid and Ebulebud Mehmed Efendi, -
vâli of Morea- wore out land operation and produced endless correspondences, putting 
military failures on each other’s shoulders.339 Mahmud II soon acknowledged that only 
military help of Mehmed Ali would change the balance in favor of the Porte.  
In 1824, the Sultan sent an imperial order to Mehmed Ali, appointing him to deal with 
the Greek Revolt and five months later, the Egyptian forces -comprising 17.000 infantry 
troops and 700 men with four artillery batteries- landed to Morea, as Fahmy states.340 
Mehmed Ali, at the same time, emphasized the importance of gathering all military authority 
in his son İbrahim Pasha’s hand for guaranteeing victory. Accordingly, he stated that he 
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might not send military help unless the Porte appoint İbrahim as both vâli of Morea and the 
grand admiral as to unite command of land and naval operations effectively.341 As might be 
expected, the Porte did not indulge this demand but found a compromise, rooting on the 
separation of command between İbrahim and Husrev: the former, as autonomous commander 
of Egyptian fleet (Donanmay-ı Mısriyye Seraskeri) were assumed to conduct naval operation 
in the islands of Hydra and Spetses (Çamlıca and Suluca) while Husrev, as the grand admiral 
of Ottoman navy, was responsible for suppression the rebellions in the islands of Samos and 
Psara (Sisam and İpsara).342 In other words, the Porte adjusted entire chain of command in 
the navy in consideration of the Mehmed Ali-Husrev contestation. 
Surprisingly, Husrev showed amicability to İbrahim Pasha when they came together 
in Halicarnassus in September 1824.343 In there, Husrev and İbrahim agreed on the joint 
operation of the Ottoman and Egypt fleets in Morea, Koron, Moton, and Sisam that 
invalidated the previous agreement based on the separate operation of these navies.344 After 
having success in the battles of İstanköy and Kazıklı Körfez, they soon dropped the idea of 
joint operation for Sisam on 1 October because of difficulties in gathering soldiers and in 
provisioning the navy for further operations and then, Husrev sailed for Istanbul in order to 
conduct futher preparations in the Imperial arsenal while İbrahim departed for Morea.345  
İbrahim was supposed to provide naval support to the land operation conducted by 
Derviş Pasha, vâli of Rumelia. Apart from delayed arrival of İbrahim, Albania troops and 
their payment issue put Derviş into the trouble and consequently, he was replaced by Reşid 
Mehmed Pasha, the commander of Vidin, on 13 October 1824.346 With this appointment, 
command of both land and naval operation of the Porte was gathered in the hands of Husrev 
and his slave Reşid Mehmed. Contrary to Mehmed Ali relying mainly his sons and relatives, 
Husrev trusted his slaves among which Reşid Mehmed and Halil Rifat had privileges status. 
Georgian-stock Reşid Mehmed (1780-1836) entered the retinue of Husrev as a slave and after 
receiving education in his patron’s residence, he began to rise in the Ottoman administration 
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especially after his success in the military campaign against Ali Pasha of Janina.347 Although 
Husrev aimed to balance influence of İbrahim at Morea by appointing Reşid Mehmed to the 
governorship of Rumelia, the relations between two parties underwent into unexpected shifts 
such as Husrev’s backing İbrahim vis-a-vis Reşid.  
Although Reşid and İbrahim were performing well for recapturing Missologhi, they 
were in need of reinforcement in terms of war material and provisions. Because Mahmud II 
mainly relied on Mehmed Ali for the provision of the Ottoman fleet, he sent the imperial 
navy to Alexandria to be repaired and reprenished with necessary equipments.348 On August 
1825, Husrev, thus, arrived at Egypt for watching over the transportation of requested 
materials to Morea.349 At the beginning, Mehmed Ali welcomed Husrev affably; in return, 
Husrev praised him for his support to the ongoing campaign. Because shipping of supplies 
took up time, Husrev extended his visit and friendly atmosphere between these old enemies 
took the form of mutual accusations in the following days. Mehmed Ali, for his part, accused 
Husrev for cowardliness of captains in the Ottoman navy and for his deliberate neglect in 
provisioning İbrahim’s army.350 He then asked Husrev and captains in his retinue to take an 
oath to fight effectively and he also announced that he might call his son back to Egypt unless 
Husrev take necessary measures.351 For whatever the reason is Mehmed Ali’s threat or not, 
Husrev went on with İbrahim, following to his arrival to Morea. 
In the theatre of war, Reşid Mehmed, like all former vâlis of Morea and Rumelia, 
encountered with difficulty in satisfying demands of Albanian troops that hindered land 
operations. Contrary to these irregular troops, discipline, order and efficiency of Cihadiye 
army under the command of İbrahim evoked admiration of Mahmud II to the extent that he 
instructed İbrahim for the re-capture of Missolonghi. On 2 December 1825, Husrev, Reşid 
Mehmed and İbrahim held a meeting to discuss plans of military operation.352 In the meeting, 
Husrev and İbrahim harshly criticized Reşid for his failure in Missolonghi and its 
neighboring area. In his defense, Reşid touched upon the disorder among Albanian troops but 
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his statement was far from placating his master and İbrahim.353 Worse still, they refused to 
send Cihadiye troops to the service of Reşid in order to protect these disciplined soldiers from 
the possible harms of irregulars. Husrev and İbrahim, in an irreconcilable manner, offered 
three options to Reşid: he may either demobilize Albanians or lead them the defense of 
Salona; lastly, he may announce his resign.354 Due to a lacuna in the documents, we may only 
speculate intentions of Husrev in siding against his own slave: He might have aimed to 
exclude himself from military failure of Reşid or he might take threat of Mehmed Ali 
seriously. Anyway, he and İbrahim showed hostility toward Reşid who, in return, directly 
corresponded with the Porte. At the end, the Porte approved the demand of Husrev and 
İbrahim and appointed them to the defense of Missolonghi and instructed Reşid to lead his 
Albanian troops to Salona.  
In Salona, delayed salaries of Albanian irregulars continued to produce major trouble 
for Reşid. As a solution, he wrote a report to the Porte, asking to send a treasurer in order to 
solve the payment issue.355 The Porte, in return, sent Hüsnü Bey and Necip Efendi, the agent 
of Mehmed Ali, to the theatre of war in order to supervise the operations of the joint 
command of Reşid, Husrev, and İbrahim.356 According to reports of Hüsnü Bey and Necip 
Efendi, Husrev and İbrahim were in irreconcilable manner and that the only solution was to 
appoint them to separate military operations after guaranteeing the re-capture of 
Missolonghi.357 In addition to this discomfort, Reşid’s Albanian troops began to envy the 
success of the Cihadiye troops and insisted that they would have realized the same military 
success if they were allowed to participate the assault of Missolonghi.358 İbrahim Pasha did 
not wanted to make Reşid resent too much and thus charged him with the command of a 
bastion near to Missolonghi but soon after, Albanian troops lost discipline while most of 
them deserted the battlefield and Cihadiye troops completed this mission successfully.359 
After nearly five years, Missilonghi, symbol of the Greek Revolt, was recaptured by the 
Ottomans on 23 April 1826.360 
 
                                                             
353  Ibid., p.251 
354  Ibid. 
355  Ibid., p.248 
356  Fahmy, All the Pasha’s men, p.57 
357  Çelik, Hüsrev Mehmet Paşa, p.253 
358  Ibid., p.256 
359  Ibid. 
360  Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, vol.II, p.19 
  
76 
 
III.6: Dismissal or Promotion: Husrev Mehmed Pasha at the Command of the Mansure 
Army 
 
 When the news about victory in Missolonghi reached the Porte, Mahmud II bestowed 
Husrev, İbrahim, Reşid and Mehmed Ali Pashas with various imperial gifts as euphoria 
dominated over the Ottoman capital. Despite of this mood of optimism, rivalry between 
Husrev and İbrahim continued to shatter war efforts in many ways. For instance, İbrahim 
asked Husrev to send sufficient number of ships to Egypt for the transportation of 
reinforcement materials but the latter did not fulfill this demand.361 Upon Husrev’s neglect of 
this mission, İbrahim informed the Porte about the suffering of his troops.362 In return, 
Husrev defended himself by stating that he had sent sufficient number of vessels, and 
necessarily kept other ships in the Morea for the suppression of ongoing threats of 
rebellions.363 Moreover, he criticized İbrahim for conducting operations without counseling 
him and for instigating Reşid on sending a joint letter to Porte, asking dismissal of Husrev.364 
Apart from letters circulating between Morea and Istanbul, Mehmed Ali was also sending 
numerous letters to the Porte. Like his son, Mehmed Ali’s main complaint was the setbacks 
in provisioning Cihadiye troops stationed in Morea and that Husrev should be dismissed 
since his neglect caused the suffering of his troops.365 In his letters, Mehmed Ali emphasized 
that his complain about Husrev does not root on his personal hostility but the grand admiral’s 
irresponsibility, paralyzing the war efforts. In the end, Husrev was dismissed from the office 
of grand admiral and called back to Istanbul in 1826.366 And yet, despite Mehmed Ali and his 
son’s satisfaction, Husrev’s dismissal did not necessarily mean his fall from grace. As Levy 
states, Husrev was informed of Janissary rebellion and its suppression, and foundation of the 
new army while he was in Morea and soon after his return to İstanbul, he assumed important 
task in the foundation of Mansure Army.367  
 In essence, the Greek Revolt changed the relations between Mehmed Ali and Sultan 
Mahmud dramatically. As we will touch upon in the following part, Mehmed Ali attempted 
to compensate his losses in Morea by sizing over Syria and his expansionist project posed 
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grave danger to the Ported throughout 1830’s. In other words, Syria campaign was a direct 
result of Mehmed Ali’s resentments to Mahmud II’s distrust to him during the Morea 
campaign. More importantly, the Greek Revolt seems to change the power relations in the 
imperial scale. Regarding these changes, Erdem associates state centralization, replacement 
of Janissary troops with conscript army, ideological adjustments, redefinition of state and 
subject people’s relation with the Greek Revolt.368 Among these developments, particularly 
abolition of Janissaries had a direct link with the rise of Husrev’s household in the Ottoman 
administration. 
Although Sultan Mahmud was not content with the performance of Janissaries for a 
long time, these troops established organic relations with other segments of society as we 
witnessed in the case of Hâlet Efendi. In other words, Mahmud II had to win broad segment 
of society in order to be able to abolish these troops. As Erdem points out, poor performance 
of these soldiers along with irregular troops during the Morean campaign and imminent threat 
of Russia were fully exploited by Sultan Mahmud and his reforming cadre in weakening 
ulema’s support to their traditional allies.369 As assassination of Selim III suggests, it was a 
must for the sultans to keep sufficient number of supporter in the capital to cope with 
opposition of unsatisfied segments of society, especially in times of radical imperial projects. 
Accordingly, Mahmud II seems to call back his leading trustees, including Husrev, to 
Istanbul to be able to realize his reform project. In this framework, appointment of Husrev to 
the command (seraskerlik) of the new army (the Trained and Victorious Soldiers of 
Muhammad) soon after the abolishment of Janissaries does not seem surprising.  
 In 1836, Moltke, Prussian officer in the service of the Ottoman army, portrayed 
Husrev’s power as following: 
Husrev had participated to the siege of Missologhi. Since then, he 
gained favor of the sultan and became indispensable ally for him because of 
two reasons; he was chief guard of the Ottoman capital and he patronized 
reforms…People who want to conduct business in İstanbul funnel great deal of 
money to Pasha. For a vali, everything should be sacrificed for having such a 
patron in the capital. Without consent of Husrev, it is impossible to get success 
in any great business. Edict (ferman) of Husrev is necessary whatever the issue 
is building or renovating a Church or another thing. He superintends promotion 
of people to the highest rank in the army. Unchallengeable influence of this 
commander manifests itself even out of the military issues. In Turkey, actually, 
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people, at the administration of state offices, were much more important than 
the prestige of the offices themselves.370 
 
As Moltke perfectly captures, Husrev gained unprecedented power between the years 
of 1827 and 1836 mainly because of his contributions to the military reforms following to the 
abolition of Janissaries. The success of Mahmud II in eliminating these troops owed much to 
his networking activities in which he appointed his trustees to the key points of the military 
and civil administration. Hüseyin Ağa -commander of Janissaries-, artillery troops, and the 
garrisons protecting the Bosporus were among these trustees who sided with the sultan and 
participated to his brutal persecution targeted other segments of Janissaries. Hüseyin Ağa, for 
instance, eliminated some opponent Janissary troops from the army by sending them the 
military retinue of Sultan Mahmud’s trustees, such as Husrev’s fleet during the Morea 
campaign where they left for dead in the desolate coasts.371 Mahmud II awarded loyalty of 
Hüseyin Ağa by appointing him as the first commander (serasker) of Mansure Army with 
extended authority such as policing Istanbul. Resolution of the sultan in destroying all power 
networks supporting to Janissaries and conscription of the young male population of Istanbul 
to the new army did not only make the public order of the capital one of the most delicate 
mission for the serasker but also assumed him a political power.372 It was this political power 
which would be base for the dominance position of Husrev in the Ottoman administration 
upon his replacement of Hüseyin Ağa in 8 May 1827.373 When compared Hüseyin Ağa, 
Husrev was much more knowledgeable about modern methods of training and weaponry 
since he had been in the household of Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, one of leading practitioners of 
new order in navy. Besides, Husrev had a chance to observe British and French armies in 
Egypt and modernized Cihadiye Army of Mehmed Ali in the Morea.374 In essence, Sultan 
Mahmud had asked help of Mehmed Ali Pasha as well. In August 1826, he requested 
Mehmed Ali to send twelve offices but his reply was not affirmative: Pasha reported that his 
Egyptian officers were not yet sufficiently prepared while his European drill masters had 
used to high salaries and expensive uniforms, and their presence in Istanbul would be 
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obstructive to the Ottoman army.375 Like Mehmed Ali, many European officers abstained 
from helping the Porte mainly because of their pro-Greek stance vis-à-vis ongoing Morea 
question. As a consequence, Mahmud II had to rely on mainly his own household in forming 
the Mansure Army. 
 Although conscription of the young population of Istanbul provided necessary number 
of the rank and file, the Porte faced with difficulty in forming the officer crops of new army. 
To solve this problem, Mahmud II established the battalion of the Ağas of the Court’s inner 
service (Enderun-i Hümâyun Ağavâtı) in which the sultan’s young slaves, free born Muslim 
servants, and sons of grandees were trained in infantry and cavalry troops (150 people in 
total) by the July 1826 but their poor performance during the war with Russia (1828-1829) 
led to Mahmud to abolish this institution in May 1830.376 Even though short-lived, the Court 
Battalion established quantitative dominance against Husrev’s slaves, amounting to between 
70-80 men. Husrev balanced influence of Court Battalion by appointing his slaves, including 
Halil Rifat, to the more prominent positions while three of first four officers rising to the rank 
of colonel (miralay) were also his protégés (İskender, Sa’dullah, and Hayreddin Mehmed 
Ağas).377 Halil Mehmed Rifat (1795-1856) had entered the household of Husrev as Georgian-
stock slave and then served him as treasurer before his access to the Mansure Army.378 It is 
very obvious that Husrev favored Halil Rifat over other members of his household especially 
in 1830s. In 1834, he, for instance, managed to include Halil Rifat into the dynastic family by 
mediating his marriage to Saliha Sultan, daughter of Mahmud II and two years later, Halil 
Rifat would take over the post of serasker.379 
Husrev, at the meantime, maintained to gather new slaves and protégés for his own 
household. As we touched upon, wars and military campaigns were the source of slaves for 
the Ottoman ruling elite and the Greek Revolt was not an exception. According to the Sharia, 
non-Muslim subjects rebelling against the Muslim ruler might be subject to enslavement. 
Apparently, Husrev enslaved or purchased some Greek boys during the Morea campaign. 
Because of the selective nature of Ottoman prospograhy -focusing merely on people of high 
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ranking- it is difficult to estimate total number of Greek boys added to his household. 
Regarding to those who promoted, at least, to the higher ranks, Sicilli Osmanî covers İbrahim 
Edhem Pasha, Kara Selim Paşa and Sücûdi Hüseyin Efendi.380 Career of İbrahim Edhem 
suggests that Husrev’s strong position in the Ottoman administration owes much to his ability 
in adapting Mehmed Ali’s novelties, such as the sending his protégés to France for 
education.381 
Although plenty of historical researches have focused on the interaction of the Porte 
and European states in the modernization period of the Ottoman Empire, few of them 
emphasized how Mehmed Ali’s reforms functioned as laboratory for this interaction. It is true 
that challenge of Mehmed Ali put Mahmud II into trouble in many ways especially after the 
Greek Revolt. His Syria campaign of 1831-33 and the Nezib Battle of 1839 did not only 
exploit military power of the Porte but also made its legitimacy suspicious in the eyes of 
Muslim population who deeply resented the Sultan’s call for help of Christian powers against 
his rebellious yet Muslim vâli. But it is also true that Mehmed Ali contributed to legitimacy 
of Mahmud’s reforms by introducing first successful example of westernization/modernized 
army to the Ottoman society, especially to its Muslim segment who was formerly suspicious 
about compatibility of western technology and knowledge to Muslim societies. For instance, 
it was partly brilliant performance of Mehmed Ali’s Cihadiye troops at the Morea that made 
it easier for Mahmud II to replace janissaries with the Mansure Army. It is also important to 
note that Mehmed Ali’s impact was not restrained to the military reforms of the Porte. To set 
example, Mahmud II established Takvim-i Vakayi, first official gazette of the Porte, in 1831, 
just after three years of Mehmed Ali’s Vakayi-ül Mısriye while Husrev sent İbrahim Edhem 
along with his three slaves to France (in 1831) following to Mehmed Ali’s dispatch of 44 
students to Paris in 1826.382 In light of this interaction it seem that Husrev managed to remain 
in the high-ranking bureaucracy throughout the reign of Mahmud mainly for two reasons: He 
was successful in implementing military reforms along the same line with Mehmed Ali -
though with time lag-, and he curbed influence of the latter over the Porte since he lost the 
competition over the governorship of Egypt to Mehmed Ali. Although Husrev had started his 
career in the Palace, it is obvious that the Palace School contributed so little his intellectual 
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development that he was one of the illiterate members of the Ottoman bureaucracy -needless 
to say his lack of Western languages and culture. Therefore he generously invested into the 
education of his household’s members.383 
Husrev provided his slaves İbrahim Edhem, Abdüllatif, Ahmed and Hüseyin with 
European-education by sending them to France. In Paris, they first attended the Institute 
Barbet and after obtained French language; they entered to the university for technical 
training. İbrahim Edhem graduated from Ecole des Mines (mining faculty) while Hüseyin, 
Ahmed and Abdüllatif attended different branches (artillery and maritime) of military 
academy.384 Gözlüklü Reşid Mehmed, another leading trustee of Husrev, followed them in 
1832 and after his education he appointed to post of Tophane-i Amire Feriki.385 Although he 
sent limited number of his slaves to France, rest of his men went through in-residence 
education for which Husrev hired numerous instructors specialized especially in 
administrative book keeping and military drill. Although he thus placed large number of his 
slaves and protégés into the Mansure Army, Husrev was not the only bureaucrat searching to 
expand his influence in the military bureaucracy. 
 In the summer of 1826, Ağa Hüseyin Pasha, first serasker of new army, İzzet 
Mehmed Pasha, Grand Admiral in between February 1827 and October 1828 and 
subsequently grand vizier, Papuççu Ahmed Pasha, grand admiral until January 1830, enrolled 
significant number of their household slaves into Mansure Army in order to sustain their 
influence in military and over state affairs in general.386 Since Mahmud II was well aware of 
the intra-elite contestations over the highest ranks of the new army, he introduced a new 
promotion system rooted on an examination in the end of 1831. Nevertheless, the exam could 
not eliminate favoritism and even Sultan Mahmud himself made direct appointments to the 
top ranks: He placed his eunuchs and courtiers to highest military ranks as the appointment of 
Said Mehmed Ağa, mabeyinci of the sultan, to the brigadier-general in the cavalry that 
opened path for his promotion to seraskerlik in 1838.387  
To sum, monopolization of highest ranks by the leading bureaucrats’ households 
prevented professionalization within the Mansure Army until the delayed establishment of 
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military academy in 1834. Although Husrev Mehmed Pasha remained in the post of serasker 
until 1836, protégés of other bureaucrats also diffused to the administration of the new army. 
As might be expected, contesting interests of these subgroups continued to immobilize 
military actions in the imperial campaigns. While leading bureaucrats worked at high 
pressure to secure posts in the new army, the Morea campaign did not yet terminate the 
disturbances on the peninsula. Worse still, heavy losses of Greek-Orthodox subjects in the 
Missolonghi diverted further attraction of European public opinion onto politics of the Porte. 
Even though successful in recapturing Missolonghi, The Porte could not re-establish its 
dominance over Morea because of the European intervention. Resulted in the destruction of 
Ottoman-Egypt joint navy in Navarino, European involvement did not only open a path for 
the emergence of modern Greece but also worsened the relation between Mahmud II and 
Mehmed Ali Pasha. 
 Success of the Cihadiye Army of Mehmed Ali in the Morea was closely monitored by 
Europeans, particularly by Russians. Upon the death of Czar Alexander, Nicholas I ascended 
to the throne in 1825 since then Russian politics in the Morea and Greece took more 
interventionist form. Because Nicholas was willing to expand Russian influence over 
orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire, the idea of possibility of Mehmed Ali’s seizure 
over Morea discomforted him.388 The British, on their part, were willing to mediate a 
settlement in Morea in conjunction with Russia to prevent a new Ottoman-Russo war which 
might be disastrous for the Porte. In March 17, 1826, growing aggression in the Russian 
politics manifested itself in the form of ultimatum to Sultan Mahmud: Czar demanded full 
restoration of the privileges of the Principalities and the autonomy of Serbia as settled in the 
Treat of Bucharest and Mahmud II, under British pressure, did nothing but met the request of 
Czar by adding recognition of Russian dominance over Caucasus and allowing free access of 
Russian ships in all Ottoman waters and Straits.389 In essence, the abolishment of Janissaries 
put the Ottoman military forces temporarily in disarray and the Porte, thus, could not resist 
new demands of Russian: In the Convention of Akkerman (October 7, 1826) Russian position 
as the protector of the region of Serbia and Romania was acknowledged that gave Russia the 
right to interfere in their domestic affairs.390 Although these were significant acquisitions, 
Russia yet maintained to pressure the Porte for the Greek subjects of Morea. In the face of the 
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Russian aggression, the Porte began to debate whether the sultan should wage a new war 
against Russia. Husrev along with Galib Pasha and the grand vizier Selim Pasha did not 
support the idea of war and stated that the Porte still lacked men and sources to battle 
Russians effectively while faction of Âkif Efendi advocated the opposite in order to regain 
lost territories and prestige.391 In the end, Sultan Mahmud adopted the latter idea and 
manifested his determination in maintaining the military campaign. In response, joint forces 
of Britain, France and Russia destroyed the Ottoman-Egyptian navy at Navarino in October 
20, 1827.392 
 When compared the Porte, Mehmed Ali and his son İbrahim Pasha seemed to have 
adopted more cautious manner towards the thread of European joint forces. For instance, 
when İbrahim informed the grand vizier regarding to his concern about the presence of a 
combined forces of French-British-Russian fleet so close to the Ottoman-Egypt navy in 
Navarino, the latter advised him to ignore such feeble threads and to rely on formidable 
power of the Ottoman state.393 Just few hours before the disaster, Mehmed Ali wrote a letter 
to his agent Necip Efendi in İstanbul and asked to convince the Porte to accept principle of 
Greek independence and to seek Austrian meditation since he was neither prepared nor 
willing to encounter with Europeans.394 The Porte, however, refused İbrahim’s demand for 
the withdrawal of his troops to Egypt. In the face of such irreconcilable manner of the Porte, 
Mehmed Ali, on his own, signed a treaty with Europeans in order to guarantee the safety for 
İbrahim’s withdrawal from the Morea.395 As if these were not enough, Sultan Mahmud did 
not make any effort for rewarding Mehmed Ali’s military contribution to the Morea 
campaign. Contrary to Mehmed Ali’s expectation that governorship of Syria would be 
bestowed upon him, Sultan Mahmud gave him Crete in which ongoing resistance of Greek-
Orthodox population may consume further wealth of Mehmed Ali, let alone generating 
necessary income to compensate his wrecked fleet.396 In sum, the Morea campaign ended 
with the resentment of Mehmed Ali to Mahmud II that will be base for his Syria Campaigns 
in 1831 and 1839.  
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Chapter IV: The Serasker and the Fermanlu 
Vâli in the Syrian Campaigns (1831-1833 
and 1839)  
 
After the Navarino Battle, growing tension between the Porte and Russia ended up 
with Nicholas’ declaration of war in 28 April 1828. Until the middle of May, Czar’s troops 
marched into Moldavia as well as eastern Anatolia as his Mediterranean fleet began to 
provide great amounts of weapons and ammunitions to the Greek insurgents.397 Because the 
Mansure Army was yet in the establishment phase, Mahmud supported his new army with 
irregular troops for the military operation in the Balkans. As with the Morean campaign, the 
sultan also asked Mehmed Ali to sent Cihadiye troops. In his response, Mehmed Ali offered 
justsome money and stated that he would send troops if he was given a governorship in 
Anatolia.398 In the end, they could not reach to an agreement that rendered Mehmed Ali to 
devote all his energy and time into modernization projects. In fact, absent of Cihadiye troops 
was not only reason for the defeat of the Ottoman troops in the Russian War. Intra-elite 
contestations, such as the rivalry of Husrev Pasha and Hüseyin Ağa, maintained to harm the 
war efforts of the Ottomans.399 
To start with, rivalry between Husrev and Grand Vizier Selim Mehmed Pasha resulted 
in the appointment of Hüseyin Ağa to the command of the Imperial Army on the Balkans. As 
Levy points out, this was very controversial appointment because the grand vizier or his 
stand-in, serasker, commands the Imperial Army according to military tradition. Since 
Husrev replaced Hüseyin Ağa in the previous year, he or grand vizier Selim Mehmed should 
have assumed the command of army. Because Husrev and Selim Mehmed were in rivalry, 
none of them wanted to leave capital for fear of losing ground to his rival and thus command 
of army fell to Hüseyin Ağa, as Levy states.400 Despite his title of independent commander-
in-chief (müstakil serasker) Hüseyin could not exclude himself from intrigues of Husrev and 
Selim Mehmed during the campaign. At first, Halil Rifat Pasha, protégé of Husrev, appointed 
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as Deputy Commander-in-chief (Ordu Ser Askeri Kâimmakamı) at Hüseyin Ağa’s camp and 
he reported directly to his patron on the regular basis.401 Later on, Said Efendi, an old rival of 
Hüseyin Ağa was appointed as Superintended of the army (Ordu Nâzırı) and in that capacity 
he easily corresponded with the grand vizier directly.402 Needless to say, they sent numerous 
letters to the palace, accusing each other for incompetence and for military failures.  
Coupled with inexperience of Mansure troops, spread of plague and resulting food 
shortage, the campaign ended up with defeat and the Porte asked European ambassadors in 
Istanbul to mediate for a peace treaty.403 To the account of Slade, Husrev Pasha advocated the 
idea of armistice and in his meeting with French and British ambassadors in the sultan’s 
palace at Therapia he confessed that “we are so beaten…we cannot be beaten more; 
resistance is useless”.404 Following day, in 13 September 1829, the Porte signed the Treaty of 
Adrianople. Thanks to mediation of the Britain and France, military acquisition of Russia was 
reduced to the control of the mounts of Danube with the right of free trade while Czar 
conceded to evacuate his troops from south of Pruth –Principalities, Dobruca, and 
Bulgaria.405 Although the Russian War of 1828-9 put Mahmud II into trouble, the greatest 
threat to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was found to come from Mehmed Ali Pasha: 
His Syria campaign of 1831-1833 challenged Mahmud’s authority in most part of Syria, 
Adana, and Hijaz region. 
 
IV.1: Mehmed Ali and the Sultan’s Unsatisfied Subjects  
 
After the Morea campaign, Mehmed Ali Pasha revitalized his army by initiating a new 
wave of conscription that encountered with resistance of the Egypt population some of who 
fled to the districts of Jerusalem, Nablus, and Gaza, within the paşalık of Acre.406 Using the 
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pretext of some 6000 peasants who had escaped to Abdullah Pasha of Acre to evade taxes 
and corvée, Mehmed Ali started the Syrian expedition on November 2, 1831.407 Because this 
campaign pitted Muslim soldiers in the Egypt army against their coreligionists in the 
Ottoman imperial army, Mehmed Ali made great effort togain legitimacy for all his military 
actions. Nevertheless, his pretext of fugitive Egyptians did not convince the sultan who 
branded Mehmed Ali and his son İbrahim Pasha as rebels (fermanlu) and sent his troops over 
them. As with the Napoleon expedition of 1798, local governors organized the defense on 
their own until the delayed arrival of the Imperial Army because of the long distance between 
Istanbul and Syria. In the initial phase of the campaign, Abdullah Pasha sent a letter assuring 
his district governor of Jerusalem that the Imperial navy was en route for the defense of Acre 
and Syria and condemned Mehmed Ali in the strongest terms such as the evil one (al-
khabûth), the rebel (al-khâraj), depraved villain (al-shaqi al-khâsir), and the devil (al-laʿin), 
as well as “the enemy of God” and “enemy of the Sultan”.408 At first glance, Abdullah 
Pasha’s maledictory language for Mehmed Ali might be seen as an ordinary accusation 
targeted to a rival bureaucrat in contestation. Rood, however, brings to light the growing 
importance of propaganda and legalizing activities that differentiated Mehmed Ali’s position 
in the eye of Syrian and Anatolian population from that of other governors -including 
Abdullah Pasha.409 In Morea, Mehmed Ali had militarily supported Sultan Mahmud against 
his non-Muslim subjects. This time, he and his Muslim soldiers were to fight against the 
sultan’s Trained and Victorious “Soldiers of Muhammad”. In other words, this war was 
among Muslims. Furthermore, the theatre of war was Muslim-dominated Syria and Adana 
regions. Considering all these, it is not surprising to see that both party –the sultan and 
Mehmed Ali- did not only use arms but also the discourse of Muslim solidarity to win the 
battle. 
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Besides, Mehmed Ali was still a governor of the Ottoman administration and his 
administrative-military servants were also members of the Ottoman imperial household and 
its culture. İbrahim Pasha managed to capture Gaza, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Haifa  and Acre within 
a short time.410 In this rapid advance, not only commanders but also civil officers in the 
household of Mehmed Ali played decisive roles. In fact, these officers were members of the 
Ottoman culture through which they easily interacted with locals and diffused into power 
networks of magnates and local administrations that enabled Mehmed Ali to be accepted as 
legitimated ruler for many people of the region. Regarding the governing-elite in the Mehmed 
Ali’s household Toledano states that 
Core members of the Ottoman-Egyptian elite spoke Turkish; shared 
values and heritage of Ottoman culture; were mostly, though not exclusively, 
Muslim; came from various parts of the empire, though some were born in 
Egypt, and from various ethnic backgrounds; were committed to serve in 
Egypt under an Ottoman-Egyptian dynasty; held office either in military or 
in the bureaucracy.411 
 
As seen above, the household strategy of Mehmed Ali bears great resemblance to the 
Ottoman imperial household: Like the sultans who distanced themselves from the main ethnic 
groups in society through kul system, Mehmed Ali staffed high-ranking offices with Turkish-
speaking elites instead of Egyptians in order to curb influence of traditional leaders of 
Egyptian society and to prevent the emergence of new local power foci. In similar way, 
Fahmy shows how Mehmed Ali deliberately reserved high-ranking positions in the army to 
Turkish-speakingofficers: Nomination for promotion of upper, in general, stated place of 
birth of candidate, to make clear that he was a “Turk” and he instructed İbrahim not to 
promote “Arabs’ even in the case of short supply of “Turkish” officers.412 Paradoxically, this 
household strategy-relying on the exclusion of Egyptians from the administration-would 
function as an inclusive policy beyond the territories of Egypt. For instance, İbrahim captured 
Tyre (Sur), Sayda, Beirut, Tripoli, and Damascus without armed contestation while support 
of Emir Beshir also contributed to the spread of pro-Mehmed Ali sentiments in these 
regions.413 İbrahim also managed to recruit some 15.000 men among various tribes in Syria 
(including Bedouins and Druses), Nablus, and Jerusalem by the summer of 1832.414 Of 
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course, discontent of the subject people to the Porte should also be considered while 
explaining the rapid march of İbrahim. 
Akşin suggests to question the possible links between this discontent and sultan 
Mahmud’s post-1826 policies. According to him, abolishment of janissaries and the 
following oppression regime and military modernization might have triggered three types of 
opposition: 1) conservatist reaction to the western-style reforms, 2) libertarian reaction to the 
growing despotism and oppression, and 3) economic reaction to the growing tax-burden.415 In 
the previous part, we mentioned how Mahmud’s attempts to suppress all possible pro-
Janissary oppositions in the capital resulted in the empowerment of Husrev as the chief guard 
of Istanbul. As Moltke states, many Janissaries had fled from Istanbul on the face of the 
oppressive city administration.416 These people may have contributed to the spread of anti-
Mahmud feelings in the provinces. İbrahim tried to win these people along with their 
relatives and friends by reviving the Janissary troops as did he in Aleppo.417 More 
importantly, İbrahim’s advance to Syria and Adana regions resulted in the Porte’s imposition 
of extra taxes over the subject people who had already in economic difficulty because of the 
centralization projects and the military defeats. This was a part of the vicious circle in which 
the more Mahmud II encountered with the threat of dissolution of the empire the more 
economic, psychological, and ideological pressure he put on the subject people. On the face 
of this growing pressure, some of Ottomans allied themselves with Mehmed Ali that led to 
the Porte to act with further suspicion toward the rest of society.  
Regarding the growing economic pressure, the Russian War of 1828-9 and Mehmed 
Ali crisis cut off the Porte’s connection with Moldova, Wallachia, and Egypt, which were the 
main supplier of the grain for the consumption of Istanbul and other leading cities. The 
following shortage of the grain did not only trigger the inflation but also increased the 
economic pressure over the peasants of the other provinces.418 This economic pressure 
doubled by the mobilization of the Ottoman Army over İbrahim: the Porte provided the 
supplies of the troops locally. Because of the distance between Egypt and Adana region, 
İbrahim also relied on the local markets in the provisioning his troops but he paid equity to 
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local producers who agreed to provide necessary materials.419 In other times, Mehmed Ali 
and İbrahim seemed to provide people more than the economic wealth. Story of 
Tahmisçioğlu Hacı Mustafa Ağa, the magnate of Kastamonu region implies that political 
patronage of Mehmed Ali also played a role in the rapid advance of İbrahim in the Adana 
region.When Mustafa Ağa and his brother Hacı Ahmed had been involved in crime in their 
hometown, they were put into the prison and after they were released with the mediation of 
some of their friends, they had escaped to Egypt to secure their lives.420 When Hacı Mustafa 
Ağa returned back, he sided with İbrahim by submitting the following letter to him; 
Mütesellims who were appointed by Serasker Husrev Pasha as to 
administer this region, have conducted oppression of the worst kind. People 
in their retinue are impious; they have done opposite what Islam and sharia 
order to do. When all things went beyond the limits of tolerable, we told the 
situation to mütesellim but he did not pay attention to our complaints. Worse 
still, he -with the instigation of people in his circle- informed the Porte 
against the honest and peaceful people of our community. While deserving 
the city with his retinue, he initiated a battle against inhabitants (ehali), in 
which he conducted all kinds of tyranny: He killed people; pillaged their 
possessions; set their houses on fire. Muslims under the command of Hacı 
Mustafa Ağa battled with these burglars, killed mütesellim and captured 
some of his men. Inhabitants of all regions are against them…We, as the 
people of this region, have decided to leave the [Ottoman] government which 
did not make any effort to provide us with security and order of which your 
people have taken advantage. We would like to announce our loyalty to you 
and hope that you shall allow us to enjoy your patronage. If you consider 
appointing a new mütesellim, you might appoint Hacı Mustafa Ağa who is 
known with his humanity and his experiences… 421 
 
Whether it was written by Hacı Mustafa himself or by one of the scribes in İbrahim’s 
retinue, the discourse of this letter might still be used to analyze the main themes of Mehmed 
Ali’s propaganda activities. First, the letter associates oppression and disruption of order with 
the mütesellim and emphasized that he was appointed by Husrev. In the second chapter, we 
touched upon extensive authority bestowed upon bureaucrats during the war times. In another 
words, Husrev, in the capacity of serasker of the army, might have directly appointed the 
aforementioned mütesellim of Kastamonu. Even this was not the real case; his extensive 
power of appointment might have been used as the basis for the smear campaign of İbrahim, 
aiming to discredit Husrev in the eyes of both people of the region and the sultan. Though the 
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letter briefly touches upon the relation of Husrev and mütesellim, it puts the latter’s cruelty 
against the people of the regionat the very center of critics. Akşin shows that the war-time tax 
for the naval efforts (kalyoncu bedeliyesi) and the Porte agencies’ seizure of the possession of 
local people for provisioning their retinues with supplies and forage played role in the 
outbreak of Tahmiscioğlu Revolt.422 In light of this information, Hacı Mustafa seems to use 
economic reaction of the people to the tax collectors of the Porte as the base for his 
collaboration with İbrahim. Second, the letter accuses mütesellim’s men for their 
disrespectfulness to sharia and tells how “Muslims” gathered under the command of Hacı 
Mustafa against them. Since legitimacy of the sultan mainly depended on his role in 
dispensing justice through appointing just administrators respectful to sharia, the letter, 
actually, implies the sultan’s violation of social contract and thus legalizes the departure of 
Muslim subjects from the Ottoman rule. According to the letter, the people of the region 
decided to leave the [Ottoman] government and to ask İbrahim to provide them security and 
order. This statement perfectly reflects the message of Mehmed Ali and his son: Muslims 
now have an alternative administration other than the sultan’s ‘oppressive’ rule.  
Mehmed Ali had gained prestige among Muslim population of the region long before 
his Syria campaign. The sultan had relied on Mehmed Ali’s army in eliminating threat of 
Wahhabis. In other words, Mehmed Ali’s presence in Egypt made the neighboring Hijaz 
region more secure for the hajj journey. Besides, the hajj provided him with the socialization 
place where he met with many members of the Ottoman administration, especially of its 
religious institutions. As Mustafa Nuri Pasha points out, many sheikhs, upper-ranking ulema, 
and leading Ottoman bureaucrats made their hajj journey via Egypt where Mehmed Ali 
hosted them, exchanged the gifts, offered his patronage and discussed the state affairs.423 
Furthermore, Mehmed Ali published manifestos in Arab countries, especially at Mecca and 
Medina, stating that Sultan Mahmud imitated non-Muslims in his doings and was not fit for 
the Ottoman throne and for serving as caliph of the Muslims.424 Besides these propaganda 
activities, disunity within the Ottoman army affected the course of the campaign.  
As Levy points out, Ottoman forces in both 1832 and 1839 lacked of coordination 
between commanders as movements of different army corps in the field were totally 
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unrelated to each other.425 Among many reasons for the lack of harmony in 1832 was a 
personal rivalry between Serasker Husrev and Ahmed Fevzi Pasha, the commander of the 
guards. To the account of the French ambassador, these two commanders relentlessly 
countermanded each other; disputed each other’s instructions; discredited other’s efforts 
before the Sultan.426 Mahmud appointed Ahmet Fevzi, avowed enemy of Husrev, to the 
military commander of guards with the title of Ferik and with independent capacity of 
command to balance Husrev’s influence in the army as Levy states.427 Thus, the Guards 
became center of opposition to Husrev within the army and Ahmed’s resentment to the 
Husrev reached to the peak in June 1839 where he leaded to the Ottoman fleet to Egypt upon 
Husrev’s seizure of the rank of grand vizier.428 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to argue that all intra-elite contestations were disadvantage 
of the Ottoman army. In some cases, Mahmud II curbed Mehmed Ali’s influence by playing 
on such rivalries successfully as with the appointment of Mehmed Pasha. When Mehmed Ali 
started the Syrian Campaign, Mehmed Pasha was the governor of Rakka and Aleppo. As a 
protégé of Husrev Pasha, he did not give credence to propaganda activities of his patron’s 
nemesis. As a result, İbrahim faced with staunch resistance in Rakka and Aleppo under 
governorship of Mehmed Pasha when compared with the other regions of Syria under the 
influence of Emir Beshir, a supporter of his father.429 Having regard to loyalty of Mehmed 
Pasha to his protector, Sultan Mahmud appointed him as a commander of the Ottoman forces 
in February 1832.430 In the meantime, the reports of Hüseyin Ağa -commander of another 
army in Adana- was, however, suggesting that intra-elite alliances of Mehmed Ali would 
rebut all military efforts of the Porte. For instance Menemencioğlu, âyân of Adana region and 
supporter of Mehmed Ali, organized a defense against the Ottoman troops around Adana: His 
attacks did not only repulse Hüseyin Ağa to Ereğli but also demoralized his troops who were 
deeply frustrated by the resistance of “subjects of the sultan” against the soldiers of sultan.431 
When Hüseyin Ağa’s and Mehmed’s forces were defeated, Mahmud II sent another 
army under the command of another protégé of Husrev namely, the grand vizier Mehmed 
Reşid Pasha. In the Konya Battle (21 December 1832), İbrahim defeated the Sultan’s army 
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and captured his grand vizier.432 It appears that this battle led many people to ask that whose 
household is the strongest one within the Ottoman territories? Different answers given to this 
question seem to shape contesting politics of all parties. For İbrahim, his father’s household 
was stronger than that of Mahmud II. Therefore he asked his father for permission to march 
in Istanbul and to declare his independence.433 In the meantime, he tried to gain further 
support for his ambitious plan by applying to legitimizing tools such as fetwa. As Rood 
reveals, İbrahim obtained a fetwa questioning “If the imam of the Muslim oppressed the 
umma,is it legal to depose him? the answer was, “it is, on condition that the umma is 
composed of 12.000 men who are all in agreement.”434 As Rood explains, this number was 
the symbolic size of the Ottoman army sent against Mehmed Ali and defeated by him. At the 
end, İbrahim could not convince Reşid Mehmed to lead this army to Istanbul to dethrone 
Mahmud II.  
İbrahim, nevertheless, managed to transfer some officers in the Ottoman army into his 
military retinue. He offered three choices to the captured officers and soldiers: to return their 
countries via Alexandria; to join the Egyptian army; to attend one of the schools at Cairo.435 
For instance, Arif Beg, a captive officer of the Konya Battle, was appointed as colonel and 
commanded a new regiment created out captured soldiers at the same battle while other 
officers were appointed as lieutenants and captains over the soldiers who had captured 
them.436 Beside captured soldiers, nearly 500-600 Albanians in the army of Reşid Mehmed 
voluntarly joined İbrahim’s forces.437 The Porte, in return, became more suspicious about 
loyalty of Albanians along with the Bosnians in the Balkans and took measures to delay the 
arrival of the news of the Ottoman defeat to Rumelia.438 As these cases show, during and 
after the Syria campaign loyalty to the sultan was questioned by many people, including 
Mehmed Ali himself. For him, the Sultan’s household is still strongest household partly 
because of its European allies. As Fahmy points out, Mehmed Ali made great effort to remain 
within the Ottoman imperial system and asked officials in Istanbul to mediate for sultan’s 
forgiveness and for having his consent on legal title to the lands he had acquired by force 
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instead of raising the issue of independence.439 He, at the same time, tried to expand his 
influence over the sultan’s subjects.  
In sum, Mehmed Ali’s household seems to provide an alternative place for those who 
were one way or another, unsatisfied with the Ottoman administration and sought for the 
protection of another Muslim ruler. As with the Morea Campaign, non-Muslim subjects of 
the Sultan may gain support of Christian states. For the Muslim subjects, however, there was 
not any Muslim state whose power could and would contest with that of the sultan. For 
instance, one of the concurring themes in the Muslim imagination was the legendary image of 
the Crimean Khan who was believed to be the only savior that would rescue the Muslim 
subjects of the Ottoman Empire in case of troubles. Considering that this Khanate was under 
the Russian rule since the year of 1774, Mehmed Ali might have fulfilled the place of the 
khan for many Muslims. In similar way, Mustafa Nuri Pasha explains success of networking 
activities of Mehmed Ali –rooting mainly on gift-giving economy- as that many people began 
to believe that he was a gift of God and he would rescue the Crimean Khanate.440 For the 
restless Muslims vis-à-vis the Russian expansion, Mehmed Ali might be the only savior. For 
unpaid Albanian soldiers, he would pay better. For Hacı Mustafa, only Mehmed Ali would 
restore him to the seat of the tax collector of Kastamonu region since he was in the fermanlu 
position within the Sultan’s administration. For unsatisfied Muslim subjects, only Mehmed 
Ali might restore just rule of an Islamic administration. As we will touch upon below, Egypt 
would be the only place for Ahmed Fevzi Pasha to escape from the intrigues of Husrev 
Pasha. On the other hand, Mehmed Ali had initiated the Syria campaign on the pretext of 
6000 Egyptians for whom Syria had been the only alternative to the cruelty of his rule. Since 
the Syrian Campaign resulted in a wide scale power shift in most of Syria and Anatolia, it is 
now necessary to analyze its impact on the Porte’s politics.  
 
IV.2: The Sultan, Civil Bureaucrats and European Allies  
 
After the Konya Battle, Mahmud II accelerated his diplomatic relations to balance 
military success of Mehmed Ali. In essence, Mahmud had mainly relied on his army to 
suppress the thread of his rebellious vâli. Since both army and navy were mainly dominated 
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by Husrev’s protégés and that Husrev was the serasker of the Imperial army during the 
Syrian campaign, the Ottoman defeat at the Battle of Konya was, in one sense, Husrev’s 
household’s debacle against Mehmed Ali and his son İbrahim. This defeat led Mahmud II to 
give more importance to the European instructors and to establish a military academy in 
1834.441 These new measures gradually decreased Husrev’s influence within the army 
although he maintained the competition with other leading bureaucrats -including Pertev 
Pasha, protector of Mustafa Reşid- of the Ottoman administration.442 It was party these 
contestations which shaped the course of events in the period between the Konya Battle and 
the promulgation of Tanzimat Edict in 3 November 1839. A closer look to diplomatic 
relations of the Porte, European states and Egypt may help us to grasp changing power 
balance between Husrev’s faction and Mustafa Reşid.  
After the Konya Battle, İbrahim asked his father for his consent to advance into 
Anatolia and upon receiving the positive reply; he mobilized the army on 20 January and 
soon arrived to Kütahya.443 From there, İbrahim wrote a letter to the Porte, asking the 
Sultan’s permission to advance to Bursa in order to supply his army with provisions that 
alarmed Mahmud II to accelerate his diplomatic efforts.444  In the face of this threat, the Porte 
had first asked the help of Britain. Although British foreign secretary to the Porte of the time, 
Lord Palmerson, tried his best to convince the cabinet, his efforts remained inconclusive 
mainly because of Britain’s preoccupation with elections at home and problems in Belgium 
and Portugal.445 Unlike Britain, Russia was closely monitoring the advance of İbrahim’s 
army. As Shaw states, Czar Nicholas sided with the Porte against Mehmed Ali in order to 
prevent establishment of a strong Middle Eastern state which would resist to Russian 
penetration better than the Ottomans had been able to do.446 Upon the agreement on the 
Ottoman-Russian alliance, a Russian fleet anchored before Büyükdere on the Bosphorus and 
in May, Russian troops landed on the shores of Asia as allies of the Ottoman Empire that 
strengthened the Porte’s position vis-a-vis Mehmed Ali.447 After guaranteeing the Russian 
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support, the Porte gave impetus to the peace negotiations with Mehmed Ali, in which civil 
bureaucrats began to take more active role.  
Composition of the diplomatic envoy sent to Egypt captures the beginning of the 
changing power balance in the central administration of the Ottoman Empire: Halil Rifat 
Pasha, one of leading protégé of Husrev, was accompanied by Mustafa Reşid Bey (amedi-i 
hümayun) in January 1833 and they submitted two letters on behalf of their own offices –of 
seraskerlik and the Sublime Porte.448 As Lütfi Efendi states, the involvement of foreign states 
into Mehmed Ali question necessitated appointment a civil servant who has a good grasp of 
the European diplomacy (bu iş yalnız hidmet-i tahrîriyeye münhasır olmayıp Mısır ve 
Avrupa’nın ahvâliyle muâmelât-ı düvelliyeye vukufu olup).449After the early death of his 
father, Mustafa Reşid (1800-1858) grew up under the protection of his uncle Ispartalı Seyyid 
Pasha and following to his training at the scribal office, he took part in the Morea Campaign 
as the seal keeper of the commander-in-chief Seyyid Ali Pasha.450 Upon dismissal of his 
master, he was also forced to out of office according to the tradition of intisab but after a 
while he managed to find a position as an army clerk during the Ottoman-Russian War of 
1828 and then he served as scribe for the Ottoman delegation conducting peace negotiation 
with the Russians in Edirne.451 After then, two events seem to shape his career: his 
attachment to the circle of Pertev Pasha and his expertise in the Mehmed Ali crisis.His first 
mission in the Mehmed Ali crisis was to restore the relations of Sultan and Mehmed Ali after 
the Morea Campaign: In the summer of 1830, Mustafa Reşid had assisted his protector Pertev 
Pasha in the envoy sent to Egypt.452  
Since Pertev Pasha’s power relations had profound impact on the career of his disciple 
Mustafa Reşid, it may be necessary to give some biographic information about him. Pertev 
(1785-1837) rose in the central administration through the bureaus of the Sublime Port where 
he served first in the Office of the Imperial Divan, then in the corresponding secretariat 
(Mektubî) and the Receiver (Amedî) before serving as chief scribe (reisülküttâb) from 1827 to 
1830.453 His patron, Galib Pasha, was among the pro-British group within the reformist cadre 
of Selim III. Like his patron, Pertev adopted pro-British ideas about the foreign affairs and 
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established close relations with the British ambassador, John Ponsonby.454 As Zürcher 
suggests, this tradition may have influenced Mustafa Reşid’s pro-British politics as well.  
In January 1833, Mustafa Reşid accompanied Halil Rifat to Egypt for negotiations 
with Mehmed Ali.455 They informed Mehmed Ali about the sultan’s forgiveness for his 
former acts and invited him to obey his authority (tahtı itaata girmesi) and not to allow 
shedding further blood among Muslims.456 They tried to convince Mehmed Ali to accept the 
following demands:457 
-to decline his claims over Şam-ı Şerif and Aleppo and Adana 
-to send taxes of Sayda, Trablus-Şam, Jerusalem and Nablus, which he captured in the Syria 
Campain 
-to send the grand vizier Reşid Mehmed back to Istanbul  
-to return Ottoman war material and soldiers he had captured 
-to retreat his troops and to pay tribute of Egypt to the imperial treasury and not to mint 
further money in the minthouse of Egypt. 
-to replace sheriff Mehmed (one of supporter of Mehmed Ali) of Hijaz with Abdulmuttalib 
These demands show the Porte’s despair vis-à-vis Mehmed Ali crisis: the Syrian 
Campaign made the Sultan devoid of tax incomes of not only Egypt but also most of Adana 
and Syria under İbrahim’s occupation. Taxes of the other regions were canalized into the 
military operations. Besides it deeply challenged legitimacy of the Sultan in many ways. 
Hijaz region -one of the pillars of the sultanic legitimacy- was, now, under Mehmed Ali’s 
influence and grand vizier –the absolute deputy of the Sultan- was in the hand of İbrahim. 
Although Mehmed Ali adopted moderate stance in the negotiation, he informed Halil Rifat 
and Mustafa Reşid about the necessity of the consulting to his son before reaching the 
decision. When Mustafa Reşid returned to Istanbul, he firstly informed Husrev Pasha about 
the peace negotiation, and after visiting mabeyin together, they introduced the issue to the 
advisory council held in the Supreme Porte.458 In light of this information, it seems that 
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Husrev was still the most dominant figure of the central administration and even the 
bureaucrats of the Sublime Porte had to put him above their own offices. 
 After the issue was debated with the French and British ambassadors at the Supreme 
Porte, Mustafa Reşid was sent to Kütahya to make a peace settlement with İbrahim. In the 
meantime, France and Britain maintained to send their own representatives to Mehmed Ali. 
General Mouarviev, Russian envoy, arrived at Egypt a week before Halil Rifat and told 
Mehmed Ali that Russia would oppress him by force if he persisted in advance to Istanbul 
while French envoy sent his message of support to Mehmed Ali vis-à-vis the Porte.459 
Apparently, Mehmed Ali used disunity of European states in his attempts to present himself 
to the Porte as favorable vâli. According to Lütfi Efendi, he told Halil Rifat that “European 
powers approved and encouraged my independence but I did not give them credence because 
of my great loyalty [to the Porte]”.460 
 In May 1833, Mustafa Reşid and İbrahim signed the Kütahya Truce on the following 
conditions: Province of Egypt reinstated to Mehmed Ali in addition to Hijaz and Crete; 
İbrahim appointed as vâli of Syrian sub-provinces of Acre, Damascus, Tripoli, and Aleppo; 
İbrahim was named as muhassil of Adana.461 In his career, Mustafa Reşid was exposed to the 
danger of death in many times and the first one happened because of the Sultan discontent of 
this treaty: Mustafa Reşid recognized İbrahim claims over Damascus, Aleppo and tax 
collection right of Adana region without the consent of the Sultan. Upon informed about 
Reşid Mehmed’s decision, Mahmud II ordered him executed but then forgave his life thanks 
to the mediation of Darbhâne Nazırı Şehîd Ali Rızâ Efendi.462 After this event, Mustafa 
Reşid became very unpopular in Istanbul and next year he was sent to Paris as special envoy 
with the mission of regaining Algeria for the Porte.463 Nevertheless, Mahmud II was not the 
only person who was discontent with the Kütahya Truce. 
 The Kütahya Truce, as Fahmy illustrates, was an agreement neither Sultan nor 
Mehmed Ali put his signature; its terms were be renewed on the yearly basis and it obliged 
the latter to pay annual tribute to the Porte.464 In other words, the sanction power of the 
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Kütahya Truce was nothing but Mahmud II’s personal will to renew it. Fahmy states that 
Mehmed Ali was uneasy about the presence of Husrev as serasker in the capital and his 
proximity and easy access to the Sultan made Mahmud particularly susceptible to his 
intrigues.465 Mehmed Ali, therefore, put pressure on the Sultan by proposing that he would 
pay his tribute regularly along with a great part of demanded arrears in case of removal of 
Husrev from the councils.466 As Kutluoğlu states, Mehmed Ali, thus, took advantages of the 
rivalry between himself and Husrev while refraining from fulfilling his fiscal obligations to 
the Porte.467 
As mentioned before, the Russian military support played important role in the 
conclusion of Mehmed Ali crisis. After the Kütahya Truce, the Porte and its ally signed a 
mutual defense pact (Hünkâr İskelesi Treaty) on 8 July 1833. Since this treaty had profound 
impact over the power shift in both the Ottoman administration and in European diplomacy, 
it is necessary to detail its context and representatives of the Porte who signed it.The treaty 
consisted of six public articles and one secret article. The public articles announced the peace 
and friendship between Russia and the Porte and provided for mutual assistance in case of 
independence of either part was threatened.468 According to the secret article, the Porte would 
protect Russia against the attack from the south by closing Dardanelles to any foreign vessels 
of war in the event of armed contest.469 In the international level, the issue of the Straits 
alarmed European capitals for taking immediate measures against the growing influence of 
Russia over the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, diplomatic traffic of the Porte witnessed 
unprecedented growth which contributed the rise of civil bureaucracy, and in the following 
peace period of 1833 and 1839, influence of both Britain and Mustafa Reşid increased. 
Regarding the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi’s impact on Husrev’s power relation, he was 
one of three bureaucrats who signed it on behalf of the Porte. In fact, the Treaty was held in 
the residence of Husrev who with Âkif Pasha and Ahmet Fevzi Pasha* represented the Porte. 
In that time, Âkif Pasha was the chief scribe and his was in rivalry with Pertev who was 
steward to grand vizier Mehmed Emin Rauf Pasha**.470 As Findley states; because Mahmud 
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II tried to bend on controlling the government from the palace by replacing Reşid Mehmed 
with Mehmed Emin who was known with colorless character, the rivalry between Âkif and 
Pertev, bureaucrats of the two top posts at the Sublime Porte after the grand vizierate, 
affected bureaucracy at its highest level.471  
In the summer of 1836, British Ambassador Ponsonby demanded dismissal of Âkif 
Pasha on the ground of his maltreatment of W.Churchill, a British subject who was 
imprisoned for shooting an Ottoman boy while hunting.472 When Ponsonby caused the 
dismissal of Âkif Pasha from the post of foreign minister, Âkif-Pertev rivalry gained the form 
of polarization between pro-British and pro-Russian bureaucrats. Subsequently, the other two 
signers of the Russo-Ottoman treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi were also removed from the power: 
Husrev dismissed from the post of seraskerlik in January 1837 while Ahmed Fevzi lost his 
proximity to the sultan.473 As this event suggests, influence of European ambassadors to the 
Porte began to play determinant role in the intra-elite rivalries by the middle of 1830s. Owing 
much to his network, Âkif re-established his influence to the extent that he suggested 
changing title of his post (umur-ı mülkiye nazırı) to interior minister (dahiliye nazırı) in order 
to gain an equal position to his nemesis Pertev at the post of foreign minister (hariciye nazırı) 
and succeeded in it.474 After then, he began to put pressure on Mahmud II for making Pertev 
executed. In this showdown, support of Husrev seems to play important role. 
Regarding Husrev’s involvement with the Âkif-Pertev rivalry, Findley states that he 
initiated double intrigue: He tried to gain Pertev’s good will, in case the latter should 
somehow remain in power, while, at the same time, collaborated with associates at the palace 
and with Âkif to topple Pertev.475 To the report of Ponsonby, Serasker Halil Rifat and Husrev 
deceived Pertev for expressing his concerns about inability of the state to meet expense of 
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regular army and for supporting maintenance of a militia (redif).476 Damad Said Bey, another 
protégé of Husrev, told Pertev that Sultan Mahmud was of the same opinion about disbanding 
the regular troops but wanted to consult Pertev first. At the end, this intrigue concluded with 
the execution of Pertev when the Sultan was convinced that Pertev was an opponent to 
military reforms.477 
Levy, on the other hand, argues that Pertev’s opposition to the formation of further 
regular troops was not result of Husrev’s intrigue. To the author, Pertev deliberately tried to 
curb excessive power of military. In 1835, a special law equalized hierarchical order and 
gradation of honorific titles of military (seyfiyye) with that of administrative (kalemiye) and 
religious-judicial (ilmiye) branches of the state organization.478 Worse still, the military 
establishment outnumbered the religious and civil hierarchy and bureaucrats in the other 
department of the administration resented to Husrev for this trend.479 Levy associates Pertev’s 
opposition to the formation of new troops and his efforts in reduction its number with this 
resentment.480 Although they give different account about the role of Husrev’s intrigue, both 
author links the fall of Pertev with his opposition to the empowerment of army. All in all, 
Mahmud seemed to perceive Pertev as an obstacle for his military reforms while the latter 
was well aware of that rise of army means further influence of Husrev over the other 
branches of state apparatus.In light of this event, it might be argued that institutional 
modernization of the state apparatus intertwined with the intra-elite rivalries, which gained 
more complex form especially after the inclusion of the European ambassadors into the 
network of leading bureaucrats.  
 
IV.3: Mustafa Reşid and the Centralization Projects  
 
Execution of Pertev Pasha had profound impact on his disciples, including Mustafa 
Reşid. Therefore it is not surprising that Mustafa Reşid put both Âkif and Husrev on trial on 
the ground of their involvement in “bribery” just three years after the death of Pertev.481 In 
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these three years, Mustafa Reşid’s contributions to centralization projects enabled him to 
gather enough power to eliminate rivals of his the late protector. Regarding his rise in the 
administration, Cevdet Pasha states that: “When the Ottoman Empire was divided into two 
parts [during the second Syrian Campaign], the foreign minister Reşid Pasha overcame 
kölemen Mehmed Ali and forced him to put his sword back into its sheath, thus he rescued 
the state from this danger”.482 What is striking in his statement is that Cevdet Pasha attributes 
heroic roles of men of sword (seyfiyye) to Reşid Pasha while describing his diplomatic 
success through metaphor of sword and fight. In other words, Reşid seemed to take over the 
responsibility of Serasker Husrev in the Mehmed Ali crisis by conducting both reforms and 
diplomatic relations. 
After the Konya defeat, Mehmed Ali crisis led the Porte to attempt to replace 
households with western-style institutions. This was a reversal of the state-led empowerment 
of households since their all functions were gradually transferred to the newly-established 
institutions during the period. In the first chapter, we detailed how elite households assumed 
former functions of devshirme system, timar system and the palace school. In 1833-18341, 
the modernization projects tried to transferall these military, educational, fiscal, and 
administrative functions of the households to the western-style institutions. In this process, all 
the ties through which a head of household and his men established mutual-loyalty were 
weakened. Accordingly, main precept of household tradition, attachment to the persona of 
master, went through dramatic change and the sultan as the head of imperial household was 
not an exception. In this transformation period, Mustafa Reşid gained influence as the leading 
supporter of the centralization projects and then he used this influence in his attempt to 
eliminate households from the Ottoman politics. A closer look to the centralization project of 
the period may help to detail these shifts in relation with Husrev-Mehmed Ali rivalry.  
First, establishment of the military academy in 1834 reduced the influence of 
households -especially that of Husrev- within the army. Mehmed Namık Pasha, founding 
father of the officer’s school, met with M.Maison –commander of French forces replacing the 
Cihadiye Troops in Morea in 1828- and recounted the latter’s observations about the 
differences between Mehmed Ali’s army and that of the Porte to the Sultan.483 For him, lack 
of schools and the ignorance of senior and junior officers which consisted of son of 
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dignitaries and of the slaves of the viziers were main reason for the ill performance of the 
Ottoman troops when compared the Cihadiye Army of Mehmed Ali.484 This observation was, 
actually, suggesting the placement of household tradition with military colleges in gathering 
and training new officers. Despite Husrev’s objection on the ground of economy, School of 
Military Sciences (Mekteb-i Ulûm-u Harbiye) was established in the summer of 1834 and its 
battalion directly attached to Namık Pasha’s brigade of Guards and placed under the 
command of the Hâssa headquarters in order to evade Husrev’s interference.485 In the next 
step, Husrev was dismissed from the post of serasker in January 1837 and Halil Rifat 
replaced him. For Moltke, Husrev’s dismissal surprised people of Istanbul for many reasons:  
It was said that Damad Halil and Said are among the people whose 
intrigue resulted in the fall of Husrev. Damad Halil Pasha was former slave 
of Husrev and became son-in-law of the Sultan through his master 
mediation. Said Pasha recently married little daughter of the sultan, for 
which Husrev spend nearly half million thaler. Since Husrev was as strong as 
to make his thirty two slaves appointed as Pasha and governor of various 
provinces, the Sultan’s dare in dismissing him without the execution 
“kellesini koltuğunun altına verdirmeden” signifies a new development that 
was impossible in the past.486 
 
As Moltke narrates, Husrev formed very composite and extensive network covering 
many provincial governors, two damads of the sultan, and numerous high-ranking officers in 
the army. It seems that Mahmud attempted to reduce this extensive influence of Husrev 
through divide and rule policy in which he sided with Halil Rifat and Mehmed Said against 
their former patron. Considering that, many of Husrev’s protégés were in the high-rank 
positions of the army and they gained expertise for nearly 10 years; overall exclusion of his 
household might paralyze the ongoing centralization projects. Rather than taking such risk, 
Mahmud seemed to keep some of these people in their place as far as he could distance them 
from Husrev. This concern might also be the reason behind Mahmud’s avoidance of sending 
Husrev to death. After three years of his dismissal, Husrev was, for instance, appointed to the 
chairmanchief of Reform Committee (Meclis-i Vâlâ) and Engelhardt associates this 
appointment with Mustafa Reşid’s similar concern: He called Husrev to active duty in order 
                                                             
484  Ibid., p.32 
485  Ibid., p.33 
486  Moltke, Türkiye’deki Durum ve Olaylar, p.78 
  
103 
 
to use his influence over the provinces, thus making provincial reforms easily accepted by the 
locals.487 
Second, the foundation of officer’s school was followed by the educational reform for 
civil officials. In the departments of civil bureaucracy, master-apprentice relation had been 
the basis of training for the young scribes. New regulations eliminated the entry of 
apprentices into the rank of bureaucracy (with the exception of Translation Office) before the 
age of 18 and thus educational functions of the departments were gradually transferred to the 
imperial colleges.488 For the new candidates of the state offices, the School of Education 
(Mekteb-i Maarifi Adliye) and the School of Literary Education (Mekteb-i Ulum-ı  Edebiyye) 
were established, providing French, Arabic, history, political science, geography, and 
mathematic lessons.489 With the formation of these institutions, the role of the education 
given in the residence of leading bureaucrats and in the state offices began to decrease. 
Accordingly, the intermediary role of households in the access to the bureaucracy began to 
lose its former importance. Göçek analyzes the outcome of this shift as following: “As the 
sultan and his immediate palace household utilized western-style educational institutions to 
prepare a new social group with which to replace office-households and provincial 
households, they, in turn forced to relinquish their power to this new group of Ottoman 
bureaucratic bourgeoisie.”490 She adds that the education reforms and centralization attempt 
of Mahmud II did not only weaken the power of households but also changed the balance 
between the Palace and the graduates of the newly-established schools.491 In similar way, 
Findley associates these reforms with “the end of the age of households” in which adoption 
of salary system and abolition of annual appointment system reduced the dependent relation 
between the head of office-households and officials.492 Since these reforms developed in 
relation with Mehmed Ali crisis, it is now necessary to touch upon the impact of the Second 
Syrian Campaign (1839) over the centralization projects of the Porte.  
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IV.4: The Second Syrian Campaign  
 
One of the main reasons of the military reforms was to re-gain losses of the Kütahya 
Truce. Although Mahmud II was eager to initiate another campaign as early as 1834 British 
and Russian pressure dissuaded him. British Foreign Secretary Palmerston was opposing 
Mehmed Ali because of his alliance with the French but he discerned that it would be 
disastrous for Mahmud to attack before the military reforms had been given time to develop 
some real substance in the army.493 Therefore both the Ottomans and Palmerston searched for 
alternative solutions. Çelik’s study reveals that Gözlüklü Reşid Mehmed Beg’s –one of 
Husrev’s slave who was in France for the education- proposed a plan for the assassination of 
Mehmed Ali in the year of 1836.494 According to the intrigue, Reşid Beg will offer his service 
to Mehmed Ali by stating that the fall of his patron made it impossible for him to find an 
office in the Porte and if he receives a positive answer, he would go Egypt and then poison 
Mehmed Ali.495 When the Grand Vizer of the time, Mehmed Emin Rauf Pasha, asked 
Mahmud II for his opinion, the Sultan approved this assassination plan and instructed him to 
inform the Foreign Minister Mustafa Reşid if necessary.496 This plan, though not realized, 
may give an idea about the complexity of the Porte’s reaction to Mehmed Ali crisis: the Porte 
seemed to apply to every possible ways ranging from an assassination plan to the search for 
the support of European states. 
 Mustafa Reşid was informed about the details of this plan when he was in Britain. In 
the previous year (1835), he was in Paris to solve the Algerian Question. He served as 
ambassador of Paris until September 1836, then he was transferred to London and in July 
1837, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs with the rank of Vizier.497 In this period, 
Mustafa Reşid was concurrently Foreign Minister and Ambassador to Britain. As Findley 
recounts, Russian Ambassador Baron von Stürmer reported that Foreign Ministry in 1837 
existed nominally since its minister Mustafa Reşid was away from Istanbul, its 
undersecretary Nuri Efendi was in Paris and Beylikçi Sârım Efendi was en route to 
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London.498 In light of these, personal relations rather than corporate decision-making of the 
foreign ministry seem to shape the Ottoman diplomacy of the time. In this context, 
particularly collaboration of Palmerston and Mustafa Reşid seems to have profound impact 
on the course of Mehmed Ali crisis.  
 While introducing the main nemesis of Mehmed Ali, Fahmy says that it “was not 
Sultan Mahmud, not even Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary, but Mehmed 
Husrev Pasha”. What made Palmerston one of three men on this list was the contesting 
interests of Mehmed Ali and Britain. Palmerston, apart from his personal hostility, perceived 
Mehmed Ali as the main obstacle for the British interest in Asia, especially after the first 
Syrian Campaign, expanding his rule far beyond the borders of Egypt.499 According to 
Fahmy, the fear that Mehmed Ali’s expansion toward Asia would bring about an Egyptian-
Russian alliance led Parmerston to find a way of confining Mehmed Ali’s power into Egypt 
without, at the meantime, enhancing the influence of Russia in Istanbul or the French in 
Cairo.500 Because his government was unwilling to provide the Porte with military support, 
Palmerston tried to curb Mehmed Ali’s power through economic sanctions, such as the 
abolition of monopolies -the main financial source of the Egyptian army.501 In London, he 
closely collaborated with Mustafa Reşid in order to convince the sultan to realize this plan. 
Although Palmerston allied himself with Mustafa Reşid to expand his influence over the 
Porte, the latter had numerous rivals in Istanbul. According to Çelik, even Mustafa Reşid’s 
appointment to the embassy to London was the result of Âkif Pasha’s intrigue.502 
Mustafa Reşid dealt with the reform drafts covering the abolishment of müsadere, 
corvée (angarya), prohibition of bribery, and the implementation of a new taxation system in 
the pilot area of Hudavendigar and Gelibolu.503 Âkif Pasha and other opponents of reforms, 
convinced Mahmud II that these reforms would restrict his sultanic authority and they made 
Mustafa Reşid appointed to London in order to use his absence to end his influence.504 
Meanwhile, a new development alarmed the Porte to take immediate measures: On May 25, 
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1838, Mehmed Ali manifested his intention to establish himself an independent monarch to 
guarantee that his heirs would take over his post after his death.505 In the face of this threat, 
the Porte mobilized its army while Palmerston and Mustafa Reşid convinced the sultan to 
agree commercial treaty of Balta Limanı (August 1838), abolishing all monopolies 
throughout the Ottoman Empire.  
Besides, Husrev was recalled to active duty and thus he began to preside over the 
councils of Egypt crisis held in his residence.506 As usual, Mahmud II seemed to bring 
Husrev into the forefront to maintain his supreme position vis-à-vis Mehmed Ali. For me, this 
strategy was part and parcel of the Ottoman political culture, which provided the sultan and 
his bureaucrats with a theatre stage to conduct their interactions on a legitimate ground. 
Moltke, for instance, describes the positions of Mahmud II and Mehmed Ali in the period of 
two Syria Campaigns as following:  “they were just two equal wrestlers giving an illusion of 
inactivity although they were in a struggle with full force”.507 Mahmud II seems to try to 
reverse this image by presenting Mehmed Ali’s challenge as an intra-elite rivalry between his 
two bureaucrats. I am not saying that Husrev-Mehmed Ali contestation was totally 
constructed/imagined. As detailed throughout this thesis, Selim III and Mahmud II splitted 
the bureaucrats into rival factions and played them off against each other. Thus they aimed to 
maintain their supreme positions by preventing overly empowerment of a certain bureaucrat. 
Mahmud II, for instance, balanced the power of Mehmed Ali in the Morea Campaign by 
appointing his nemesis Husrev as the grand admiral as did he to balance influence of the 
latter in the Mansure Army by appointing Ahmed Fevzi to the commands of guards. 
Although this policy helped the sultans to maintain their central position in the Ottoman 
imperial structure, the intra-elite rivalries paralyzed the running of all state affairs. For 
instance, one of the main reasons behind İbrahim’s advance was intra-elite contestations in 
the army, which rendered well-coordination of the commanders impossible. As we will detail 
below, Abdülmecid, the successor of Mahmud II, and the leading bureaucrats of his time 
acknowledged that the unique solution of Mehmed Ali crisis was to urgently conduct reforms 
in the harmony/unity especially after the military defeat at the Nezib Battle.  
Unlike the first Syria Campaign, all European powers were closely monitoring the-
Porte-Mehmed Ali tension in 1839. Because they were against an armed conflict, the Porte 
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tried to evade Mehmed Ali’s threat by stimulating a general uprising among the population of 
Syria under the rule of İbrahim.508 Meanwhile, the Ottoman army under the command of 
Hâfız Pasha was stationed at eastern Anatolia and the reconnaissance troops collected 
information about İbrahim’s army. According to the reports of the Ottoman officers and the 
British consul of Bagdad, Mehmed Ali was gathering new soldiers to capture the Basra 
region.509 Worse still, Ali Rızâ Pasha, governor of Bagdad, reported that Mehmed Ali’s 
military activity stimulated Iran to plan an attack to the border region across Bagdad and he 
asked the Porte to send reinforcements.510 Subsequently, the European powers decided to 
arrange a meeting to discuss Mehmed Ali crisis while the Porte accelerated its war 
preparations. Apparently, the Porte maintained its diplomatic relations with the 
representatives of Britain, France, Russia, Austria and Prussia while, at the same time, 
attempting to solve Mehmed Ali cirisis on its own by mobilizing its troops in secrecy.511 It is 
also important to note that the Porte made a great effort to conduct this war effort within the 
framework of new reforms as with the mission of İzzet Efendi. 
For the fortification of Konya, the Porte sent necessary money to Hacı Ali Pasha, 
governor of the city, and then dispatched Hacı İzzet Efendi to inspect the preparations and to 
inform Hafız Pasha about the propaganda activities in the Cebel-i Lübnân region.512 The 
Porte used its central treasury to cover the expenditures of this mission and instructed Hacı 
İzzet not to impose any extra taxes of the old order (usûl-i atîka üzere şuradan buradan 
alınan akçe ve hediyye) over the subject people.513 As this case implies, the Porte attempted 
to bring the interactions of its agents with the subject people into the line of new reforms 
during the Second Syrian Campaign. There were various reasons for this changing 
governmentality. As mentioned above, the Porte’s main goal was to solve the Mehmed Ali 
crisis without the European intervention. To be able to realize this plan, the Ottoman 
administration had to win support of the society for reforms and for the struggle against 
Mehmed Ali. The new adjustment made for Friday sermons may help to grasp this point:  
Normally, Friday prayer sermons had been exclusively religious 
guidance speeches given in Arabic language which was not understandable 
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by most of the Turkish speaking people…Sheihk efendis delivering these 
speeches are now instructed to translate sermons into Turkish containing 
now religious, worldly and mystic advices fitting the period that they live in, 
and leading people to beneficent calls of the sultanate. It is such a great 
service and tradition, to announce imperial declarations to the public through 
the proper language considering all people from any walk of life, especially 
when it comes to fight against enemies of Islam.514 
 
Judging by this adjustment it seems that the Porte acknowledged inefficiency of its army in 
eliminating the threat of Mehmed Ali and began to consider the possibility of waging a total 
war. In order to be able to mobilize the subject people in such war, the Porte should firstly 
conflate the interest of the subject people with that of empire.In other words, the Ottoman 
administration should eliminate arbitrary treatments of its agents to the subject people to form 
a common front. Actually, this was an attempt to make a peace settlement with its subject 
people. As we will detail in the context of the Tanzimat Edict and the following reforms, the 
Porte admitted these arbitrary treatments by defining them as ‘usûl-i zulmiyye’. It is also 
important to note that the Porte could not materialize this total war as a pitched battle at 
Nezib but as the empowerment of the empire by implementation of reforms with the growing 
participation of the subject people and with the well-coordination of bureaucrats.In April 
1839, Hafız Pasha advanced toward Aleppo to instigate a general revolt against İbrahim but 
could not win the support of locals. As Shaw states, Mehmed Ali established so effective 
civil and military bureaucracy in Syria that enabled him to rebut the Porte’s propaganda 
activities.515 Two months later, İbrahim’s troops defeated the Ottoman army at Nezib (June 
24, 1839). This defeat was followed by a political turmoil: On 30 June, Mahmud II died and 
Husrev staged a coup d’etat in the accession ceremony of Abdülmecid. 
 
IV.5: Coup d’etat of Husrev Pasha and the Promulgation of the Tanzimat 
 
After seizing the seal of authority of grand vizier from the hands of Mehmed Emin 
Rauf Pasha, Husrev appointed himself as the grand vizier and placed his men to the key 
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positions, restored Halil Rifat to the post of serasker.516 This coup d’etat deteriorated 
Mehmed Ali crisis in many ways. Above all, Grand Admiral Ahmed Fevzi, nicknamed traitor 
(hain/firari), handed the Ottoman fleet to Mehmed Ali. According to rumor, towards the end 
of the reign of Mahmud II, Husrev along with some bureaucrats tried to depose the Sultan, 
who suffered an incurable illness, in favor of Abdülmecid.517 A group led by Ahmed Fevzi 
tried to save the Sultan by killing Abdülmecid.518 When Abdülmecid, Husrev and his protégé 
Halil Rifat came to power, Ahmed Fevzi escaped to Egypt to save his life. As might be 
expected, Ahmed Fevzi’s statement was quite different: the fear that Husrev, the main 
nemesis of Mehmed Ali, might use his new power to turn the fleet over Russia in preparation 
of joint attack drove him to do so.519 When Ahmed Fevzi encountered the French fleet, on his 
way to Egypt, he even told the French captain that Sultan Mahmud had been murdered by 
Husrev and Halil Rifat Pashas, who were planning to surrender the Ottoman Empire into the 
hands of Russian.520 Husrev, in return, sent letters to senior officers in the Ahmed Fevzi’s 
fleet, in which he asked them to arrest Ahmed Fevzi and to return the fleet to Istanbul.521 
When Mehmed Ali was informed about these correspondences, he sent two letters (on 27 
June and on 16 August, 1840) directly to Husrev, calling upon him to resign his office and 
retire to private life.522  
In the first letter, Mehmed Ali used the case of Ahmed Fevzi in his attempt to present 
Husrev as the main responsible for the ongoing crisis. Accordingly, he stated that the lack of 
security (emniyyetsizlik) in the Ottoman administration, resulting from the presence of 
Husrev, was the main reason which led many officers and leading bureaucrats to jointly 
decide to bring the fleet to Egypt.523 Then, he emphasized that these people -like he himself- 
were not opposing or revolting to the Ottoman state but they were expressing their discontent 
to Husrev.524 He went on by stating that Husrev’s resignation would be beneficent for both 
the Ottoman Empire and Muslims.525 In the second letter, Mehmed Ali especially complained 
about Husrev’s treatment putting him in the place of a foreigner by ignoring his successful 
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efforts for the well-being of the Ottoman state and Muslims.526 As Kutluoğlu states, Mehmed 
Ali used the issue of the Ottoman fleet as a bargaining chip in order to convince the Porte to 
recognize his hereditary rule over the territories under his administration and to occasion the 
removal of Husrev.527 Thus, the rivalry of Mehmed Ali and Husrev, once again, complicated 
the Egyptian problem and brought deadlock to the negotiations between the Porte and 
Mehmed Ali.528 
In these turbulent times, Mustafa Reşid was in Britain. After he was informed about 
the death of Mahmud and the following coup of Husrev, he wrote his concerns to Palmerston. 
In his letter, Mustafa Reşid emphasized the importance of establishing a new system (un 
système immuablement établi) rooting on immutable/unchangeable principles.529 According 
to Mustafa Reşid, there were close links between the replacement of person-based rule with 
this system; confinement of autocracy; growing loyalty of people to state; their support to 
reforms; and the resurge of the Ottoman Empire.530 When Mustafa Reşid returned to Istanbul 
to pay homage to the new sultan, he realized once again that overly personalized Ottoman 
politics was not only threatening the empire but also his own life. According to Mehmed 
Galib, Husrev reminded Abdülmecid that Sultan Mahmud had ordered the execution of 
Mustafa Reşid and advised him to fulfill his father’s will but could not convince the new 
sultan.531 Besides, Mustafa Reşid’s protector, Pertev Pasha, was executed just two years ago 
and Husrev’s coup d’état led some bureaucrats to think that their lives would end in the same 
way. Having connected to each other, the defeat at Nezib Battle, the death of Mahmud, coup 
d’état of Husrev, the growing aggression of Mehmed Ali, Ahmed Fevzi’s surrendering of the 
imperial navy to Egypt, drove the Ottomans into a great pessimism.532 It was this state of 
crisis which united formerly contesting bureaucrats on the common cause that they could 
save their own lives and that of the Ottoman Empire by urgently solving Mehmed Ali crisis.  
Regarding this issue, Ahmed Cevdet states that even those bureaucrats who were not 
content with the reforms gave consent to the promulgation of the Tanzimat in order to solve 
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Mehmed Ali crisis.533 Thus, on 3 November 1839, the Foreign Minister Mustafa Reşid could 
proclaim the Tanzimat Edict (Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu) promising the establishment of new 
institutions that would guarantee the sultan’s subjects’ security of life, honor, and property; 
form a regular system to asses and levy taxes, and to develop new methods to assure a fair 
system of military service. This edict was, actually, embodiment of what Mustafa Reşid 
called as ‘un système immuablement établi’. In similar way, Lütfi Efendi depicts the outcome 
of Tanzimat Edict as the subjection of the Ottoman Empire to law (Tanzîmât-ı Hayriyye 
âdetâ Devlet-i Aliyye’yi bir kanun-ı cedîde rabt u tesvîk eylemiştir).534  
Because the threatening state of Mehmed Ali’s issue and the crisis atmosphere 
prevalent in the Porte opened a path for the promulgation of Tanzimat, the edict primarily 
focused on the issue of security. The edict, for instance, associated the escape of Ahmed 
Fevzi with the lack of security.535 In order to protect the bureaucrats and the running of state 
affairs from the danger of intra-elite rivalries, the consultancy tradition (meşveret) was 
institutionalized. First, the Council of Judicial Ordinances (Meclis-ı Ahkâm-ı Adliye) was 
made the sole consultative and legislative body, supplanting the Council of the Porte.536 
Second, the rule of unanimity voting was adopted and the bureaucrats were supposed to 
pledge loyalty to the decisions of the council. Regarding the capital punishment, it was 
announced that “until the pleas of the criminal are examined and adjudged publicly, in 
accordance with the laws of the sharia, no one shall be executed, secretly or publicly.537  
For the security of subject people, the edict promised to replace the tax-farming 
system with new system in which tax-payers were assigned to pay suitable tax according their 
ability and possessions. While explaining the necessity of this shift, the edict associated 
oppression of old order with mütesellims. Like the letter of Tahmisçioğlu, the Tanzimat Edict 
condemned mütesellims in the strongest possible terms (“pençe-ü cebr ü”, cemî-ı harekât ü 
sekanâtı gadr u zulmden”) and stated how tax-farming system resulted in the concentration of 
political and economic power at the hands of such oppressors in detrimental way to the 
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subject people.538 Considering that İbrahim was the mütesellim of Adana region at that time, 
the Edict might have aimed to illegitimate his position in the eyes of subject people. After 
emphasizing the link between the just rule and patriotism of people, the edict stated that “if 
property is fully secure, then, the individual would care for his own affairs and his zeal for 
state and millet and love of motherland will increase daily…”539 Then it made promises for 
regulation of military services and abolishment of bribery through the expansion of salary 
system to all bureaucrats and stated that these new regulations would cover all subject of the 
Empire. 
We may now question to which degree Tanzimat edict altered the power relations 
between the sultan, bureaucrats, and subject people. The power of the sultan over the 
property, the life and death of bureaucrats were transferred to the Council of Judicial 
Ordinances that marks a rupture from kul system. Thus, the bureaucrats gained more secure 
position vis-à-vis sultan but, at the same time, their control over the imperial tax sources were 
also reduced through the abolishment ofthe tax-farming system. It is also important to note 
that high-ranking bureaucrats and vâlis began to receive salary equivalent to their former 
wealth they had generated from the tax-farming system. As Kırlı points out, the fear that the 
cutting off salaries would alienate these bureaucrats to the reforms led the administration to 
adopt this policy.540 The change was that the gift-giving economy was included into the 
framework of bribery and centrally appointed muhassıls began to collect taxes directly.541 
Although deficiencies in muhassıllık system forced the central administration to return to old 
system within two years, high-ranking bureaucrats began to loose their connections with local 
power focii.542  
Apart from the implementation of reforms, the Porte maintained its diplomatic 
relations with European powers vis-à-vis the challenge of Mehmed Ali. After the removal of 
Husrev from the post of grand vizier in May 1840, Mehmed Ali and his French alliances also 
accelerated the diplomatic negotiations with the Porte in order to convince the Ottomans to 
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settle the peace without the involvement of the other Powers.543 In the end, the Porte resolved 
Mehmed Ali crisis with the joint intervention of European states. On 12 July 1840, 
representatives of the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Britain, Prussia, and Austria signed the 
London Agreement: Europeans agreed to support the Porte against Mehmed Ali in return for 
its agreement to close the Straits to battleships in war and peace.544 Soon after the agreement, 
they gave Mehmed Ali an ultimatum to withdraw from Syria, Adana, Crete and Arabia and 
forced him to deal with the sultan. According to the Imperial edict of 1 June 1841, the sultan 
named Mehmed Ali as governor of Egypt for life and recognized hereditary rights of his male 
descendants in return his reduction the size of Egypt army to 18.000 in war times and obliged 
him to execute treaties signed between the Porte and the European powers in Egypt.545 
This final settlement of Egyptian crisis marks the beginning of the new era for many 
reasons and Cevdet Pasha perfectly depicts them. First, he narrates how the rivalry of 
Mehmed Ali with Husrev Mehmed lost its importance in the former’s negotiations with the 
Porte: Mehmed Ali now tried to make the amount of tribute of Egypt reduced by offering a 
bribe Mustafa Reşid.546 As detailed, internalization of Mehmed Ali crisis contributed to the 
rise of civil bureaucracy in the Ottoman administration, which would dominate over the 
Ottoman politics until the reign of Abdülhamid II. In this Tanzimat era, Mehmed Emin Âli 
and Keçecizade Mehmed Fuad -disciples of Mustafa Reşid- with other leading reformists 
tried to expand reforms in order to bring all branches of the governmental apparatus into 
more centralized and professionalized line.547 Was this end of the influence of household 
tradition and intra-elite contestations over the Ottoman politics? Many Tanzimat bureaucrats, 
although they were associated with reform, rationalization and rule of law, were actually 
patron pashas who were frequently criticized for their arbitrary decision and favoritism, as 
Riedler states.548 Ironically enough, Cevdet Pasha criticizes Âli Pasha for not to train 
personel, namely not to be patron for new candidates of the scibal offices.549 Considering that 
Cevdet Pasha himself was one of the leading Tanzimat bureaucrats, his criticis perfecty 
captures how deeply household and patronage tradition entagled in the political culture of 
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reformers. This seems also true for Midhad Pasha, another leading Tanzimat reformer, who 
mainly relied on the members of his own household while practititoning reforms.550 
Furthermore, the composition of Midhad Pasha’s household suggests that some former 
protégés of Husrev and their relatives included themselves into the Tanzimat bureaucracy: 
İbrahim Edhem’s son Osman Hamdi was in the retinue of Midhad Pasha.551 This leads us to 
question careers pattern of Husrev’s other protégés after the resolution of Mehmed Ali crisis. 
As mentioned before, the relation of Husrev with his leading protégés Halil Rifat and 
Mehmed Said began to deteriorate in 1837. Although Husrev lost his power upon his 
dismissal from the post of grand vizier in 1840, and his following trial -prohibiting his 
contact with other bureaucrats- Mehmed Said and Halil Rifat seemed to remain in power 
through their intimate connections with the palace.552 In the following years, Mahmud 
Celaleddin, the son of Halil Rifat also became a damad of the dynastic family and his son 
Prince Sabahaddin played active political role in the movement of Jeune Turks.553  
Regarding the relation of Mehmed Ali and the Porte, the resolution of Egypt question 
opened a new era for the growing traffic between Cairo and Istanbul. In this framework, 
Cevdet Pasha narrates how the consumption habits of relatives of Mehmed Ali were imitated 
by some bureaucrats of the Porte.554 Cevdet Pasha, then, touches upon the importance of 
external borrowing which enabled these bureaucrats to compete with the luxurious lifestyle of 
the Egyptians in the Tanzimat era.555 This new phenomenon, the external borrowing, seemed 
to provide the Tanzimat bureaucrats with an alternative source of wealth other than the 
provincial revenue sources. In this framework, the impact of the Egypt crisis over the 
growing political and financial dependency of the Tanzimat bureaucrats to the European 
powers and its repercussions in their relations with the society need further investigation, 
beyond the scope of this thesis. Lastly, the growing traffic between Cairo and İstanbul may 
be traced in the inclusion of Mehmed Ali’s grandson Mustafa Fazıl Pasha (1829-1875) into 
the Ottoman central administration: He assumed important tasks in the financial affairs of the 
Porte until his dismissal upon his opposition to the financial policies of Fuad Pasha in 
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1866.556 After this struggle and the alteration of Egyptian succession rule in favor of his 
brother’s son, he went to Paris where he maintained his criticism of the Porte claiming he was 
the head of a large party called Young Turkey (la Jeune Turquie).557 It is also important to 
note that in the alteration of Egyptian succession in 1867, the Porte conferred the title of 
khedive on the heirs of Mehmed Ali Pasha.558 In sum, the household of Mehmed Ali 
maintained its existence as the Khediviate of Egpyt while the household of Husrev Mehmed 
was scattered upon his death although some of his protégés managed to keep their influential 
positions in the Ottoman administration. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis examined the rivalry between Husrev Mehmed Pasha and Mehmed Ali 
Pasha within the framework of household. After they became the members of the imperial 
household with the mediation of their masters, they built their own households through which 
they did not only interact among each other but with the different segments of the Ottoman 
Empire. That is why I analyzed their interaction at the juncture of these intertwined power 
relations. Accordingly, the first chapter of this thesis focused on the household strategies of 
the sultan as macro sphere of the Ottoman intra-elite relations and detailed how the sultan 
organized their power relations through the distribute policy rooting on the division of tax-
payer subject people and tax-exempted kuls. The chapter, then analyzed the conditions which 
paved the way the rise of ruling-elite households in this distributive policy and concluded that 
with the gradual replacement of timar system with tax-farming system, they began to assume 
functions of timar system, devşirme system and palace schools. Since these institutions 
helped to the sultan in attaching their servants to their persona, the rise of ruling elite 
household was, in one sense, re-personalization of the Ottoman administration.  
The second chapter of this thesis traced how this personalization produced rivalries 
and factionalism among the households of the Ottoman bureaucrats and patronage networks 
by analyzing the contestation of Husrev Mehmed and Mehmed Ali over the governorship of 
the province of Egypt. The events in this chapter suggested that Selim III divided the 
bureaucrats into rival factions and played them off against each other. Thus he maintained his 
supreme position by attempting to prevent overly empowerment of a certain bureaucrat 
despite of the devastative impacts of this policy over the war efforts. In another words, the 
sultan’s servants went through two-folded alienation: alienation from the rest of society as 
detailed in the chapter I, and alienation from each other through balance policy of the sultans. 
Second, this chapter detailed the impact of the master’s power relations over the household-
building strategies of their members. Because the household was main unit of interaction for 
the Ottomans, socialization culture of the head of households left a deep imprint on their 
members. Mehmed Ali, for instance, relied on his family members as did his protector and 
uncle Tosun Ağa while Husrev Mehmed, similarly, emulated his master Küçük Hüseyin 
Pasha in finding new trustees through slavery. This chapter then stressed on the interaction of 
Husrev Mehmed and Mehmed Ali with the composite power networks in Egypt and touched 
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upon the importance of intra-household alliances in the latter’s success in taking the control 
of Cairo. Regarding the expansion of his control over entire Egypt, the last part of this 
chapter touched upon how he benefited from the French colonial administration, Mamluk 
household tradition, Selim III’s military reforms, and kinship ties.  
The third chapter covered the interaction of Husrev Mehmed and Mehmed Ali within 
the period of the Greek Revolt and the First Syria Campaign. Having connected each other, 
the Greek Revolt, the successful modernization projects of Mehmed Ali especially in army, 
the abolishment of janissaries and the formation of Mansure Army determined the general 
framework of their interaction. In this dialectic process, the Greek Revolt and empowerment 
of Mehmed Ali become the main driving force for the military modernization of Mahmud II. 
In order to be able to conduct this project, the sultan increased his economic and political 
pressure over the society. In this process, Husrev accumulated significant power in his hands 
in the capacity of serasker of Mansure Army and as the head guard of Istanbul. Mehmed Ali, 
in his part, dealt with the ways to expand his power over the hinterland of Egypt. In the first 
place, he tried to convince Mahmud II to give consent to his expansion to Syria -by sending 
his troops to the Morea Campaign. That Mahmud II did not fulfill Mehmed Ali’s expectation 
and he lost his fleet at Navarino opened a new era: Mehmed Ali initiated the first Syria 
Campaign.  
The last chapter dealt with the changing power balance between Mehmed Ali, Husrev 
Mehmed, and the sultan and its transformative impact over the Ottoman administration and 
society from the beginning of the First Syria Campaign to the London Agreement of 1840. 
The First Syria Campaign both revealed and manipulated the discontent of subject people and 
bureaucrats of the Ottoman Empire to the Mahmud’s way of rule. The military superiority of 
the Egypt army was not the only reason behind İbrahim’s rapid advance in Syria and Adana 
regions:  Mehmed Ali managed to gain the support of different segments of the Ottoman 
society for many reasons. Especially after the defeat of Konya Battle and the Porte’s call the 
help of a Christian state against Mehmed Ali made legitimacy of the Ottoman administration 
more suspicious for many people. Mahmud II had associated the survival of the empire with 
the formation of modern army. Idealization of this army was coupled with stigmatization of 
janissaries; persecution of pro-janissaries intensified political control over society; Husrev 
gained an extensive power as the serasker of the new army; expenditures of the new army 
resulted in the imposition of heavy taxes; upon the failure of this new army against a Muslim 
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vâli the Porte asked the help of Russia. This chapter then detailed how Mehmed Ali tried to 
win the heart of people who one way or another blamed Mahmud II and Husrev for all these 
events and the resulting vicinity circle in which growing pro-Mehmed Ali tendency drove 
Mahmud II to adopt more exclusive policy. 
Then, second part of the chapter presented the rise of the civil bureaucracy and the 
British influence over the Ottoman politics after the Konya Battle and Hünkâr İskelesi Treaty. 
This power shift was followed by the expansion of reforms and the establishment of imperial 
colleges that weakened the mediatory role of households in the access to the state offices. 
Lastly, I detailed how the defeat at the Second Syria Campaign and following political 
turmoil –including coup d’etat of Husrev- led to the leading bureaucrats to reach a consensus 
on the implementation of Tanzimat reforms urgently. As Tanzimat edict and the following 
laws suggest, the survival of the Ottoman Empire was now associated with the 
implementation of reforms. In this process, Husrev lost his former influence in favor of 
Mustafa Reşid and other civil bureaucrats who contributed to the resolution of the Egyption 
Question through the intense diplomatic negotiations with the European Powers.   
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